From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Sat Aug 06 2005 - 08:39:36 BST
Hi David --
Thanks for pointing out this website, which may offer a suitable vehicle to
submit an article in behalf of my own philosophy.
http://www.onlineoriginals.com/showitem.asp?itemID=287&articleID=35
>
> This may interest other MOQers as it shows how an ontology of
> equi-primordial being and becoming or SQ & DQ can offer a new
> conception of god. Macann also discusses relationship of his ideas to
> the East and people like Nishida. I think Macann in this essay sets out
> a good reason why the ONE should not be thought of as conscious.
> Macannlike Pirsig see the need to describe being/SQ in levels so as
> to be able to tell a genetic story of the dynamic evolution of being/SQ.
Macann addresses the right questions in this very literate article, but is
careful to avoid answering any of them in an unequivocal manner. I suppose
"lack of conviction" is viewed as a desirable characteristic of the
philosophical scholar. Also, I'm not particularly comfortable with
Heidegger's 'becoming of being' concepts which seem to concern Macann almost
as much as societal evolution obsesses Pirsig.
Although I'm not sufficiently schooled in Eastern mysticism to comment on
Nishida, I agree that consciousness, as in the awareness of an objective
other, should not -- indeed could not logically -- be regarded as an
attribute of the One. However, while it is my opinion that no specific
(i.e., finite) attribute is assignable to the primary source, its link to
conscious awareness does imply "sentience in its absolute state", whatever
that might represent metaphysically. Without it, we may as well forego the
idea of a primary source altogether since it adds nothing to the meaning of
the life-experience.
For that reason, I prefer Geoffrey Read's "The Fatal Trap" and "A New
Ontology", both of which are published on this same site. Let me quote from
the latter as an example of what I mean.
"[Hegel] rightly saw that the source must be defined in terms of something
common to all experience, something of which every experience is a
particular instance. But his definition is unsatisfactory because he failed
to define 'being', leaving it as an empty abstraction. With our precise
theory of the structure of entities we are in a position to improve upon
this. Two components of the basic problem are obvious enough. We cannot
define the One in terms of anything ontologically prior, since, by the very
nature of the case, there is nothing ontologically prior. Also, for our
definition to be meaningful, we must define the One in experiential terms.
But since all experience necessarily derives from the One, it might seem
that any such definition must involve circularity. However, though all
experiences derive from the One, in a sense they still are the One, since
they are no more than dynamic forms, or patterned processes, of the One and
its Negation -- which latter, as we have seen, is purely privative, owing
its existence solely to the One. So that, in effect, the One is the sole
substance of the Universe."
I think this ontology is compatible with the experiential basis of Pirsig's
MoQ, and it perfectly expresses my theory of Essence as the Not-other. It
would also fit Kaufman's URT thesis, if he could see his way to including a
non-existential source.
I shall have to study these theories more thoroughly before judging their
significance, but you have provided a fine reference for this area of
personal interest. I look forward to discussing the finer points of these
concepts with you in the near future, David.
Again, many thanks for putting the URT into a broader philosophical
perspective, and for your willingness to consider the notion of a primary
source.
Essentially yours,
Ham
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