Re: MD Bolstering Bo's SOL - Part A

From: Michael Hamilton (thethemichael@gmail.com)
Date: Fri Jun 17 2005 - 11:40:02 BST

  • Next message: Platt Holden: "Re: MD Bolstering Bo's SOL - Part A"

    Hi Bo, Ant and others,

    I sent this yesterday, before the other reply, but apparently it got
    rejected by the mailing list because Gmail once again managed to throw
    in lots of HTML without me asking it to. Anyway, here goes.

    Ant said:
    Primarily, if you retain SOL, I think you have to explain where the MOQ
    (which is an intellectual map of reality)

    Bo replied:
    MOQ an intellectual map? By this criterion isn't about everything
    said and written about the world's workings "intellectual maps"?
    The Bible, the Koran, the cavedweller's mythologies (who
    definitely were from before intellect). This is sort of a repetition of
    the Paul letter where Pirsig went farther down into the biological
    level. This is the blind alley that the intelligence-intellect (I call it)
    leads to.

    MH replies to Bo:
    I think the examples you give _must_ fall into the intellectual
    category. Where else can they fit? Can they possibly be social, like
    language? No. The Bible _uses_ language, but for a higher purpose than
    mere communication. It attempts to present a picture of some kind of
    truth. The examples you give are of "mythos" - the small shrub from
    which grows the enormous tree of "logos", as described by Pirsig in
    ZMM. Primitive the mythos may be, but it still is an attempt _by_
    society to understand reality. I'm not saying that the Bible and the
    Koran had no social component - they clearly did (the Ten Commandments
    being a good example), but in as much as they attempt to describe
    reality, they are mythos and primitive intellect.

    A little further on, Ant said:
    Your dictionary might state that "intellect" is
    "the power of the mind to reason contrasted with feeling and instincts" but
    even from ZMM alone it is clear that Pirsig's quest to expand rationality

    Bo interjected:
    He did, but he had not acquired the final MOQ, ZMM's
    Romantic/Static variety we now see as corresponding to the
    social/intellectual levels.

    MH replies to Bo:
    I think this is too simplistic by far. Classic (I'm fairly sure that's
    what you meant to write instead of "Static"?) corresponds to
    intellect, sure. But Romantic quality with social quality? Do John and
    Sylvia bear much similarity to Rigel and the Victorians described in
    Lila? I think not. In ZMM Pirsig says that Romantic quality has to do
    with "surface appeal", which I would say has something to do with
    Dynamic Quality, or at least with non-intellectual value in general.
    The Classic/Romantic split is about intellect vs non-intellect, not
    simply intellect vs society. However, if I understand correctly what
    Bo is trying to say here, this only strengthens his suggestion that
    Classic quality, i.e. the "incomplete" intellect that Pirsig resists
    in ZMM, i.e. the "ghost of reason", corresponds to the intellectual
    level of the complete MOQ (the MOQ being the much-refined form of the
    expanded, value-centred rationality that was originally outlined in
    ZMM). BUT! This doesn't quite give the game to the SOL! I'll elaborate
    in a moment, but I think it's high time I let Ant finish his sentence!

    Ant finished his sentence:
    [Pirsig's attempt in ZMM to expand rationality] would tend to disagree
    with this [dictionary] definition

    Bo replied:
    No, it agrees perfectly. Reason was the dilemma Phaedrus'
    teacher colleagues confronted him with, and he understood that
    this could NOT be "expanded", it had to be made subordinate to
    Quality. And he identified intellect as the S/O prism.

    MH nit-picks:
    Yes, Phaedrus realised that the dialectical subject/object dilemma had
    to be made subordinate to Quality. But! He arrived at this conclusion
    by "reasonable" means, don't you think? Value-centric reason, as
    outlined in ZMM and refined in Lila as the MOQ, can termed an
    "expanded" form of reason, because it is capable of everything reason
    was previously capable of _and more_. However, I think this is a
    semantic issue. We are in agreement here except for the use of the
    word "expanded". UNTIL, that is, you claim that following his insight
    that subjects and objects are subordinate to Quality, he "identified
    intellect as the S/O prism". I doubt that you will find precise
    textual support for this, because it is slightly, but significantly,
    simplistic. Throughout ZMM, he identified intellect, which you agree
    corresponds to the Classic quality of ZMM, as the general chopping-up
    of reality into forms and shapes and categories, _of which S/O is just
    one of many possible chops_. I don't think you'll find Pirsig saying
    in ZMM that intellect _only_ chops reality into subject and object,
    because it clearly isn't the case.

    In fact, if we agree that Classic quality equals MOQ's intellectual
    level, then to understand the intellectual level we need only re-read
    ZMM's excellent introduction to the notion of Classic quality, with
    its myriad of hierarchies. Importantly, Pirsig points out that many
    alternative hierarchies can be constructed to deal with the same
    thing. To quote page 79:

    "You get the illusion that all those parts are just there and being
    named as they exist. But they are named quite differently and
    organized quite differently depending on how the knife moves."
    (Incidentally, Scott, if you're reading this, would I be right in
    guessing that this is what you call "nominalism"?)

    It follows that the split into subjects and objects is just one of the
    ways in which the intellectual knife can cut. For example, a
    metaphysical hierarchy can be formed by dividing reality into dynamic
    and static quality, then dividing static quality into inorganic
    patterns, biological patterns....... and so on! I will happily say
    that intellect can divide Quality into subjects and objects, but I
    will not say that intellect _only_ divides Quality into subjects and
    objects.

    An attempt at reconciliation, though: the four static levels of
    evolution were devised by Pirsig in an attempt to divide static
    quality in such a way that it encompasses _everything_ (except value
    itself), as a more holistic division than "me-in-here" /
    "that-out-there". Like any other hierarchy, it's a pragmatic division
    chosen for its intellectual value. So, if you can argue that the SOL
    definition of the four levels can still "catch" all static patterns,
    from the MOQ to Marxism to the various ways of classifying motorcycle
    components to anthropology to astrology, then SOL is as "true" as it
    could possibly be. However, at this stage I still want to ask you: if
    intellectual quality is a subspecies contained by the MOQ, what kind
    of a static pattern is the hierarchy that constitutes the MOQ, i.e.
    the hierarchy containing dynamic quality and the four levels of static
    quality?

    Yours exhausted,
    Mike

    MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
    Mail Archives:
    Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
    Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
    MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net

    To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
    http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Fri Jun 17 2005 - 12:56:56 BST