Re: MD Theism, Non-Theism, Anti-Theism, Nihilism

From: Mark Steven Heyman (markheyman@infoproconsulting.com)
Date: Sat Jul 16 2005 - 02:23:42 BST

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    Smirnov, Cusa, Scott, Ham:

    Gentlemen. You are all assuming the reality of a transcendent
    Source, then bending over backward to wedge it into your metaphysics.
    The interesting psychological question is why?

    Some comments below...

    Ham quotes Smirnov:
    "[But] the indefinableness of God in a mystical sense comes in fact to be
    indefiniteness; that is, it rules out any definite proposition about the
    Divine essence.

    msh 7-15-05:
    The first sentence assumes the reality of God.

    ham:
    What Smirnov is saying is that we cannot assign any kind of attribute to
    what is already Absolute, except its Unity or "Oneness". The metaphysical
    paradox, then, becomes a logical challenge. What can we say about God in
    order to incorporate it into a workable metaphysics?

    msh 7-15-05:
    All of the the above assumes the reality of God, and the third
    sentence displays a desire to wedge the God concept into a "workable
    metaphysics." What is the psychological motivation behind this
    desire?

    Scott:
    I would say that we also cannot attribute to it Unity or "Oneness". It is
    not One, not Many, not One and Many, not neither One nor Many.

    msh 7-15-05:
    Assumes the reality of [God], then precedes to talk about it in a way
    that strikes me as, well, gibberish. Sorry, Scott.

    Ham said:
    Cusa's solution was to construct a logical theory of "otherness".

    "The first principle cannot be other either than an other or than nothing
    and likewise is not opposed to anything"... "The world is not God but is not
    anything other than God." God is "not other", he says, because God is not
    other than any other, even though "not-other" and "other" seem opposed. But
    an "other" is not opposed to God from whom it is derived. Thus, for any
    given non-divine X, X is not other than X, and X is other than not X. What
    is unique about the "divine not-other" is precisely that it is not other
    than either X or not X.

    msh 7-15-05:
    This assumes the reality of God, then tries to provide a logical
    basis for talking about God. BTW, as suggested above, this logical
    theory of "otherness" is unintelligible to me. But let's just assume
    I suffer from some sort of genetic mental deficiency which prevents
    me from understanding something that Ham and Scott are able to grasp.

    If the theory of "otherness" or "contradictory identity" allows you
    to incorporate an assumed primary source into your metaphysics, why
    won't the same theory support Pirsig's assumption of Quality as the
    primary source?

    Mark Steven Heyman (msh)
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