From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Tue Mar 04 2003 - 15:50:45 GMT
Matt S:
> Well you seem to be quite happy to dismiss all of
> postmodernism (except Pirsig) with the questionable
> notion that this is a paradox, so I guess we're just
> going round in circles here.
I'm quite happy to dismiss self-contradictory statements like "All
thought is relative" and "There are no absolutes."
> Foucault never denies
> the existence of 'all universals', as I said before,
> only that the idea of a continuous, accurate continuum
> of thought is a myth.
That "only" idea is a "universal."
> (in fact, I don't know what the
> big deal is with these 'universals' anyway to be
> honest: they seem to merely be a way of
> over-simplifying the inherent complexity in postmodern
> analysis).
Well, I don't know what the big deal is with "postmodern analysis" which
lays claims to the truth of its analysis while in the same breath denying
that one truth is better than another.
> But I state it again, that there is no
> paradox as it is quite possible to use verifiable
> historico-analytical methods to show how people think
> has changed throughout history. What's wrong with
> this?
Nothing. If that's all postmodernism says--that it's true that people have
changed how they think over the years--I have no argument with it. But
when it goes on to claim that no truth is inherently better than any
other, I hop off the train.
> If Foucault's methods of thought must by
> implication be relative, does this mean we should
> refrain from reading his works? If so, how is thought
> to progress in opposition to this stubbornness? Do we
> just ignore the great revelations being made in our
> understanding, and stick to our nice comfortable
> metaphysical lies?
How do you know Foucault isn't spreading a bunch of metaphysical lies
if you admit to no standards of truth?
> > > And if you contend that Pirsig
> > > is not postmodern at all, what do you make of his
> > idea
> > > of the relativity and interchangeability of
> > > metaphysics?
> >
> > Could you run that by me again with a quotation from
> > Pirsig that says
> > what I think you're saying? Perhaps you're referring
> > to his maps
> > metaphor?
>
> I'm afraid I don't have either of his books with me at
> the moment. But I recall Pirsig saying that the MoQ
> isn't superior to the SOM by default, it is merely
> Pirsig's proposition that it 'fits' better with
> thinking. Is this wrong?
No. You're right. That's part of the MOQ, recognizing the value of other
intellectual patterns. To my knowledge, no other metaphysics allows
a competing metaphysics to have value. You, for example, give
postmodern metaphysics a thumbs up for reasons I have yet to discern
and am trying to find out (even though postmodernism denies there is
any such thing as a metaphysics.) But I give it a thumbs down because
it doesn't meet Pirsig's standard (and mine) of "logical consistency."
Platt
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