From: Mark Steven Heyman (markheyman@infoproconsulting.com)
Date: Mon Jul 18 2005 - 05:32:23 BST
Scott prev:
And it is interesting to ask why you see it as a psychological
question. Are we back to the "religion is for wimps" business?
msh 7-16-05:
I don't think so. I think there's a psychological element involved
in one's choosing to assume G rather than g in developing one's
metaphysics. It might be interesting to explore that element, that's
all.
Scott:
Well, it has been pretty heavily explored by Feuerbach, Nietzsche, Freud,
and others, but I can't see that much has been demonstrated but their own
prejudices.
msh 7-17-05:
This seems a bit dismissive of three people who, if they read most of
what passes for philosophical discussion on this list, would think
they were listening to a puppet show. I'd be very interested in your
easy dismissal of Nietzsche in particular. Another thread, maybe?
scott previously:
You don't accept the possibility that God, or Nothingness, or the
Tao, or whatever, might not serve one as an intellectual hypothesis?
msh 7-16-05:
Sure I do. Pirsig assumes Quality as G, which he directly equates
with the Tao. Both you and Ham are criticizing RMP, remember?
That's why I asked the following question...
msh before:
If the theory of "otherness" or "contradictory identity" allows you
to incorporate an assumed primary source into your metaphysics, why
won't the same theory support Pirsig's assumption of Quality as the
primary source?
Scott:
Well, as I qualified what I had said earlier, contradictory identity puts
the source/product division into question as well, but in answer to your
question, put in terms of "primary source", I agree that Quality is the
primary source. But I also maintain that Quality presupposes, and is
presupposed by, Consciousness and Intellect. Since Pirsig just assumes
Quality, his metaphysics can't come to grips with consciousness or
intellect.
msh 7-17-05:
Does an understanding of the Tao come to grips with consciousness and
intellect? That is, do you find the Tao te Ching lacking the same
conclusiveness you spot in ZMM combined with LILA?
Scott previously:
As to its striking you as gibberish, it is a straightforward
application of the Buddhist tetralemma, the cornerstone of 2000 years
of Buddhist logic. If you have a way of describing or explaining
consciousness, or intellect, or quality, in Aristotelian logic, I'm
all ears.
msh 7-16-05:
Being old doesn't keep an idea from being gibberish. But I've
already conceded that it just may be beyond my ability to understand.
What's disappointing is that those of you who claim to understand it
are unable to help me see the light. When I was a kid, television
was a mystery to me. How do we send pictures through the air? But I
had no problem finding someone (my father) who could explain it to
me, and the mystery disappeared. My feeling at this point is that
"contradictory identity" theory is about maintaining a mystery, not
solving one.
Scott: In a sense, contradictory identity *is* about maintaining a
mystery, in that it prevents one from falling into one or the other
ways of "telling oneself he understands" (from your Vonnegut quote).
It is not an explanation or a description. One can only explain or
describe something by putting it into terms of something else. But if
the "it" under question is the basis of everything, there is no
explaining or describing it. That is the difference between
television and, say, consciousness.
msh 7-17-05:
Sure. If. Is the "it" the basis of everything? That seems to be
where we part ways whenever we haggle about this. You assume
Consciousness is it. Pirsig assumes Quality, and I assume Matter, or
to use Ian's better term, Physicality.
You don't like MOQ, but I believe the last go round we agreed that
MOC and MOP both provide acceptable interpretations of the world as
we know it (maybe I'm being kinder to MOP than you would be). You
suggested that science has no reason to accept MOP over MOC and,
therefore, shouldn't. I say, what's the alternative? Should we re-
write 350 years of scientific documentation just to fit your
preferred model? Do you regard this as a productive use of time?
scott 7-16-05:
I suspect the only way to get any kind of handle on contradictory identity
is to immerse oneself in a problem that has no Aristotelian solution (though
one might not know that in advance).
msh 7-17-05:
Thanks for the tip on how to get a handle on contradictory identity.
But how does one know there is no scientific (Aristotelian) solution
to a problem in which one is immersed?
scott 7-16-05:
For me, this happened after spending some years wondering how a
spatio-temporal entity (such as a computer or a brain) could be aware
of anything extended in space and/or time.
msh 7-17-05:
I don't see this as an insurmountable problem. You're talking about
memory, that is, how does our brain retain thoughts of what happened
after the immediate sensory data of an event is no longer present. A
few studies I've read (no references on hand, but will provide if
you're interested), suggest that, after a primary event is sensed,
self-perpetuating "rings" of synaptic firings replicating the primary
information can occur indefinitely in certain portions of the brain.
Sort of like the way a computer uses RAM to store information until
that portion of memory is over-written by later input.
Mark before:
As for an explanation of consciousness, I think them nogoodnik
positivists have come a long, long way toward understanding the
relationship between the brain and awareness. This doesn't mean they
have the final explanation, or that they ever will. Science says "We
don't have an answer to the question of what causes consciousness,
but so what? Saying G caused it, or G IS it, is no answer, either."
Scott:
They will never, as positivists, get past the problem of the transcendence
of space and time inherent in every conscious act.
msh 7-17-05:
I don't see this problem. You're assuming space and time are
transcendent, not immanent. You may be right, but just saying it
don't make it so.
scott:
They are committing the fallacy of seeking an explanation of
perception in terms of the product of perception (spatio-
temporality).
msh 7-17-5:
But this is the chicken egg we're trying to crack.
BTW, as a true believer in the weaknesses of Enlightenment
rationality, you might be interested in Chomsky's thoughts on post-
modern philosophy. Here he is, as usual, a reed not bending in the
storm:
http://www.chomsky.info/articles/1995----02.htm
I think the general complaint is that Derrida, Focault, et al, use
reason to devalue reason, which does seem odd, does it not? Anyway,
if you get a chance, I'd like to know what you think.
Thanks,
Mark Steven Heyman (msh)
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