Re: MD Clearing up Bo's intellectual mess, part I

From: Matt Kundert (pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com)
Date: Wed Jun 29 2005 - 23:08:54 BST

  • Next message: Matt Kundert: "Re: MD Clearing up Bo's intellectual mess, Part III"

    Excavating SOM
    ----------------------------------------

    Bo,

    Bo said:
    I see that you are in a panic to distance yourself from me. A great pity,
    but who am I to stop you.

    Matt:
    This is starting to reach the apex of comedy, but more importantly, it is
    about to nosedive down the other side into just plain sad.

    Bo--I was never on your side. I was always criticizing you. The first step
    to critique is understanding, which brings _vocabularies_ together, but not
    necessarily agreement. People can't agree or disagree until they understand
    each other, and I worked pretty hard trying understand what the hell you've
    been going on about all these years. I wasn’t positive that we’d disagree
    on any substantial issue, but I had a pretty strong sense that we would, and
    I think that sense has proven correct. Much of my emphasis on how you don’t
    disagree that much with everybody else was an attempt to off-set your
    bizarre predilection for painting yourself as insane or “beyond the pale.”
    I’m sorry, you’re not. I’m not even sure that your iconoclasm is
    interesting.

    I recommend trying to engage Bo to anybody who wants some extra practice at
    the art of interpretation. You really gotta' work hard at getting the
    disparate pieces of sentences he leaves around to fit together and "unlock"
    their meaning. But I think I got it. But for you Bo--a lot of your replies
    just keep pointing to a very bad reading habit. It just seems more and more
    that you don't understand people very well, at least, when I think they are
    being fairly understandable.

    At any rate, I do have something philosophically pertinent to say, though it
    does have to do with Bo's reading habits. I want to answer two questions:
    Is the SOM of ZMM really the mind/matter dualism? and Does the mind/matter
    dualism really start with Socrates?

    The first is an attempt to do Paul one better. I think Paul is absolutely
    right to bracket the firstness of Pirsig’s ZMM to Lila in the face of Bo’s
    “I’ve got the True MoQ because it was the first one” and focus on which one
    is better. For his purposes, he just wants the best philosophy. That’s
    what I want most of the time, too. But I’d like to focus on Bo’s textual
    claim about ZMM, that it is quite obvious (with “overwhelming” textual
    evidence) that Pirsig is talking about the mind/matter dualism in ZMM. Not
    only do I think Bo’s SOL is not as good as the standard interp, I don’t even
    think it can be found as a position Pirsig ever took. (Granted, of course,
    that what I’m about to do doesn’t rebut the possible utility of Bo’s
    interpretation, but Paul’s done a bunch on that and so have I.) Bo’s claim,
    of course, is not just that Pirsig’s talking about mind/matter, but that its
    obvious that the subject/object dualism is the intellectual level in ZMM.
    The problem for Bo is that he conflates a whole host of distinctions under
    it, and locates them all with Socrates. I wanna’ pick out the mind/matter
    dualism.

    Is the SOM of ZMM really the mind/matter dualism? There are two primary
    areas where Pirsig describes what he’s up against: the S/O Dilemma (Ch 19,
    my pagination will be to the 25th Anniversary ed.) and pretty much all of
    Part IV. I think Bo gets most of his material from the first, the S/O
    Dilemma. The SOD is set up as a mind/matter dilemma: does Quality “exist in
    the things we observe?” or “is it subjective, existing only in the
    observer?” (231) Pirsig butts his head against each of the horns. He says
    in acknowledging the truth of the objective horn, “Quality … was not a
    physical property and was not measurable,” (234) thus taking the dualism
    seriously, as true. When he goes up against the subjective horn he takes on
    “scientific materialism,” “what is composed of matter or energy and is
    measurable by the instruments of science is real.” (236) Pirsig makes
    pretty good work of scientific materialism, but, he says, that lands him in
    the camp of idealists, which he wasn’t so sure about. And then he says,
    “Actually this whole dilemma of subjectivity-objectivity, of mind-matter,
    with relationship to Quality was unfair,” (239) before concluding: “Phaedrus
    … went straight between the horns of the subjectivity-objectivity dilemma
    and said Quality is neither a part of mind, nor is it a part of matter.”
    (240)

    All of this bodes well for Bo. Here we have Pirsig linking subject and
    object directly with the mind/matter dualism. What else could he be talking
    about?

    The clues are littered about in this section, but they aren’t completely
    obvious. The first is his treatment of the objective horn. To grab that
    horn would be to “refute the idea that objectivity implied scientific
    detectability.” (232) He abandons that route, because of the seeming
    obviousness of physical properties, but not before indicating that he was
    “thrown off by an ambiguity in the term _quality_.” (234) I don’t think it
    was the ambiguity in quality, I think it’s the ambiguity in “object” and
    “subject” that does him in. In preparing his brief assault on the objective
    horn he says, “In today’s world, ideas that are incompatible with scientific
    knowledge don’t get off the ground.” (234) Hey, but where are these ideas?
    They’re in the mind, right? Hunh. So, ideas about objects, like scientific
    knowledge, get to be objective? And, really, “objectivity” itself simply
    stands for “ideas in the mind that relate to matter,” as opposed to
    “subjectivity” which means “ideas in the mind that relate to something else,
    e.g. ______ .” This ambiguity in the terms he’s using bursts right out of
    the text a page later when he slices and dices scientific materialism:
    “scientific concepts … could not possibly exist independently of subjective
    considerations.” (237) The reason is because anything in the mind is
    subjective, in the subject. That’s the bind and the ambiguity.

    I think the sentence that tells us the most about Pirsig’s concerns is this
    one: “The whole purpose of scientific method is to make valid distinctions
    between the false and the true in nature, to eliminate subjective, unreal,
    imaginary elements from one’s work so as to obtain an objective, true
    picture of reality.” (236) Because when we get to the finale of ZMM, there
    is a stunning lack of talk about subjects and objects. Instead, its about
    rhetoric, dialectic, logic, reason, mythos, logos, truth, the good. I think
    it is important to take into account that ZMM is a journey, not a
    dissertation. It is attempting to bring us to a state that resembles
    Pirsig’s, when he first went through it, and to do that it goes through the
    same stages he went through. But that doesn’t mean theses are positive,
    like a ladder we keep going up. Its more like pulling a sled through the
    snow, picking up and dropping things as we need—except that Pirsig doesn’t
    tell us when he’s dropping things.

    ...continued in Part II

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