From: Scott Roberts (jse885@cox.net)
Date: Mon Jul 18 2005 - 20:18:01 BST
Mark SH,
Scott prev:
Well, it has been pretty heavily explored by Feuerbach, Nietzsche, Freud,
and others, but I can't see that much has been demonstrated but their own
prejudices.
msh 7-17-05:
This seems a bit dismissive of three people who, if they read most of
what passes for philosophical discussion on this list, would think
they were listening to a puppet show. I'd be very interested in your
easy dismissal of Nietzsche in particular. Another thread, maybe?
Scott:
I think Nietzche said a lot of interesting things, so I don't dismiss him.
All I am saying is that his treatment of Judeo-Christianity -- the acme of
the "religion is for wimps" school -- is a case of choosing one's data based
on preconceptions. In the New Testament there are passages saying that to
follow Christ requires giving up all the comforts of society, of turning
away from one's family. Does Nietzsche take this into account?
Scott prev:
Well, as I qualified what I had said earlier, contradictory identity puts
the source/product division into question as well, but in answer to your
question, put in terms of "primary source", I agree that Quality is the
primary source. But I also maintain that Quality presupposes, and is
presupposed by, Consciousness and Intellect. Since Pirsig just assumes
Quality, his metaphysics can't come to grips with consciousness or
intellect.
msh 7-17-05:
Does an understanding of the Tao come to grips with consciousness and
intellect? That is, do you find the Tao te Ching lacking the same
conclusiveness you spot in ZMM combined with LILA?
Scott:
No, and yes. This doesn't mean that there might not be Taoist philosophers
who did come to grips with consciousness and intellect, but I'm not aware of
them (I'm just not very familiar with the development of Taoist philosophy),
so when I say "no", I am referring to the popular understanding of the Tao .
It also doesn't mean that I dismiss the Tao Te Ching. Reading it -- or
reading ZMM for that matter -- is a good thing if one is still on the "field
of substance" (e.g, SOM). Reading the Tao Te Ching takes one to the "field
of nihility", which is good. These terms are those of Nishitani, who then
says one shouldn't stop there, but one needs to go on to the "field of
emptiness", in which one empties out the Tao, through the logic of
contradictory identity.
Scott prev:
In a sense, contradictory identity *is* about maintaining a
mystery, in that it prevents one from falling into one or the other
ways of "telling oneself he understands" (from your Vonnegut quote).
It is not an explanation or a description. One can only explain or
describe something by putting it into terms of something else. But if
the "it" under question is the basis of everything, there is no
explaining or describing it. That is the difference between
television and, say, consciousness.
msh 7-17-05:
Sure. If. Is the "it" the basis of everything? That seems to be
where we part ways whenever we haggle about this. You assume
Consciousness is it. Pirsig assumes Quality, and I assume Matter, or
to use Ian's better term, Physicality.
You don't like MOQ, but I believe the last go round we agreed that
MOC and MOP both provide acceptable interpretations of the world as
we know it (maybe I'm being kinder to MOP than you would be).
Scott:
I doubt that I agreed to this, or else I was misunderstood. I don't see the
MOP as providing any useful interpretation of language, for example (though
see my post to Ian -- as he describes physics as "quality as informational
interactions" sounds to me like saying physics = language, so perhaps one
should wait for his reply.)
Mark continued:
You
suggested that science has no reason to accept MOP over MOC and,
therefore, shouldn't. I say, what's the alternative? Should we re-
write 350 years of scientific documentation just to fit your
preferred model? Do you regard this as a productive use of time?
Scott:
What's to rewrite, other than culling out the nonscientific that is
presented as scientific, notably neo-Darwinism? Science studies the
inorganic, and does it well. It fails in studying anything else (what it
studies of the biological are the inorganic features of biological
entities).
scott 7-16-05:
I suspect the only way to get any kind of handle on contradictory identity
is to immerse oneself in a problem that has no Aristotelian solution (though
one might not know that in advance).
msh 7-17-05:
Thanks for the tip on how to get a handle on contradictory identity.
