From: Scott Roberts (jse885@localnet.com)
Date: Tue Jun 14 2005 - 21:17:52 BST
Paul,
I missed the connection to the potentially belled cat, sorry :)
--- Scott:
--- Do you deny that there is a difference between what we perceive with our
--- senses and what we know about the inorganic universe? The former is a
--- matter
--- of wind in our face, trees, and rainbows, while the latter is a matter
--- of
--- moving air molecules and photons. Barfield is only emphasizing that
--- naive
--- realism doesn't work, yet we presuppose it when we talk about anything
--- other
--- than physics, e.g., in thinking about evolution.
Paul: Hang on, he explicitly states that "particles" refers to a neutral
objective reality which he defines as "reality insofar as it is independent
of our awareness." Add to this the notion of a subjective consciousness
which is only aware of its own creations and I think we can see some
whiskers...
Sorry, I mean -- I think we have evidence of a thesis which maintains some
subject vs object distinctions.
Scott:
He uses a subject/object vocabulary, but how is that avoidable, other than
with synonyms? One needs to distinguish between sense perception and
thinking, for instance. The issue is not whether or not there is a
subject/object distinction -- there clearly is, whether of SO[1] or SO[2].
The issue is whether we turn that distinction into a metaphysical basis,
whether in the form of Cartesian dualism, or materialist or idealist monism.
As for "reality insofar as it is independent of our awareness", the only way
to not consider such a possibility is solipsism.
Scott continued:
It is not Kantian, in
--- that
--- Barfield argues that we do in fact know things about what is "behind"
--- the
--- sense experiences.
Paul: But he is still talking about the unrepresented reality behind the
appearances of collective representation, right?
Scott:
As does Pirsig, for example in the menu analogy, or the discussion of seeing
different colors depending on one's culture. I note that you haven't
answered my question: "Do you deny that there is a difference between what
we perceive with our senses and what we know about the inorganic universe?
The former is a matter of wind in our face, trees, and rainbows, while the
latter is a matter of moving air molecules and photons." How do you describe
the difference?
Scott prev:
That knowledge is a matter of concepts, and it is
--- only
--- the modernist nominalist bias that leads to Kant. By nominalism, I mean
--- the
--- assumption that the conceptual universe is something that developed --
--- somehow -- in human beings only.
Paul: That's not nominalism, is it? Doesn't that mean that anyone that
thinks that only humans speak and write in propositions is nominalist?
Scott:
That's why I gave a definition, to be clear about what I meant by the term.
A nominalist thinks that a concept exists solely in the language capability
of a human. A non-nominalist thinks that a concept is a connection between
the thinker and that which is thought about, that is, its existence is
shared between them.
Scott prev:
--- It should be obvious that nominalism
--- and
--- SOM are mutually dependent.
Paul: Yes, but not so sure about your definition. I don't think that
believing that only humans speak and write in propositions is tying one down
to SOM.
Scott:
Try it with the definition I gave. Unless one loses the participation with
the thought-about one cannot have SOM or nominalism. The two arose together
only because original participation was lost.
Scott prev:
This assumption arose from *forgetting* that
--- what we now call "nature" is a system of representations, a system that
--- changes as consciousness evolves.
Paul: This talk of "representation" is surely tying Barfield to SOM. I
also think Barfield's wholesale acceptance of the primacy of consciousness
(i.e. idealism ) is suspect.
Scott:
Again, do you think that Pirsig's menu analogy ties him to SOM? I see no
difference between the two cases, except that Barfield's point is that
representation happens in sense perception as well as thinking. As to the
primacy of consciousness, if you can show the vaguest hint of how to get
consciousness from non-consciousness, or how one can speak of value without
awareness, I will reconsider my position.
- Scott
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