From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Sun Mar 02 2003 - 19:29:16 GMT
Matt S:
MS:
> I don't
> think you can make such a bold claim as 'obviously he
> (Foucaullt )has made a judgement' without being acquainted with
> his work. He does no such thing. He accepts that,
> e.g., a plant is as it seems visually (and so, in a
> sense, we can 'know' reality), but then shows the
> discontinuity in how society has integrated plants
> into thought and knowledge in the field of naure and
> science, and so demonstrates the relativity of
> thought.
PH:
Foucault makes a judgment if, as you say, "He accepts that a plant is
as it seems visually." Pirsig makes a different judgment. He says a
plant is not as it seems visually, but is a pattern of moral value left
behind by the force of DQ. Judgments about the nature of reality, about
what "is" and "is not," are based on fundamental metaphysical
premises which are always judgment calls. If you claim Foucault makes
no judgments, how can he (or you or me) make a judgment that what he
says is right?
PH:
> > I take it "formal" means "all in your head."
MS:
> In so much as it means *how* we think, not *what* we
> think.
PH:
So logic and math are formal but not "substantive" or real. Is that your
position?
MS:
> To paraphrase myself, 'Quality is not universal in
> reality itself, only in how we perceive reality in the
> MoQ'. I can perceive reality. But I can also analyse
> my own perception. And in this way, I can determine
> that 'quality' is located in my perception, and so not
> in reality. I never make any claims about reality
> other than it being a contact source of stimuli to my
> perceptions, such that it can be thought about. This
> is a concept basically at the core of postmodernism:
> to turn thought back around on itself, and analyse
> thought, not reality, to show the faults, the
> relativity and the limits of thought.
PH:
You define reality as "a contact source of stimuli to my perceptions."
But you say thoughts about the source or the stimuli are not real. So
the first thought, the one that identifies reality as being a contact
source, is real but the other thoughts aren't real? I am confused.
MS:
> > > I'm referring to the postmodern trends in
> > > deconstructivist Europe (e.g. Foucault, Derrida,
> > > Lyotard, Baudrillard, Satre, as well as 'golden
> > > oldies' like Nietzsche), as well as the so called
> > > 'bourgious liberalism' in the US, exemplified by
> > Matt
> > > E.E.'s favourite, Rorty. Of course, each of these
> > > contributions can't simply be reduced to the idea,
> > > 'truth is contingent', but they all build upon an
> > > anxiety over 'universals', meta-narratives, and
> > the
> > > idea that human reason holds the solution to
> > > everything.
PH:
> > Well, if thoughts aren't real, what difference does
> > it make?
MS:
> When did I say 'thoughts aren't real'? I've merely
> said that thoughts (and other elements of human
> consciousness) are illusions. I never said that the
> illusions don't exist.
PH:
Above you said that "Quality is not a universal in reality itself." So
naturally I concluded that Quality as a thought wasn't real. Now I see
that all thoughts are illusions, including those of Foucault I presume.
MS:
> When has Pirsig 'persuasively argued' against Eurpoean
> Deconstructivism? Or postmodernism in general, for
> that matter?
PH:
The entire MOQ as presented in Lila is an argument against
postmodernism if postmodern posits, as you point out, that thoughts
are illusions. In the MOQ, thoughts are "real as rocks" intellectual
patterns.
PH:
> > Are you saying that slavery is NOT absolutely
> > immoral? Are you saying
> > "constructions of man" are unreal? What is your
> > objection to man's
> > constructions? Why do you separate ideas and "human
> > reason" from
> > reality?
MS:
> Yes I am arguing that. Constructions of man are real
> in the sense that they are constructions, one has to
> remember that many of the components of thought rely
> upon their claim of absolutivity for their credibility
> - it is this that is 'unreal'. Human reason invents
> many things that are not real, again perhaps the
> example of morals helps. Morals exist in our heads
> indeed, but to 'moralise' is often to conceive of
> god-given or metaphysical morals that have no material
> presence (as they are beyond humanity) and so are unreal.
PH:
So something has to have "material presence" to be real? Sounds to
me like your boy Foucault is just another SOM type who buys into
good, old fashioned science-style metaphysics. As Pirsig describes the
SOM outlook:
"Subject-object science is only concerned with facts. Morals have no
objective reality. You can look through a microscope or telescope or
oscilloscope for the rest of your life and you will never find a single
moral. There aren't any there. They are all in your head. They exist only
in your imagination." (22)
Not only do you agree that morals are products of imagination but you
go even further and say thoughts are imaginary, too. In direct
contradiction, Pirsig says thoughts are real "intellectual patterns," and
morals not only exist, but are the "whole thing." (13)
Platt
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