But how does one know there is no scientific (Aristotelian) solution
to a problem in which one is immersed?
Scott:
That is what one discovers when one realizes that some necessary term (e.g.,
continuity, in awareness) is identical with its contradictory (change).
scott 7-16-05:
For me, this happened after spending some years wondering how a
spatio-temporal entity (such as a computer or a brain) could be aware
of anything extended in space and/or time.
msh 7-17-05:
I don't see this as an insurmountable problem. You're talking about
memory, that is, how does our brain retain thoughts of what happened
after the immediate sensory data of an event is no longer present. A
few studies I've read (no references on hand, but will provide if
you're interested), suggest that, after a primary event is sensed,
self-perpetuating "rings" of synaptic firings replicating the primary
information can occur indefinitely in certain portions of the brain.
Sort of like the way a computer uses RAM to store information until
that portion of memory is over-written by later input.
Scott:
Assuming absolute space and time, and keeping to the granularity of
synapses, how is there awareness of anything larger than a synapse? What is
there that can span the activity of numerous synapses? This is what all such
studies cannot explain. The data of one synapse cannot be merged with that
of others into something larger. This applies to memory, to current
perceptions, to anything we call mental.
Scott prev:
They will never, as positivists, get past the problem of the transcendence
of space and time inherent in every conscious act.
msh 7-17-05:
I don't see this problem. You're assuming space and time are
transcendent, not immanent. You may be right, but just saying it
don't make it so.
Scott:
Actually, I am saying that space and time are immanent, that is, that they
are created in the act of perception, and so perception transcends space and
time as it immanentizes it (the contradictory identity of continuity and
change, BTW). In any case, what I am saying is that assuming there is only
strictly spatio-temporal activity, which is what science studies, there
could be no perception (see above about the synapse). Therefore, since there
is perception, the universe does not consist of strictly spatio-tempral
activity. Therefore, it is silly to assume that sentience emerged in time
from a non-sentient universe.
scott prev:
They are committing the fallacy of seeking an explanation of
perception in terms of the product of perception (spatio-
temporality).
msh 7-17-5:
But this is the chicken egg we're trying to crack.
Scott:
And I'm showing that it is uncrackable when assuming absolute space and
time.
Mark said:
BTW, as a true believer in the weaknesses of Enlightenment
rationality, you might be interested in Chomsky's thoughts on post-
modern philosophy. Here he is, as usual, a reed not bending in the
storm:
http://www.chomsky.info/articles/1995----02.htm
I think the general complaint is that Derrida, Focault, et al, use
reason to devalue reason, which does seem odd, does it not? Anyway,
if you get a chance, I'd like to know what you think.
Scott:
I don't know about Foucault, but I don't think one can accuse Derrida of the
sort of nonsense that Chomsky is criticizing. I could be wrong on that,
since I haven't read all that much of Derrida, being more dependent on
others' interpretations, e.g., that of Rorty and Magliola. In any case, the
point I would make is that, sure, a great deal of nonsense, some of it
harmful, is written under the banner of postmodernism, similarly with most
other banners, e.g., mysticism, socialism, Christianity, materialism -- you
name it. But that in itself is not a reason to dismiss postmodernist
thought. There is wheat amidst the chaff, and Chomsky is focusing on the
chaff.
The difference is that to deconstruct is not necessarily to devalue. My
principle complaint about the MOQ is that in it, reason is seen as less
valuable than DQ, so I hardly want to devalue reason. I have no complaint
against Aristotelian logic. I was a math major, and consider its training to
have been of utmost value. Later I studied computer and cognitive science,
and it too was of great value, until I realized that it could tell me
nothing about consciousness. So rational inquiry as Chomsky understands it
is what you want for studying, say, the brain. But if one is interested in
studying consciousness, and reason itself, the logic of contradictory
identity is necessary.
So I don't believe Enlightenment rationality to be weak, just not always
applicable.
- Scott
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