From: Paul Turner (paul@turnerbc.co.uk)
Date: Thu Jun 16 2005 - 17:32:04 BST
Scott,
Paul previously said: [Barfield] explicitly states that "particles" refers
to a neutral objective reality which he defines as "reality insofar as it is
independent of our awareness." Add to this the notion of a subjective
consciousness which is only aware of its own creations and I think
we....have evidence of a thesis which maintains some subject vs object
distinctions.
Scott: The issue is whether we turn that [subject/object] distinction into
a metaphysical basis, whether in the form of Cartesian dualism, or
materialist or idealist monism.
Paul: I agree that this is the issue, and Barfield implicitly starts from
the metaphysical assumption that there is a subjective consciousness which,
in conjunction with the senses, perceives collective representations of an
objective reality. All that he has done is move macroscopic nature into the
realm of subjective consciousness.
Now, he says that he is not claiming to be writing metaphysics but by taking
as a given the notion of an "objective reality" and freely using it, he
accepts the structure of a SOM. He says he is only offering a thesis on the
evolution of consciousness but this begs the question of why there should
be, indeed if there even is, such a metaphysically distinct thing as
consciousness (with its correlative objective reality) that needs explaining
in the first place.
Scott: As for "reality insofar as it is independent of our awareness", the
only way to not consider such a possibility is solipsism.
Paul: That is the sort of traditional philosophical blunder one makes when
starting from the assumption that the only alternative to objective reality
is the subjective self. A valuistic or pragmatic alternative is to restrain
the terms subjective and objective from having anything fundamental to say
about awareness of reality beyond being useful general terms for delineating
patterns as easy or difficult to measure and predict, quick or slow to
change, more or less likely to require new descriptions to help us cope
with, affected by talking etc.
Scott continued:
It is not Kantian, in
--- that
--- Barfield argues that we do in fact know things about what is "behind"
--- the
--- sense experiences.
Paul: But he is still talking about the unrepresented reality behind the
appearances of collective representation, right?
Scott: As does Pirsig, for example in the menu analogy, or the discussion
of seeing different colors depending on one's culture.
Paul: But static patterns (e.g. menus and colours) are not classified as
appearances or representations in the MOQ and are not caused by objective
particles.
Scott: Do you deny that there is a difference between what we perceive with
our senses and what we know about the inorganic universe?
Paul: Of course not. But the difference is not between objective and
subjective, or reality and appearance, which is what I take Barfield to be
saying. I don't think that either "the wind on our face" or "moving air
molecules" gets any closer to or further away from the experience which is
being described than the other.
Scott prev:
That knowledge is a matter of concepts, and it is
--- only
--- the modernist nominalist bias that leads to Kant. By nominalism, I mean
--- the
--- assumption that the conceptual universe is something that developed --
--- somehow -- in human beings only.
Paul previously: That's not nominalism, is it? Doesn't that mean that
anyone that thinks that only humans speak and write in propositions is
nominalist?
Scott:
That's why I gave a definition, to be clear about what I meant by the term.
A nominalist thinks that a concept exists solely in the language capability
of a human.
Paul: Yes but, the way I see it, the dichotomy - that one must either be a
nominalist or not - also depends on another prior assumption: that there are
individual things out there in the first place which either do or do not
share universal properties independent of the general descriptions and names
humans use to "represent" them. Since this correspondence theory --
subjective representation of an objective reality -- is left behind by the
MOQ the question of whether one is nominalist or not is a false dilemma.
So, you may be correct that nominalism is a sign of SOM but your definition
of nominalism is, in a subtle way, incomplete i.e. it is a necessary but not
sufficient condition.
Paul previously: This talk of "representation" is surely tying Barfield to
SOM. I also think Barfield's wholesale acceptance of the primacy of
consciousness (i.e. idealism) is suspect.
Scott: Again, do you think that Pirsig's menu analogy ties him to SOM? I
see no difference between the two cases, except that Barfield's point is
that representation happens in sense perception as well as thinking.
Paul: I think the difference is that static patterns are in no way said to
have a *representational* relationship to Dynamic Quality. I think the
relationship is purely causal i.e. Dynamic Quality produces and changes
patterns.
Scott: As to the primacy of consciousness, if you can show the vaguest hint
of how to get consciousness from non-consciousness, or how one can speak of
value without awareness, I will reconsider my position.
Paul: Given past conversations and my general confusion over what is meant
by these terms anyway, may I first ask where you draw the line between
non-consciousness and consciousness because it is not clear to me if you
think there is a line that can be drawn or if you are constructing a straw
man.
Assuming the former, do you mean e.g. human and non-human? Inorganic and
organic? Dare I say it, matter and mind? Awake and asleep?
Also, do you distinguish consciousness from experience?
Regarding the challenge of speaking of value without awareness, are you
saying that awareness exists first and causes value? Are you saying that
they arise together? If so, why is the distinction worth making? Can you
have awareness without value?
Regards
Paul
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