From: Matt Kundert (pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com)
Date: Mon Oct 03 2005 - 02:44:56 BST
DMB,
I think this conversation has become fruitless. There really doesn't seem
to be much point in continuing it. Either I have to go out of my way to
explain every little thing I write or you have to go out of your way to try
and understand what I do have written. You seem unwilling to do the latter
and I don't have the time or energy to do more of the former than I've
already tried.
The one thing I will say is that I'm surprised at your reply to my comment
on Hayes.
Matt said:
I have three comments about your use of Hayes. One, my distinctively
Pirsigian instincts reacted poorly to, "The deciding characteristic that
separates these two categories [of cognition] is the presence or absence of
some kind of judgment...." I realize that Hayes works some qualification
around this, but for someone impressed by Pirsig, I would think that all
categories of cognition would in some sense be judgments (since everything
is Quality). I just can't imagine Pirsig signing on to anything that said,
"a cognition in which there is a complete absence of creative judgment," no
less than as the description of his DQ, which I would've thought would have
been more like the complete _presence_ of creativity. So I'm not sure what
the up-shot is of putting (at least that part of) Hayes together with
Pirsig.
DMB said:
Frankly, I'm a bit surprized that you do not already see the similarity
between Hayes' "complete absence of creative judgement" and Pirsig's
"pre-intellectual experience". How about if we compare Pirsig's
"undifferentiated aesthetic continuum" with Dignaga's "pure sensation"? ...
What if "static patterns" can be described as "creative judgements". ... To
put it in plain english, I'm talking about two categories of experience, one
that divides reailty and one that doesn't. ... So, if DQ is
pre-intellectual, meaning DQ is experience without conceptual divisions,
then likewise, "pure sensation" is experience without "creative judgement".
Matt:
If you thought you were connecting two thinkers on _one_ idea, "two
categories of experience, one that divides reality and one that doesn't,"
then I think you're wrong. Its no big deal to do a head count of people who
talk about division and non-division of reality if that's all you were
doing. That's not really all that interesting. And that's not what I took
you to be doing. I took you to be doing something interesting in your
pairing of Hayes and Pirsig, which is to say you take at least two ideas in
the two thinkers, match up the obvious X with the other obvious X (Hayes or
Dignaga's "pure sensation" with Pirsig's "pre-intellectual experience"), and
then use one Y (Hayes' "a cognition in which there is a complete absence of
creative judgment") to highlight and amplify the other guy's more obscure Y
(Pirsig's "DQ").
It would have been surprising if I'd missed the connection between pure
sensation and pre-intellectual experience. I saw that surface similarity.
What I was suggesting is that the surface similarity was obscuring a deeper
difference, not a deeper likeness. I was (pro hoc) suggesting that your
further assertion that "if DQ is pre-intellectual, meaning DQ is experience
without conceptual divisions, then likewise, 'pure sensation' is experience
without 'creative judgement'" should look like there's something wrong with
it to a Pirsigian. What I was in passing suggesting was that Pirsig's use
of Northrop's "undifferentiated aesthetic continuum," with the emphasis on
_aesthetic_, was enough of a description to make us wary of any experience
described as the "absence of some kind of judgment." I was suggesting that
Pirsig's hot stove example from Lila, as his description of the
pre-intellectual experience in action, should be enough to dissuade us from
accepting Hayes because Pirsig's purpose, in that example, was to show us
how valuing, _judging_, is at the very core of all experience. I was
suggesting that Pirsig's description in Lila of reality as being coextensive
with morality (morality being all about judging) should be enough to make us
think twice before accepting that Hayes and Pirsig have the same
descriptions of "pure sensation."
Be all that as it may, you could possibly convince me, maybe not that Pirsig
is in any way suggesting that some part of our experience is not valuing or
judging, but that static patterns are where all the creativity happens
(maybe not as Pirsig describes them, but as _we_ should, pace Pirsig,
describe them). I've been traveling down that road for some time and it
seems like a good one.
However, the real crux of our differences is the use of "pure sensation" at
all. Not in describing what Pirsig thinks he's up to. Oh no, I totally
agree there. That's why I totally see what your pointing to in the relation
between Pirsig and Hayes on "pure sensation" (though I think it unhelpful
because he would appear to be up to something a little different than Pirsig
for the above reasons). Our difference here is summed up by the fact that
you, Pirsig, and Hayes all think "pure sensation" or some synonym is a good
concept, term, or phrase to use in a philosophy. I think you, Pirsig, and
Hayes are all wrong. (And I know I'm in the minority here.)
