From: Sam Norton (elizaphanian@kohath.wanadoo.co.uk)
Date: Wed Jul 27 2005 - 14:45:24 BST
Hi Paul,
Pleasure to talk to you as always.
> Paul: I say above that I already agree that GPTs are modifiable, but I
> questioned whether this was a perennial occurence.
I think the perennial bit is simply that nothing is absolute, and that all
intellectual patterns are *in principle* modifiable. Obviously some last
longer than others.
> Paul: My point was that the brujo was not following social or
> intellectual
> patterns, he was following DQ.
> Paul: Yes, in the sense that the brujo's decisions were Dynamic and not
> static.
But there was something about the brujo that caused him to value DQ over and
above the other social and intellectual patterns available to him.
I think we're basically agreed on the brujo.
>
>>The selection and development of intellectual patterns, eg in science,
>>depends upon patterns of intellectual integrity, eg honesty. And that
>>isn't
>>simply a social level pattern, because it seems to me that the social
>>level
>>has no use for honesty as such, because societies don't necessarily
>>benefit
>>from honesty; a different scale of values applies. Whereas the fourth
>>level
>>seems to me to be precisely structured by those values - the fourth level
>>_could_not_exist_ without the value of honesty. It is honesty which
>>structures the fourth level (along with other elements).
>
> Paul: I'm sorry but I really don't see, by what you've said so far, how
> honesty structures knowledge. Can you elaborate on this?
OK. Let's begin with another useful quote from Lila 24 (it's always so
refreshing for me to go back to RMP himself). Early in the chapter he says:
"...the MoQ asks: which values is science unconcerned with? Gravitation is
an inorganic pattern of values. Is science unconcerned? Truth is an
intellectual pattern of values. Is science unconcerned? A scientist may
argue rationally that the moral question, "Is it all right to murder your
neighbor?" is not a scientific question. But can he argue that the moral
question, "Is it all right to fake your scientific data?" is not a
scientific question? Can he say, as a scientist, "The faking of scientific
data is no concern of science?" If he gets tricky and tries to say that that
is a moral question about science which is not a part of science, then he
has committed schizophrenia. He is admitting the existence of a real world
that science cannot comprehend."
Now I think that largely establishes the point I'm trying to make, but I
would want to expand on it. Consider the case of Pons and Fleischmann, who
back in 1989 announced that they were generating energy from cold fusion. As
far as I understand it they were.... rather hasty in their claims, and that
their claims have not yet proved reproducable by other scientists. So,
somewhere along the line, there was some deception. I would suggest that in
terms of their understanding of what their experiments were showing, they
were misled by their own desires, whether of future fame or wealth or glory
or even just intellectual satisfaction at having solved a particular
problem. In other words I would suggest that at some level they were not
being honest. Hence, I would say, that there is an internal relationship
between honesty and truth, ie the perception of truth requires honesty. Put
differently, the perception of intellectual Quality is a function of the
virtues of the intellectual pattern doing the perceiving. If those
intellectual patterns are structured by honesty then they will have higher
Quality than those which haven't.
Is that any clearer?
Sam
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