From: Matt Kundert (pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com)
Date: Sat Oct 01 2005 - 23:56:47 BST
Hey David,
David said:
This monism, or sometimes non-reductive physicalism, contrasts with
something key to the MOQ. The MOQ prefers to talk about SQ that exists at
different levels, hence giving equal ontological status to SQ no matter what
level we place it on with a non-reductive or emergent relationship between
the levels. So that SQ is related to DQ/possibility in a comparable way no
matter whether SQ is on the particle, molecule, cell, instinct, or cultural
product level. The retention of physicalism or monism seems to contrast with
this 'equality' of SQ in the MOQ. Although I would be happy to be a monist
of a meaningless sort, to overcome dualism, but indicating a common
source/substance that is simply incredibly plastic,closer to Aristotle's
idea of matter, i.e. that which is open to all the possibilities of form.
Do I contrast this correctly would you say?
Matt:
I would say not exactly. The heart of me describing pragmatism as a monism
would be the _non-reductive_ part, sans any adjoining -ism. I see this as
perfectly in line with Pirsig's system because Pirsig's system starts as a
single "entity"---Quality. It doesn't start as a dualism between SQ and DQ,
just Quality. He then suggests that the best way to begin describing
Quality (which is another way to say "define" or "make the first
metaphysical cut") is not the old subject/object cut or his tentative
suggestion of the romantic/classic distinction in ZMM, but his new
Dynamic/static distinction.
I take his point in that section of Lila, along with his redescription of
causation as "pre-conditional valuation," to be that no distinction one
makes of Quality cuts reality at the joints, no cut is a hard, old school
metaphysical cut of reality into distinct natural kinds (like the Platonic
shadows/Forms cut or or the Cartesian mind/matter cut), but are rather
practical distinctions made for specific purposes. Thus I take Pirsig to be
an anti-reductionist, somebody who does not want to _reduce_ all Xs to Ys,
but simply wants to sometimes describe Xs as Ys. Somebody who, instead of
saying, "All Xs are _really_ Ys," will say, "Okay, for this specific
purpose, it might be helpful to think in terms of Ys instead of Xs."
This should strike people as paradoxical. After all, doesn't Pirsig reduce
everything to Quality, everything to value? Well, he does, but I think the
only reason it looks paradoxical is because he's using an older terminology,
viz. the metaphyisical terminology. As I said before, from a _metaphysical_
point of view, from the point of view of someone who wants to make hard
cuts, pragmatism will look like a monism, just like Pirsig, because both
refuse to make any hard cuts. And as everyone is well aware, Pirsig owns up
to this very paradox when he says the Metaphysics of Quality is a
contradiction in terms. And if I'm reading you right, this might be what
you mean when you say, "I would be happy to be a monist of a meaningless
sort, to overcome dualism, but indicating a common source/substance that is
simply incredibly plastic." However, I would add that I take that monism to
be meaningless precisely because its there simply to overcome dualism _and
all other reductions_, so that on the other side looking for a common source
or substance seems kind of quaint.
(This is how I think people should take my suggestion about getting rid of
metaphysics. I'm not suggesting we get rid of "defining," I'm suggesting we
get rid of "hard cuts." The smell of paradox arises in Pirsig because the
metaphysical terminology was developed to be "defining-as-making-hard-cuts."
Pirsig uncouples "defining" from "hard cuts," but everything in the
language still revolves around those "hard cuts," so it sometimes sounds
like bad metaphysical-as-hard-cuts instead of innocuous
metaphysical-as-defining. All I'm suggesting is that Pirsig can look less
paradoxical if we use a different set of terms to describe what he's up to.)
Matt
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