This is actually a good place where everything I've been saying comes to a
head. If you thought my problem was that I didn't see the distinction
between pure and sullied sensation, or pre-intellectual experience and
post-, or DQ and static patterns as highlighted by those descriptions, in
Pirsig and others in the mystical tradition (school of thought, whatever),
then you were wrong. I understand that. I just disagree with it. What
I've been trying to suggest to you for the last few weeks was that we can do
without that distinction (in a certain qualified sense) and still get
everything we want out of mysticism.
I know you disagree with this. You think that distinction the very heart of
mysticism. In one sense, I agree, but in another sense (the sense I've been
trying to elaborate), I disagree. For instance, I can generally agree with
you that "music and lots of other art is basically a non-verbal experience,"
that fucking is generally a non-verbal experience (unless you're into
talking dirty, which muddies, so to speak, the example). If its obvious to
you in the sense that THERE'S NO TALKING, then we are in agreement here.
That's the general obviousness I see. However, these experiences can be
talked about. Some people love to talk about music and art. Some people
love pillow talk. When I said that pragmatism "makes a virtue of
necessity," I was talking about the fact that we can talk about _anything_
and that we do, in fact, talk about everything. I was saying that once you
start talking, that's when pragmatism comes into its own. And once we start
talking, once we start trying to describe our experiences, pragmatism is
suggesting that in epistemological conversations (in other words, when
talking about the nature of knowledge or knowing) it is best that we stay
away from the concept, term, phrase "pure sensation" or "unmediated
experience." I'm suggesting that in _those_ contexts (in the everyday sense
of the word, there is really nothing very esoteric about the way I use it),
those conversations, when you use "pure sensation" or "unmediated
experience" you are almost inevitably led towards the appearance/reality
distinction.
Again, you quite obviously disagree with me. But I can't try and elaborate
on why I see that now. A lot of what I've written since January was trying
to make good on that suggestion. My sparring with Paul back at the
beginning of the year was all about this. At the time, you didn't think
much of it. But all I'm suggesting is that the unmediated/mediated
distinction isn't very useful. If a conversation about the distinction's
utility goes anything like this:
X: "The divided/undivided distinction isn't very good."
Y: "What are you talking about? It's great!"
X: "No it isn't, it makes you fall back on the appearance/reality
distinction."
Y: "No it doesn't!"
X: "Sure it does. Here, I'll show you. Try and use it."
Y: (Tries using it, keeps being faced with the skeptic, and eventually says
that he doesn't have to answer the skeptic.)
X: "Well, if you're don't want to answer the skeptic, you've pretty much
avoided epistemology."
Y: "Fine then. I don't want to do epistemology."
X: "Alright, good then. If that's the case, though, then what's the
distinction _for_ if not epistemological conversations?"
Y: "Its for describing experience."
X: "Yeah, but why? Why do we need it to describe experience? To what
purpose does it serve?"
Y: "It helps in describing experience, its useful, as you keep saying."
X: "Yeah, but _how_ is it useful?"
Y: "Well, we need it to adequately describe our experience."
X: "If that's your only answer, then you're in trouble."
As I started saying, if the conversation goes anything like that, then the
user of the distinction is, to quote X, "in trouble." The reason Y's in
trouble is because "adequacy" only comes into play if you are trying to
_represent_ something already there (i.e. experience or reality). That's
representationalism to a T. And if you have representationalism, as you
tacitly agreed to earlier, then you have the appearance/reality distinction.
If Y doesn't say adequate, and can't really think of a replacement purpose
for keeping it around, then that's a good reason for thinking that the
distinction has outlived its usefulness.
So I still don't know, DMB. I said at the very beginning of this post that
this conversation seemed to be dead. And it still does. But I tried saying
something again anyways. I'm guessing you'll reply again (we both seem to
have a problem with leaving dead horses alone) and we can only assume I'll
try again in some sort of response to that. But I'm tired and out of
patience and lacking in time, as I'm guessing you are. If you want to
resurrect my spirit for this conversation, my request is that you not try
and beat me down for everything I say (which is really more debilitating to
a conversation then helpful and I ignored a lot to try and move this one
forward), but focus on the narrow point above: what is the purpose of the
distinction between divided/undivided reality that avoids "adequacy" and
similar cognates. We can work from there if you want, or if there's some
similar, narrow point you'd rather talk about, we can go from there.
Matt
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