From: ian glendinning (psybertron@gmail.com)
Date: Mon Apr 25 2005 - 04:35:36 BST
Ham,
You said (again)
That is a non sequitor. A rational argument can support a proposition
(A) without having to support the rationality of a proposition (B). It
does not follow that reality must conform to man's reason simply
because there is rational evidence of a creator.
I say.
Rational argument doesn't have to follow syllogistic logic, full stop.
I've pointed out before, and you seem to have missed, that the
corollary of that last sentence is not just a non-sequitor, but
totally meaningless. If we forget the cause / effect implications of
the two halves of your statement for a moment ... and look at just one
assertion ...
"Reality [need] not conform to man's reason"
Forget the second half of your statement for just a minute, and as a
man (presumably) just think about that assertion.
[Pause for thought experiment.]
Man's reason is the moveable feast, not reality.
Of course reality doesn't "conform" to man's reason for any cause at
all - "because the sky is pink" makes about as much sense.
Man's reason must conform to reality, is more like it.
Ian
On 4/25/05, hampday@earthlink.net <hampday@earthlink.net> wrote:
> Mark --
>
> Of course I meant to write *a priori* rather than *a posteriori* when
> referring to the empiricist's rejection of intuitive knowledge. But, since
> you have provided a source for the original text, let's examine what Hume is
> really saying in his Dialogues, Pt. II.
>
> Here is the analogy as Philo presents it to his dialectical companions Demea
> and Cleanthes, followed by his conclusions:
>
> "If we see a house, Cleanthes, we conclude, with the greatest certainty,
> that it had an architect or builder; because this is precisely that species
> of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause.
> But surely you will not affirm, that the universe bears such a resemblance
> to a house that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or
> that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude is so
> striking, that the utmost you can here pretend to is a guess, a conjecture,
> a presumption concerning a similar cause; and how that pretension will be
> received in the world, I leave you to consider.
>
> "Good God! cried Demea, interrupting him, where are we? Zealous defenders of
> religion allow, that the proofs of a Deity fall short of perfect evidence!
> ...
>
> "It would surely be very ill received, replied Cleanthes; and I should be
> deservedly blamed and detested, did I allow, that the proofs of a Deity
> amounted to no more than a guess or conjecture. But is the whole adjustment
> of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a resemblance? The
> economy of final causes? The order, proportion, and arrangement of every
> part? Steps of a stair are plainly contrived, that human legs may use them
> in mounting; and this inference is certain and infallible. Human legs are
> also contrived for walking and mounting; and this inference, I allow, is not
> altogether so certain, because of the dissimilarity which you remark; but
> does it, therefore, deserve the name only of presumption or conjecture?
>
> "Were a man to abstract from every thing which he knows or has seen, he
> would be altogether incapable, merely from his own ideas, to determine what
> kind of scene the universe must be, or to give the preference to one state
> or situation of things above another. For as nothing which he clearly
> conceives could be esteemed impossible or implying a contradiction, every
> chimera of his fancy would be upon an equal footing; nor could he assign any
> just reason why he adheres to one idea or system, and rejects the others
> which are equally possible.
>
> "Again; after he opens his eyes, and contemplates the world as it really is,
> it would be impossible for him at first to assign the cause of any one
> event, much less of the whole of things, or of the universe. He might set
> his fancy a rambling; and she might bring him in an infinite variety of
> reports and representations. These would all be possible; but being all
> equally possible, he would never of himself give a satisfactory account for
> his preferring one of them to the rest. Experience alone can point out to
> him the true cause of any phenomenon."
>
> Now IMO, all that Hume has achieved here is to demonstrate that we do not
> have perfect proof of a Designer. He has not disproved the proposition.
> Despite Demea's protest that the analogy "falls short of perfect evidence",
> I don't think you can reasonably deny that this house analogy and Paley's
> watchmaker analogy both provide evidence that a Creator is more probable
> than no Creator. That perfect proof is lacking should not surprise anyone,
> least of all the philosopher, who wouldn't be able to justify his calling if
> the facts were otherwise."
>
> msh says:
> > A careful reader of the dialogues will discern no less than six
> > objections to the Design Argument. Since any one of them is
> > sufficient to put the Design Argument on ice, I'll spare you an
> > analyis of all six. Here are the four I find most interesting,
> > though I will be happy to discuss the other two if you so desire:
> >
> > 1) The analogy between the universe and man-made items is very weak.
> >
> > For an analogy to be convincing, there must be
> > substantial similarity between the analogy's object and target.
>
> Why then didn't Hume suggest an analogy that had good similarly, such as the
> watchmaker's story, instead of setting up a strawman that he could so easily
> knock down? A bit one-sided, wouldn't you say?
>
> If we were conscious of a chaotic universe, a cause would still be implied;
> the fact that we are conscious of an intelligently designed universe is
> evidence that the cause is "intentional" rather than incidental or random in
> Nature.
>
> > 2) - Analogies to the the origin of the universe are meaningless,
> > since the "creation" would be a single, unprecedented, and in fact
> > unique event.
> >
> > We have only one universe. Analogies are meaningful only when we can
> > compare and contrast a variety of objects or ideas. It is both
> > meaningful and useful to compare the attributes of humans,
> > sunflowers, tides and watches, but to what do we compare the
> > universe?
>
> We can "describe" the universe in the same way that we can describe a house
> or a watch. Descriptions can be comparisons in that sense. When they
> include principles or features that suggest purpose or intent, they infer an
> intelligent designer.
>
> > 3) Intelligence is not the only active cause in the world.
>
> I agree, but I don't see this an objection to the ID argument.
>
> > 4) Even if signs of intelligence are everywhere, it does not follow
> > that intelligence created the universe.
>
> This only works as an objection if the intelligence "seen everywhere" is
> regarded as primary evidence. Of course the evidence can not be primary
> because someone had to design it. So this is an argument from a false
> premise -- which may explain why it is your "favorite" .
>
> Ham (previously):
> > I find Paley's "Watchmaker" argument a far more convincing defense
> > for ID.
>
> > msh says:
> > I have no doubt that Paley's argument is effectively used by ID
> > proponents in convincing ID enthusiasts that their desired belief is
> > logically sound. Of course, the argument has NO effect on anyone who
> > has actually read, and is capable of understanding, Hume's
> > criticisms.
>
> You're really impressed with Hume's criticisms, aren't you?
>
> Ham said (earlier):
> > I make the claim that Essence [e.g., God] "is", without the
> > contingency of either "being" or "existing". From a rational perspective,
> you'll
> > tell me that makes no sense. But who says that ultimate reality must
> > conform to man's reason?
> >
> > msh says:
> > You are the one who claims that Paley's analogy, a rational argument,
> > supports the notion of an intelligent creator of the universe, so you
> > obviously believe that reality conforms to man's reason.
>
> That is a non sequitor. A rational argument can support a proposition (A)
> without having to support the rationality of a proposition (B). It does not
> follow that reality must conform to man's reason simply because there is
> rational evidence of a creator.
>
> Thank YOU, Mark
> Ham
>
>
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