From: skutvik@online.no
Date: Sat Sep 03 2005 - 07:48:23 BST
Ham and Group
(I don't know if it is Horse's new server, but messages often
disappear. This one for example)
1 Sep. you wrote:
> Hi Bo (also David M and JC) --
> Like Matt, I have more difficulty with how you express yourself than
> with some of the concepts you're arguing for. This may be a
> semantic problem with one or both of us -- I don't know. But it's
> the main reason why I've been following your posts from the
> sidelines, withholding my urge to respond. I wanted to be sure I
> 'heard you correctly' before jumping in with comments that may be
> considered inappropriate.
English has become our age's latin and we are forced to
(ab)use it.
> I think it's commendable that you are dealing with individual
> consciousness. It's a major area of contention and confusion in the
> MoQ that is sorely in need of clarification. Although it's possible
> to interpret Mr. Pirsig's epistemology in a variety of ways, I think
> you'll agree that the best choice is one that is consistent with the
> Quality hypothesis as well as Pirsig's principle that Quality is
> "the primary empirical reality of the world".
The MOQ results from Phaedrus' initial trouble with "reason" (he
did not know of any SOM at that time) When pursuing reason to
its very limit he faced absurdity. And SOM's reason is an
independent subject with consciousness about (its) objective
world. Your "individual consciousness" Do you agree?
I ask because there are objections to a SOM; that it is a straw-
man constructed by Pirsig for his MOQ to replace. I ought not go
on before you agree or disagree, because unless this point is
clear we will just talk past each other, but I take the chance that
your "axe" is not to deny a SOM.
> At the same time (and at least as important to me) there is a need
> to establish the role of the "individual" in the Quality thesis.
I have said it before: The individual in the MOQ - an independent
subject - appeared with the intellectual level. IS the intellectual
level. In other words: Intellect=SOM which is the SOL idea.
Here an important point must be made: SOM has two aspects,
one that says that the subject (mind) is a by-product of matter,
and another that says the opposite: These are the
materialist/idealist camps.
> I'm
> constantly troubled by the assertions made here that individuality
> is of minor consequence, that conscious awareness arises as a
> byproduct of Nature's evolution to higher levels of complexity, that
> the individual self is a meaningless abstraction whose choices and
> will to act are mere reflections of the "intellectual culture" from
> which it emerges.
It sounds like you may belong to the idealist camp, but the MOQ
does not agree with any: It rejects SOM and starts from scratch,
and here I must repeat something that obviously you did not see
in my previous post(s) There are grand concepts that might have
served as the starting point and among those are consciousness.
A metaphysics of consciousness (MOC) would have been about
as effective
And now you will hopefully see MOQ's point. You think that Pirsig
has omitted the most important aspect of existence, namely
consciousness, awareness, mind, whatever... and thereby
created some dead inanimate level evolution, but that is NOT
what he has done, what he DID was to chose VALUE which he
saw as the mother of all the said "grand concepts"
>This reminds me of Sartre's thoughtless comment that "man is
> 'unnecessary' ...the world exists just as well without him."
No, the MOQ has no likeness with Sartre's. Believe me.
And this is about enough. If you understand the above our
differences are gone. If not my ability to present the MOQ has
failed again ....
Bo
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