From: Scott Roberts (jse885@localnet.com)
Date: Thu Jun 16 2005 - 22:27:44 BST
Paul,
Paul: I agree that this is the issue, and Barfield implicitly starts from
the metaphysical assumption that there is a subjective consciousness which,
in conjunction with the senses, perceives collective representations of an
objective reality. All that he has done is move macroscopic nature into the
realm of subjective consciousness.
Now, he says that he is not claiming to be writing metaphysics but by taking
as a given the notion of an "objective reality" and freely using it, he
accepts the structure of a SOM. He says he is only offering a thesis on the
evolution of consciousness but this begs the question of why there should
be, indeed if there even is, such a metaphysically distinct thing as
consciousness (with its correlative objective reality) that needs explaining
in the first place.
Scott:
He does start with the SOM vocabulary, ('subject', 'objective reality',
'representation', etc.) since that is the vocabulary of his audience. But
where does he end up?
- with evidence of the mutual dependence of the growth of alpha-thinking
("thinking about things") with our notion of 'objective reality', that is,
that the latter developed in recorded history starting (in the West) with
the Greeks, and so is contingent and not fundamental.
- that our current belief in nature as objective reality did not become as
it is until about 1500, i.e., with the rise of SOM.
- that before then and after this current stage, this SOM-like separation
does not hold
- that what we (as SOMites) think of as 'that which is to be represented',
i.e., truth by correspondence with external reality, has it backwards, that
instead, the supposed objective external reality is in fact a
representation -- that it is semiotic.
So it seems to me to accuse Barfield of SOM is ridiculous. There is, though,
a major difference between what he does about it with what Pirsig does, and
that difference lies in Pirsig's being a nominalist, and Barfield not. That
which the inorganic represents, according to Barfield, is what is
traditionally called by such names as 'spirit', 'mana', 'waken', or 'life
principle'), and which can also be called Quality. So it "represents" in the
same sense that your words in this post represent what you think.
Scott previously: As for "reality insofar as it is independent of our
awareness", the
only way to not consider such a possibility is solipsism.
Paul said: That is the sort of traditional philosophical blunder one makes
when
starting from the assumption that the only alternative to objective reality
is the subjective self. A valuistic or pragmatic alternative is to restrain
the terms subjective and objective from having anything fundamental to say
about awareness of reality beyond being useful general terms for delineating
patterns as easy or difficult to measure and predict, quick or slow to
change, more or less likely to require new descriptions to help us cope
with, affected by talking etc.
Scott:
What about the problem of whether a computer can be aware? or electrons? How
are we aware of things changing? Was there awareness before there were sense
organs? The pragmatist or valuistic alternative just ignores these
questions. Matt would say, I think, that they should be ignored. I disagree.
Furthermore, the only alternative to objective reality is NOT the subjective
self (in my philosophy, nor in Barfield's). My alternative is contradictory
identity, which Barfield calls polarity (the term borrowed from Coleridge).
Scott continued:
It is not Kantian, in
--- that
--- Barfield argues that we do in fact know things about what is "behind"
--- the
--- sense experiences.
Paul: But he is still talking about the unrepresented reality behind the
appearances of collective representation, right?
Scott:
Yes. See above. It is "unrepresented" because we have the lost the ability
to "read" the inorganic. When regained, we regain the experience of its
being expressive, rather than "just there".
Scott previously: As does Pirsig, for example in the menu analogy, or the
discussion
of seeing different colors depending on one's culture.
Paul: But static patterns (e.g. menus and colours) are not classified as
appearances or representations in the MOQ and are not caused by objective
particles.
Scott:
Surely the menu is being thought of as a representation. If it isn't, how
can it inform one of what there is to eat?
Scott previously: Do you deny that there is a difference between what we
perceive with
our senses and what we know about the inorganic universe?
Paul: Of course not. But the difference is not between objective and
subjective, or reality and appearance, which is what I take Barfield to be
saying. I don't think that either "the wind on our face" or "moving air
molecules" gets any closer to or further away from the experience which is
being described than the other.
