From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Sun Apr 24 2005 - 20:48:19 BST
Mark --
Of course I meant to write *a priori* rather than *a posteriori* when
referring to the empiricist's rejection of intuitive knowledge. But, since
you have provided a source for the original text, let's examine what Hume is
really saying in his Dialogues, Pt. II.
Here is the analogy as Philo presents it to his dialectical companions Demea
and Cleanthes, followed by his conclusions:
"If we see a house, Cleanthes, we conclude, with the greatest certainty,
that it had an architect or builder; because this is precisely that species
of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause.
But surely you will not affirm, that the universe bears such a resemblance
to a house that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or
that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude is so
striking, that the utmost you can here pretend to is a guess, a conjecture,
a presumption concerning a similar cause; and how that pretension will be
received in the world, I leave you to consider.
"Good God! cried Demea, interrupting him, where are we? Zealous defenders of
religion allow, that the proofs of a Deity fall short of perfect evidence!
...
"It would surely be very ill received, replied Cleanthes; and I should be
deservedly blamed and detested, did I allow, that the proofs of a Deity
amounted to no more than a guess or conjecture. But is the whole adjustment
of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a resemblance? The
economy of final causes? The order, proportion, and arrangement of every
part? Steps of a stair are plainly contrived, that human legs may use them
in mounting; and this inference is certain and infallible. Human legs are
also contrived for walking and mounting; and this inference, I allow, is not
altogether so certain, because of the dissimilarity which you remark; but
does it, therefore, deserve the name only of presumption or conjecture?
"Were a man to abstract from every thing which he knows or has seen, he
would be altogether incapable, merely from his own ideas, to determine what
kind of scene the universe must be, or to give the preference to one state
or situation of things above another. For as nothing which he clearly
conceives could be esteemed impossible or implying a contradiction, every
chimera of his fancy would be upon an equal footing; nor could he assign any
just reason why he adheres to one idea or system, and rejects the others
which are equally possible.
"Again; after he opens his eyes, and contemplates the world as it really is,
it would be impossible for him at first to assign the cause of any one
event, much less of the whole of things, or of the universe. He might set
his fancy a rambling; and she might bring him in an infinite variety of
reports and representations. These would all be possible; but being all
equally possible, he would never of himself give a satisfactory account for
his preferring one of them to the rest. Experience alone can point out to
him the true cause of any phenomenon."
Now IMO, all that Hume has achieved here is to demonstrate that we do not
have perfect proof of a Designer. He has not disproved the proposition.
Despite Demea's protest that the analogy "falls short of perfect evidence",
I don't think you can reasonably deny that this house analogy and Paley's
watchmaker analogy both provide evidence that a Creator is more probable
than no Creator. That perfect proof is lacking should not surprise anyone,
least of all the philosopher, who wouldn't be able to justify his calling if
the facts were otherwise."
msh says:
> A careful reader of the dialogues will discern no less than six
> objections to the Design Argument. Since any one of them is
> sufficient to put the Design Argument on ice, I'll spare you an
> analyis of all six. Here are the four I find most interesting,
> though I will be happy to discuss the other two if you so desire:
>
> 1) The analogy between the universe and man-made items is very weak.
>
> For an analogy to be convincing, there must be
> substantial similarity between the analogy's object and target.
Why then didn't Hume suggest an analogy that had good similarly, such as the
watchmaker's story, instead of setting up a strawman that he could so easily
knock down? A bit one-sided, wouldn't you say?
If we were conscious of a chaotic universe, a cause would still be implied;
the fact that we are conscious of an intelligently designed universe is
evidence that the cause is "intentional" rather than incidental or random in
Nature.
> 2) - Analogies to the the origin of the universe are meaningless,
> since the "creation" would be a single, unprecedented, and in fact
> unique event.
>
> We have only one universe. Analogies are meaningful only when we can
> compare and contrast a variety of objects or ideas. It is both
> meaningful and useful to compare the attributes of humans,
> sunflowers, tides and watches, but to what do we compare the
> universe?
We can "describe" the universe in the same way that we can describe a house
or a watch. Descriptions can be comparisons in that sense. When they
include principles or features that suggest purpose or intent, they infer an
intelligent designer.
> 3) Intelligence is not the only active cause in the world.
I agree, but I don't see this an objection to the ID argument.
> 4) Even if signs of intelligence are everywhere, it does not follow
> that intelligence created the universe.
This only works as an objection if the intelligence "seen everywhere" is
regarded as primary evidence. Of course the evidence can not be primary
because someone had to design it. So this is an argument from a false
premise -- which may explain why it is your "favorite" .
Ham (previously):
> I find Paley's "Watchmaker" argument a far more convincing defense
> for ID.
> msh says:
> I have no doubt that Paley's argument is effectively used by ID
> proponents in convincing ID enthusiasts that their desired belief is
> logically sound. Of course, the argument has NO effect on anyone who
> has actually read, and is capable of understanding, Hume's
> criticisms.
You're really impressed with Hume's criticisms, aren't you?
Ham said (earlier):
> I make the claim that Essence [e.g., God] "is", without the
> contingency of either "being" or "existing". From a rational perspective,
you'll
> tell me that makes no sense. But who says that ultimate reality must
> conform to man's reason?
>
> msh says:
> You are the one who claims that Paley's analogy, a rational argument,
> supports the notion of an intelligent creator of the universe, so you
> obviously believe that reality conforms to man's reason.
That is a non sequitor. A rational argument can support a proposition (A)
without having to support the rationality of a proposition (B). It does not
follow that reality must conform to man's reason simply because there is
rational evidence of a creator.
Thank YOU, Mark
Ham
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