From: Matt Kundert (pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com)
Date: Wed Oct 12 2005 - 20:08:21 BST
Ian,
Ian said:
Would you agree there is a difference between
(1) The immediate value valued (in your / our Pirsigian sense hopefully),
and
(2) Some subsequent conceptualisation of whatever has been experienced
(immediately valued) in order to support some intellectual judgement /
argument / whatever ?
The former being immediate valuing The latter being an intellectual
fabrication (Whatever we call actually them ?)
We Pirsigians may be saying (2) is old SOMism, subsidiary to (1) and
therefore not to be valued too highly, but we are surely nothing as extreme
as denying its existence entirely in any common sense sense ?
Matt:
There is a difference between 1 and 2 for Pirsigians that think there is
something like a "pre-intellectual experience" that is philosophically
useful, yes. This is what I mean about a real difference between me and DMB
and me and what Pirsig seems to be suggesting (about half the time) because
I don't think there is a philosophically useful or interesting distinction
to be made between 1 and 2. It also highlights Platt's agreement with my
frowning at DMB's use of Hayes. Platt thinks that to use pure sensation as
Hayes does is to drain out Pirsig's central insight. I agree. But, I also
think that using "pure sensation" or "pre-intellectual experience" _at all_
will eventually, when seen to its consequences, undermine Pirsig's central
insight. Platt doesn't, which makes sense because neither does Pirsig. But
that's the difference between Platt, DMB, and myself. I think DMB has more
or less correctly pushed pure sensation to find its philosophical
consequences, but I think that simply exposes why we should just ditch the
whole idea. From my perspective, DMB wants to preserve "pre-intellectual
experience" more than the notion of "Quality," Platt (like Pirsig) wants to
(per impossible) somehow balance them, and I want to preserve the notion of
"Quality" more than pure sensation.
Another way to put this is to say that there's nothing philosophically
interesting about the difference between one's gut reaction and one's
further reflections. It seems to me that Pirsig is banking on this
commonsensical distinction to get our assent about the notion of a
"pre-intellectual experience" (compare Phaedrus' response to Rigel on
whether Lila has quality in the beginning of the book to Lila's doll's
saying to Pirsig at the end of the book that _that_ response was the one
moral thing Phaedrus did in the whole novel), but "pre-intellectual
experiece" is anything but commonsensical--it is a term of philosophical
art, a philosopher's tool. If one spins out the difference between pure and
impure sensation as you did above, a description that tries to span the
distance between philosophy and common sense (in order to try and get
agreement from me, to make it look like something simple, which is exactly
why Pirsig does it), it would seem that you'd be commited to saying that
one's gut reactions are to valued more highly than further reflection. But
this doesn't seem right. Not only is there no way to tell whether gut
reactions are on the par better than further reflections (let alone always
better), it seems wrong in so far as some people would seem to have pretty
bad gut reactions. They could stand to reflect a little bit more about
their life and choices and not be so impulsive. Sure, gut reactions are
where we start when making choices and figuring out what we value, but I'm
not sure why we should say that gut reactions are the best test of high
quality. It seems to me that they're the _first_ test, but its only after
reflection we should feel safe. (And I'm implying neither that never being
impulsive is good (impulsive sex in public places can be great) nor that we
should be Frettin' Freddies, always overthinking.)
In sum, I'm saying two things:
1) There's a difference between the common sense notions of "gut reaction"
and "pre-intellectual experience." (The corollary being, not only am I
claiming that the MoQ, in this context, has nothing to do with "gut
reaction," but also that SOM, in this context, has nothing to do with
"further reflection.")
2) One of the ways "pre-intellectual experience" (or "pure sensation") will
eat alive Pirsig's central claim about Quality is exhibited by DMB's recent
posts. (The corollary being that Pirsig's central claim about Quality will
eat alive Pirsig's reliance on "pre-intellectual experience," as I've tried
to exhibit on occasion.)
Matt
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