From: Scott Roberts (jse885@cox.net)
Date: Wed Sep 14 2005 - 22:03:14 BST
Paul,
>Scott prev:
>Ok, I see that you both don't like my muddling the meaning of the word
>'essence'
<skip>
Now the question for the
>MOQ
>is: how do we distinguish between universals and particulars? SPOV fit the
>role of universals (concepts/instincts/physical laws) well. Where do
>particulars fall, and most importantly, how do the particulars and
>universals relate?
Paul said: I think I understand the problem you are trying to 'solve' here.
That is, if everything is always changing, how does one moment relate to the
next? What persists through the change? As I understand it, Magliola
presents two answers to this, neither of which rely on a concept of
universals or particulars - Derridean 'trace' and Nagarjunian 'dependent
co-arising'.
I don't have the time or room to complete a full exposition here (and you
have the book I am getting this from, Scott) but with respect to 'trace'
Magliola talks about a 'thread' of experience which survives the absolute
negative reference (knowing things only through differences) which
constitutes phenomenal experience. Nagarjuna talks about phenomenal
'happenings' which constitute connected experience even though, because they
are dependently arisen through the same process of negative reference
described by Derrida, do not involve the transfer or continuation of
anything (e.g. a particular or a universal, even in an interdependent pair)
which can rightly be called a self-existing entity.
Scott:
I think the problem here is that when one speaks of persistence through the
change, one thinks of something that persists, and so the question is the
nature of that something. What I am saying is that while we speak of such
somethings, they are not self-existent, as they "exist" only be virtue of
their dependencies and thread-like function. Nevertheless, in conventional
speech we necessary make reference to them, and generalize them with words
like 'thing', 'concept', 'idea', and if philosophically literate,
'universal', 'essence', and 'static pattern of value'. In other words, I
think we must have such words, but we can use them without ascribing
self-existence to anything. So while Magliola does not use the word
'universal', the function of that word is there in the phrase "connected
experience" and "dependently arisen".
Paul said:
As I understand it, for something to be self-existing it has to have
self-identity - an 'expression' (e.g. manifestation(s)) has to completely
express the 'expressed' (e.g. source). Now, Derrida, Magliola, and
Nagarjuna think this impossible because "the originating factor operative in
classical self-identity can never really be reflected by the expression
which is its "mirror," for during the "time it takes" for the reflexive act
to catch the originating factor, the latter has changed." [Magliola,
Derrida on the Mend, p23] So if the originating factor cannot be
expressed/fully express itself, how is it 'known' at all? And if it cannot
be known for any duration at all, in what respect does it make sense to talk
about an originating factor?
Scott:
Yes, one cannot posit a something (universal, concept, thing, etc.) that
exists independently of its expression. Nevertheless, one must posit a
something (universal, etc.) that exists by virtue of its expression, yet is
not its expression (that is, is and is not its expression). Likewise, one
cannot posit an expression (a particular) that exists independently of what
it expresses, for it too exists by virtue of the universal. "Universal" and
"particular" are just more words to be used to express a contradictory
identity -- other equivalent words are "signified" and "signifier",
"concept" and "speech act", "type" and "token", and so on. My point is that
we can't do without some such pair if we want to philosophically examine the
nature of reality.
Paul said:
Here is where I can return to the MOQ and suggest that Dynamic Quality is
such an 'originating factor' which can never really be reflected by static
expression, for during the "time it takes" for the static pattern to catch
Dynamic Quality, the latter has changed. Recall that, in LILA, Pirsig says
that "static patterns emerge in the wake of Dynamic Quality." I think that
in Derridean terms we could say that trace emerges in the wake of differance
and in Nagarjunian terms we could say that the dependently arisen emerges in
the wake of sunyata.
Scott:
I think in doing this you are reverting back to a conventional view, rather
than keeping with the Nagarjuna/Derrida/Magliola position. That is, why
speak of DQ as an originating factor at all? To me it leads to privileging
DQ over SQ.
Paul said:
So, is Pirsigian Dynamic Quality another term for the same process? I
certainly think that the MOQ can be read that way and if so, then universals
and particulars are rather meaningless with respect to the MOQ, as far as I
can tell.
Scott:
They are not present in the MOQ, and therefore the MOQ has no basis for
discussing language, consciousness, or intellect. (Well, more accurately, as
I see it, SPOV is equivalent to 'universal', but since the MOQ is missing a
correlative phrase for 'particular' it isn't able to give an account of how
SPOV work). If one wants to philosophically explore these topics, one cannot
do so without bringing in universals and particulars (or some equivalent).
Paul said:
Finally, do you have any thoughts on my suggestion that contradictory
identity is itself logocentric, as Magliola indicates with respect to
Heidegger?
"Recall that conventionally, thinking and Being are considered not just
contraries, but contradictories - thinking is the contradictory of
non-thinking, and non-thinking is Being...In other words, Heidegger is
affirming the identity of these contradictories....The superb irony, of
course, is that here we see Heidegger deconstructing the first phase,
logocentric rationalism; and [later] we shall see the Heideggerian sort of
logocentrism likewise deconstructed!" [Magliola, Derrida on the Mend, p74]
Scott:
I wouldn't be surprised if Magliola, Nagarjuna, and Derrida would see what I
want to do with contradictory identity as being logocentric, though my
version is different from what is said here. In the first place, I see being
and becoming as being a contradictory identity, not being and thinking.
'Thinking' is a name for the CI of being/becoming. (There are many
variations: for 'thinking' one can use 'conciousness' and 'value', for
'being/becoming' there are 'continuity/change', 'universal/particular',
'dynamic/static (in the MOQ sense)', and so on --these are not all
interchangeable, BTW.) Now I don't see this as logocentric, since the
"center" de-centers itself, in that when one tries to think about it, one
gets that "interminable sliding", or as Merrell-Wolff put it, the one term
turns into the other. Nevertheless, it is the case that I think that a
metaphysics can be written with CI as its center (or has been, albeit
unsystematically -- see Barfield's "What Coleridge Thought"). What keeps it,
as I see it, from being logocentric is that CI is not an originating factor
since there is nothing separate from it that gets originated -- all reality
"just is" CI doing its thing. If nothing else, it eliminates the SOM-like
distinction between the metaphysics and something the metaphysics is
"about". Instead, the metaphysics is an example of what it is about. The
logic is the metaphysics.
- Scott
- Scott
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