Scott:
As I remarked to Matt a while back, with any mysticism, or in Barfield's
case the proposition that we are moving toward something called "final
participation", there is necessarily an appearance/reality distinction,
though it is called being unenlightened vs. being enlightened, or some such.
So it is not just a matter of alternate descriptions. According to Barfield,
our current state, where participation has gone underground, so to speak, is
a diseased state. To recover we need to think about these differences, e.g.,
between the data of our sense experiences as being objective reality vs. as
being representations. The pragmatist alternative you mention above, and the
MOQ, does not face these issues.
Scott:
That's why I gave a definition, to be clear about what I meant by the term.
A nominalist thinks that a concept exists solely in the language capability
of a human.
Paul: Yes but, the way I see it, the dichotomy - that one must either be a
nominalist or not - also depends on another prior assumption: that there are
individual things out there in the first place which either do or do not
share universal properties independent of the general descriptions and names
humans use to "represent" them. Since this correspondence theory --
subjective representation of an objective reality -- is left behind by the
MOQ the question of whether one is nominalist or not is a false dilemma.
So, you may be correct that nominalism is a sign of SOM but your definition
of nominalism is, in a subtle way, incomplete i.e. it is a necessary but not
sufficient condition.
Scott:
Do you agree with Matt that the question of the origin of language is to be
found in Darwinist presuppositions, that it was a matter of clever apes
creating language to cope with its environment? That is what I am mainly
criticizing under the name "nominalism". In origin, it went hand in hand
with a correspondence theory, but it remains when the correspondence theory
is rejected.
My view, by the way, is that there is, in language, correspondence, but it
is with another form of language, not something non-semiotic.
Paul previously: This talk of "representation" is surely tying Barfield to
SOM. I also think Barfield's wholesale acceptance of the primacy of
consciousness (i.e. idealism) is suspect.
Scott previously: Again, do you think that Pirsig's menu analogy ties him
to SOM? I
see no difference between the two cases, except that Barfield's point is
that representation happens in sense perception as well as thinking.
Paul: I think the difference is that static patterns are in no way said to
have a *representational* relationship to Dynamic Quality. I think the
relationship is purely causal i.e. Dynamic Quality produces and changes
patterns.
Scott:
Well the issue is with the relationship with other static patterns, not to
DQ, no? And I think your last sentence there raises all sorts of questions.
Do we have free will if it is DQ that produces and changes patterns?
Scott previously: As to the primacy of consciousness, if you can show the
vaguest hint
of how to get consciousness from non-consciousness, or how one can speak of
value without awareness, I will reconsider my position.
Paul: Given past conversations and my general confusion over what is meant
by these terms anyway, may I first ask where you draw the line between
non-consciousness and consciousness because it is not clear to me if you
think there is a line that can be drawn or if you are constructing a straw
man.
Scott:
I am asking how someone who thinks that there is non-conscious reality is
able to explain how consciousness could have developed from it. I do not
think there is non-conscious reality, so how am I to draw a line?
Paul continues:
Assuming the former, do you mean e.g. human and non-human? Inorganic and
organic? Dare I say it, matter and mind? Awake and asleep?
Scott:
I mean: Pirsig says that in the inorganic world, we can say instead of A
causes B, that B values precondition A. Does that mean that he thinks B is
conscious? I say it does, and I agree with it.
Paul continued: Also, do you distinguish consciousness from experience?
Scott: No.
Paul continued:
Regarding the challenge of speaking of value without awareness, are you
saying that awareness exists first and causes value? Are you saying that
they arise together? If so, why is the distinction worth making? Can you
have awareness without value?
Scott:
I don't think so. I think they co-exist: wherever there is value there is
awareness, and wherever there is awareness there is value. And I think that
this "wherever" is everywhere. And I think it is necessary to add intellect
to the ubiquity of value and awareness, otherwise it makes no sense to speak
of *patterns* of value. No pattern exists in isolation, it is valued (rated
as better or worse), so there is choice involved, the possibility of not-A
as well as A. Thus we are speaking of intellect: evaluation, inherent in
value.
- Scott
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