Re: MD Bolstering Bo's SOL

From: skutvik@online.no
Date: Sat Jun 04 2005 - 07:40:56 BST

  • Next message: Allenbarrows9966@aol.com: "Re: MD Bolstering Bo's SOL"

    This was written before I subscribed and in the meantime there
    has been other responses to this thread, but - phew - I am not
    prepared to through "the motions" again so for Allen, you better
    read the essay first and then see if it makes more sense.

                                      ---------------------

    Hi Scott old friend.

    You wrote:
    > Before one can evaluate Bo's SOL, a fundamental logical error in the MOQ
    > needs to be addressed. That error is to ignore two different meanings of
    > the word pair: subject and object. One meaning is to equate 'subject' with
    > 'mind' and 'object' with 'matter', which I'll call subject[1]/object[1].

    The "mind/matter" variety of S/O is rather recent, some say from
    Descartes, but it springs from the same root.

    > The other meaning (which I'll call subject[2]/object[2]), covers the X and
    > Y respectively in sentences like "X is aware of Y" or "X thinks about "Y",
    > or "X values Y".

    This is an individual facing its environment and has nothing to do
    with the MOQ. Self as different from other is something intellect
    (SOM has problematized by its eternal S/O dichotomy.

    > The MOQ dissolves the opposition between subject[1] and
    > object[1] by calling each different levels of static patterns of value.
    > This makes a certain amount of sense,

    Calling them what? Do you mean the "standard" procedure of
    tucking SOM under the MOQ that calls inorganic and biological
    patterns "objects and social and intellectual "subjects"?. If so it
    does not make sense to me, but lets SOM spread inside the
    MOQ. It HAS to be one level - intellect - to be safely taken care
    of.

    > but does nothing to dissolve the
    > opposition between subject[2] and object[2]. This latter opposition is
    > simply ignored by the MOQ,

    For the said reason.

    > which makes the MOQ inadequate as a
    > metaphysics. I've raised this issue several times, but no MOQ defender has
    > dealt with it.

    No wonder.

    > The reason it needs to be dealt with is that Bo's SOL is talking about
    > subject[2]/object[2], not subject[1]/object[1].

    The SOL is very much addressing the mind/matter variant
    because that IS SOM. As said it's a rather recent offshoot of the
    S/O root that grew from the upheaval described in ZMM. It
    corresponds to Barfield's "original participation" loss.

    > This can be seen easily
    > enough when the object of thought is another thought. Bo is essentially
    > correct when he says of human intellect that its value is in the S/O
    > divide, when that is taken to mean the S[2]/O[2] divide. (I disagree with
    > him in that I don't think this value in the divide only occurs in human
    > intellect -- I would say that all value occurs in an
    > Intellectual/Quality/Consciousness divide, also known as contradictory
    > identity -- but that is a separate discussion).

    To the extent that I understand, it's truly a separate discussion.
    You may have noticed that I see a viable "Metaphysics of
    Consciousness" with the known static levels of consciousness,
    but it would not change anything.

    > So the fourth level
    > consists of this divide occurring in physical beings, known as humans. For
    > a an extensive discussion of the value of the S[2]/O[2] divide, see
    > Barfield's "Saving the Appearances: A Study in Idolatry".

    Trust Scott! ;-)

    > Pirsig responded (in LC) to Bo's general drift by noting that certain
    > intellectual acts are not S/O, in particular mathematics. Here again, not
    > making the distinction between [1] and [2] muddies the discussion. If I am
    > thinking about rocks, then the object of thought is O[1] and O[2], but if
    > I am thinking about the Pythagorean theorem , then the object of thought
    > is only O[2]. But there is a further complication in that the Pythagorean
    > theorem only becomes O[2] after I have thought about it. That is, during
    > the thinking, there is no "thinking about", there is just the thinking. So
    > during the mathematical thinking, Pirsig is right that there is no S/O
    > divide -- the thought is the object of thought, but this can only be
    > discerned when reflecting on the thought, and reflection is S[2]/O[2].
    > Nevertheless, can one say that mathematical thinking is a transcendence of
    > S[2]/O[2]? Perhaps. What is the case is that in a certain sense all good
    > thinking is mathematical. If I am thinking as a scientist about rocks,
    > what I am doing is working with concepts, not particular rocks. An
    > experiment with rocks is a testing of the concepts. But, again, this is
    > leading into other issues. But the point is that without a correction to
    > the MOQ such as SOL, there is no way to address them. And one also needs
    > to keep the distinction between the two meanings of S/O in mind.

    Reeling from this I can only say regarding the mathematics issue:
    Ancient people (social level) used calculation (or math as we
    have begun to call it) and in this sense Pirsig is right;
    mathematics has no S/O content, because the social level has no
    S/O "thinking". But then comes the intellectual "thinking" and
    when IT "thinks" there suddenly is a S/O content to
    EVERYTHING ...... what makes you, Scott, see all kinds of S/O
    divisions.

    Bo

    MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
    Mail Archives:
    Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
    Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
    MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net

    To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
    http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Sat Jun 04 2005 - 07:44:37 BST