Re: MD Primary Reality

From: Scott Roberts (jse885@localnet.com)
Date: Thu Jun 16 2005 - 15:22:16 BST

  • Next message: Michael Hamilton: "Re: MD Bolstering Bo's SOL - Part A"

    Steve,

    Steve said:
    How does agency fit into this picture? Didn't Pirsig claim as one of the
    attributes of a person the ability to respond to DQ?

    Scott:
    He did, but I fail to see that it helps the problem. Why not say that an
    agent *is* DQ (or better, DQ/SQ interaction)? Why not acknowledge that
    intellect creates? Because, as far as I can see, to do so conflicts with his
    anti-intellectual prejudice, stemming from his mystical presuppositions.

    Steve continued:
     To define an
    individual as the smallest 'unit' of agency (along with continuity as you
    suggest) clearly gives substance to what we mean by a person as opposed to
    just an amalgamation of static intellectual patterns which seems to ignore
    obvious individuality. Is this ability to respond (directly) to DQ separate
    from intellectual static patterns in the same sense that inorganic and
    biological patterns are a separate level (or any of the other levels)? This
    would be a good working definition of self-awareness for the MOQ.

    Scott:
    First, I am not really trying to "define" individuality. I only want to
    point out that the MOQ's definition of a person is inadequate, precisely
    because it fudges on issues of agency and so on. But you raise an important
    question here ("Is this ability to respond (directly) to DQ separate from
    intellectual static patterns...?"). For instance, one can ask if inorganic
    patterns are able to respond to DQ, and if not, then what is it about
    intellectual patterns that make them different in this regard. And one can
    ask, if the ability to respond to DQ is not separate from the static
    patterns themselves, should one be calling them static? That ability seems
    to me to be the essence of being dynamic.

    My conclusion from these sorts of issues is that the MOQ has defined itself
    in such a way that is simply has no adequate way to deal with human
    entities. My solution to this problem is to stop considering intellect as
    the fourth level of SQ, but see it instead as on the same level as Quality.

    - Scott

    Live well,
    Steve

    > Matt et al,
    >
    >
    > Matt said (to Bo):
    > A summary of the position that I believe all four of us [Matt, Paul, Ant,
    > and DMB] stand in/with/as: What we call "mind" is better refered to as a
    > collection of static intellectual patterns. A person does not _have_
    > intellectual patterns, we _are_ intellectual patterns. A "person" is a
    > particular amalgamation of static intellectual patterns, the vast majority
    > of which we share with other people.
    >
    > Scott:
    > I've said this sort of thing myself at one time, but it doesn't work. It
    is,
    > in fact, the Theravadin view of the self, which Nagarjuna challenged. It
    > doesn't work because it ignores the continuity over the set of static
    > intellectual patterns (also, it leaves unsettled where to locate the
    source
    > of new patterns). So while it doesn't make sense to call the self a
    > container of the set of static patterns, it also doesn't make sense to say
    > the self *is* the set of static patterns. When I wake up in the morning, I
    > need to "place" myself, that is, remember where I am, what I have to
    today,
    > possibly even my name. All of these are beliefs, but they make no sense
    > without the setting called "me". Now this is what Rorty would call an
    > intuition that, in his opinion, we should get rid of, but while I agree
    that
    > the intuition that this 'setting called "me"' should not be assumed to be
    an
    > independent thing (a container, for example), it is also not the beliefs
    > that are gathered. In short, it is one of the poles of a contradictory
    > identity (the other being the beliefs). Each is not the other, but each
    > constitutes the other. What you four (and Pirsig) are doing is taking one
    > pole of a polarity as true, making the other pole "just an appearance",
    and
    > that fails.
    >
    > This error arises in the MOQ because of Pirsig's conflation of the
    > mind/matter meaning of S/O (S/)[1]) with the intentionality meaning (what
    I
    > call S/O[2]). The first can be dissolved because all the S[1] can be
    treated
    > as O[2]. But S[2] is still left dangling, which is why the MOQ, and
    > materialist pragmatism, are inadequate and incoherent.
    >
    > - Scott
    >
    >
    >
    > MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
    > Mail Archives:
    > Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
    > Nov '02 Onward -
    http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
    > MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
    >
    > To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
    > http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
    >
    >

    MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
    Mail Archives:
    Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
    Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
    MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net

    To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
    http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html

    MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
    Mail Archives:
    Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
    Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
    MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net

    To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
    http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html

    This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Thu Jun 16 2005 - 15:26:59 BST