From: Matt Kundert (pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com)
Date: Fri Oct 07 2005 - 23:11:30 BST
Case,
Case said:
I may be saying that as an sentient being I have to start with a subject
object distinction in the same way that as a mammal I started with breast
milk. But I don't take that to mean anything special about the ultimate
nature of reality.
...
I was a bit hazy on the distinction taxonomy but I can work with that.
Although I would point out that hard distinctions can only be revealed
through the use of language which is inherently soft in this sense.
...
The existance of grey does not negate the hard distinction between black and
white. Rather it reveals the range of possiblity in the relationship.
Matt:
I want to firm up what I mean by "hard" and "soft." The difference I'm
getting at is that with hard distinctions, there can be no grey between
them. A hard distinction does not demarcate a continuum between two terms,
which is, rather, what happens when a distinction is "soft." What I mean by
hard distinctions are distinctions that get at the ultimate nature of
reality. For instance, from the part I like about what you've been saying,
it makes perfect sense for you to say that language "is inherently soft,"
but it doesn't make sense for you to say that hard distinctions can be
revealed--at all. The use of "reveal" is in particular disquieting because
it swings you around to the metaphor of "revealing" the "hard reality"
behind the "soft appearances."
Another way to put this is asking about your analogy between sentience and
mammals. If the S/O distinction is hard, then it is a necessary
relationship that gets at "true reality." You seem not to want that. You
say you don't and then your analogy gives us a _contingent_ relationship.
If this is the case, though, that means that sentience starting with the S/O
distinction is a function of education. Mammals don't have to start with
breast milk anymore--we don't, for instance. Its a contingent matter that
they do. But if that _is_ the case, then your analogy means we _can_ throw
off the "shackles" of SOM. And that's what I would try and persuade you of.
I would try and suggest that Descartes didn't discover something innately
human. I would try and show you that we don't have to live with the
paradoxes that arise out of your attempt to go around the difficulties of
Cartesian philosophy while still living your life. Which is what I'll try
and briefly begin suggesting below.
Case said:
As you point out western philosophy has been tap dancing around Decartes for
four hundred or so years. Even Decartes tap danced around Decartes. So
rather than breaking out my boogy shoes I deal with the problem in the only
way that makes sense to me. I accept the existance of others. I accept the
existance of the material would. I believe that that I can infer things
about other subjects through referance to my own internal states.
I accept these things on Faith.This lets me get about my business and the
lingering shred of doubt keeps me honest.
Matt:
What I would try and suggest is that there is an easier way to make sense of
the situation, one that eliminates paradoxical "leaps of faith" you've
described. The first thing I would suggest is that "these things" you take
on faith are things you're only taking on "philosophical faith." I doubt
that you are constantly besieged by doubt about the existence of others and
rocks when you go about your business on a day to day basis. "Faith" would
seem to imply that you have no reasons for believing that there is a
material world. But you have plenty of regular, common sense reasons. It
helps to believe in an independent material world so you don't stub your toe
all the time. These, in fact, are the reasons you _do_ believe in the
material world and other people, despite your "lack" of reasons. What you
lack are _philosophical_ reasons, which leads you to say that you believe
them on faith.
What I want to suggest is that your being impressed by Descartes is going to
lead you down an historically predictable path. If you think we are
_forced_ into confronting solipsism by something in the nature of things,
then you are going to start to want reasons for avoiding it. The continued
failure to find them, and yet our continued ability to function well enough,
leads you to a bifurcation of the conceptual terrain. On the one hand, you
have solipsism because you can find no reasons for avoiding it. On the
other hand, you function as a human being in a world of other sentient
beings and physical stuff. You see the belief in other people and physical
objects as simply being assumptions, ones from which you build useful
inferences to function, but if never supported by reasons, could potentially
make an ass out of u and me.
This is the path that leads from Descartes to Kant. Kant confronted
Descartes problem, bifurcated the world into the noumena and phenomena, and
solved the problem of solipsism by saying that we function in the world as
empirical realists, but to support that realism we have to be transcendental
idealists.
To suggest that this is a bad idea, I would first ask why we are _forced_
into solipsism. What in the nature of the world suggests this? Merely
asking the question, of course, makes us confront the idea that, by saying
we are forced into solipsism, we are asking about the true nature of
reality. So if we ask the above question, by what criteria can we answer it
successfully? How are we to agree on a set of criteria? Wouldn't we then
need criteria to guide our choice of criteria? Isn't this the same lack of
criteria in determining the nature of reality, i.e. what reality does and
doesn't force us to believe, the same lack of criteria you noticed in
deciding what somebody's inner states are?
If we do lack hard, philosophical critieria about what reality does and
doesn't force us to believe, then we are led to believe that the idea of
solipsism, and all of its Cartesian supports, are a set of assumptions,
assumptions that lead you to a set of inferences. These inferences lead you
to claim that assumptions about other people are unsupported, they are
_simply_ assumptions one must believe on faith. But what are your
_philosophical_ reasons for believing the set of _Cartesian_ assumptions?
If we have no criteria for determing their touch-down to the foundation of
reality, then they swing just as free as your assumptions in other people
and the material world.
And if this is the case, can we not then _change_ these starting assumptions
so that instead of leaving our assumptions about other people out to hang,
they hang together nicely and supported?
If we can change it, then the first place we should start is in the belief
that looking for hard, philosophical reasons and criteria is a good (or even
neccessary) thing. We do that by discarding the hard/soft distinction we
were using in the first place. Instead, we use a distinction between
criteria that are easy to get agreement on (like when you kicked a rock) and
criteria that is difficult to get agreement on (like when we've solved the
problem of solipsism).
That's, at least, how I would begin to make that suggestion.
Matt
_________________________________________________________________
Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE!
http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archives:
Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Fri Oct 07 2005 - 23:46:52 BST