RE: MD Bo's Incompleteness Theorem

From: Matt Kundert (pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com)
Date: Tue Jun 21 2005 - 21:57:47 BST

  • Next message: hampday@earthlink.net: "Re: MD Bo's Incompleteness Theorem"

    Platt,

    Platt said:
    Just so, any reality based on the subject/object split (SOM) is going to be
    inconsistent or incomplete. Why? Because it makes no provision for values.
    The proof? Even though values cannot be defined and thus are unacceptable to
    SOM, a world without values would be unrecognizable. We couldn’t survive
    long unless we intuitively knew some things are better than others.

    Matt:
    I agree with you, Platt, that Bo's SOL-MoQ isn't all that complicated. Its
    slightly on the less side of exactly what Pirsig's saying, as far as I can
    tell. But that's not why I'm writing.

    When you say that "any reality based on the subject/object split is going to
    be inconsistent or incomplete" "because it makes no provision for values," I
    think you're wrong. I think its this particular issue that got, way back in
    the day, Struan Hellier's panties in a bunch most often. I think Pirsig
    makes a mistake if he says that SOM leaves out values. Much like my
    redescription of the fall of positivism recently, I think SOM _does_ include
    values, it just doesn't produce consequences that look any good to us. A
    world without values _would_ be unrecognizable, but that should be your
    first indication that nobody has ever seriously suggested it. What SOM says
    is that values exist in someone's mind. Pirsig's description of the S/O
    Dilemma in ZMM is a good description of what happens with SOM that he
    doesn't like. It says values are subjective, that they are "whatever you
    like," and therefore of little consequence. This is A. J. Ayer's logical
    positivist ethical doctrine of emotivism (it is truly irony's twisted sense
    of humor that Struan should accuse the _MoQ_ of being emotivist). There is
    no rational reason to believe any particular value or moral rule because
    they are all just irrational impulses in your head. Now _that_ just sounds
    dumb, and very few people became emotivists. The consequence of emotivism
    was another big reason why people started dismantling positivism in the
    academy. We do believe things for very important reasons. They aren't just
    impules. Pirsig's MoQ tries to rearrange philosophy's furniture to allow
    that intuition about the way we function.

    But that doesn't mean SOM said values don't exist, or they didn't place them
    anywhere, or whatever. That cuts a little too quickly as a rejection of SOM
    and makes SOM look like a strawman. SOM _isn't_ a strawman, but,
    concurrently, it is a also bit more fierce than many of us here give it
    credit for.

    Matt

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