Re: MD The SOL fallacy was the intelligence fallacy (was Rhetoric)

From: david buchanan (dmbuchanan@hotmail.com)
Date: Mon Oct 24 2005 - 00:05:33 BST

  • Next message: david buchanan: "Re: MD Rhetoric"

    Scott and all MOQers:

    Scott said:
    ...DMB regards the MOQ's treatment of intellect as holy writ, and so
    considers it an adequate reply to ridicule what I say simply because it goes
    counter to the MOQ. ...I should add that changing the way one thinks about
    intellect also means changing the way one thinks about DQ, and I think that
    is really what drives DMB up a wall.

    dmb says:
    Holy writ? The purpose of my ridicule was simply to demonstrate that your
    assertions were less than logical. If I'm demanding conformity to anything
    here, its conformity to the laws of making sense. I think you understand
    that much. By now you must have realized that I consider it a duty and a
    pleasure to remind you that you're not making any sense. I was way past due,
    don't you think?

    But seriously, as I see it, your assertions were contradictory and
    confusing. I tried to show that. I can take the humor (at your expense) out
    of it and take you through it step by step, but that's not very fun for me.

    Scott explained:
    Here I am just saying that whatever one can say about DQ can be said about
    intellect. That means that intellect is DQ, but does not imply that all DQ
    is intellect. If you want to rebut the claim, what is there that you can say
    about DQ that does not also apply to intellect? Well, I do see some
    confusion, in that I should be distinguishing between dynamic and static
    intellect, where dynamic intellect is whatever it is that, for example,
    Einstein employed in coming up with the static intellect we call the
    theories of special and general relativity. Do you deny that we should call
    that intellect? If not, let us proceed with examining what we say about DQ:

    dmb replies:
    Dynamic intellect? See, you've had to invent a new category, one that is
    apparently self contradictory, in order to make a contradictory assertion.
    The "confusion" you refer to is not a failure to distinquish between static
    and dynamic intellect, the confusion comes from trying to assert that
    "whatever one can say about DQ can be said about intellect". That's what
    makes no sense. This might be a bit humorous, but the point is to reveal the
    lack of logic in your assertions.

    "Here I am just saying that whatever one can say about wetness can be said
    about dryness. That means that dryness is wetness, but does not imply that
    all wetness is dry. If you want to rebut the claim, what is there that you
    can say about wetness that does not also apply to dryness? Well,
    I do see some confusion, in that I should be distinguishing between wet and
    dry dryness, where wet dryness is whatever it is that, for example, Einstein
    employed in coming up with the dryness we call the theories of special and
    general relativity. Do you deny that we should call that dryness? If not,
    let us proceed with examining what we say about wetness:"

    Scott continued:
    DQ is undivided. How can one say that dynamic intellect is divided if it can
    transcend any division and create new divisions? DQ leaves new SQ in its
    wake. Dynamic intellect leaves new concepts (symbolic SQ, aka static
    intellect) in its wake. DQ is pre-intellectual. Well, I called this
    nonsensical. How does it make sense that whatever Einstein employed (or, if
    you like, employed Einstein) in coming up the the theories of relativity
    should be called "pre-intellectual"?

    dmb replies:
    Pirsig explains exactly this sort of intellectual creativity. The SOVD paper
    and the Poincare example springs to mind. As I understand it, the thinker
    manipulates the symbols around the problem looking for an explanation or a
    solution of some kind and of the virtually infinite possible answers, one
    will be selected dynamically, on the basis of that pre-intellectual Quality.
    Later that selected answer will be symbollicaly manipulated until it can be
    shown to work in static terms, until it is latched. And this kind of
    creativity is only consistent with the overall evolutionary scheme of the
    MOQ. Alll levels of static quality evolve dynamically. All new patterns are
    selected dynamically. Yep, even at the intellectual level.

    Scott said:
    That's all I can think of at the moment. What else did you have in mind that
    rebuts my claim that whatever one says about DQ can be said about dynamic
    intellect? (There is, of course, DQ as it applies to the other levels. and
    that would be different, but that, as I say, requires the further
    argumentation.)

    dmb replies:
    You've invented this new category "dynamic intellect" in order to get at a
    perfectly legitmate question about intellectual creativity, but you do so as
    if Pirsig never addressed the issue or indeed, demonstrated in his own
    personal efforts in the writing of the book we are here to discuss. That
    just kills me. You keep pretending to be a MOQ detractor, but I think you're
    only objecting to your own questions, which stem from your own
    misconceptions. And then you come of with stuff like "dynamic intellect" and
    offer it as an improvement? I think it not only fails to improve anything, I
    don't even think it makes sense, about as much sense as the confusing and
    contradictory concept of "wet dryness". Here's one more example of the lack
    of logic that provoked my cruelty. And, again, this is you trying to explain
    AFTER the ridicule...

    DMB had said:
    Also, you say intellect manipulates, creates, and sheds concepts, but its
    not bound by concepts and is concept-free?

    Scott replied:
    Yes. Not bound means free, doesn't it? Intellect is concept-free in the same
    sense that we say that DQ is SQ-free. Of course there is no intellect
    without some concepts, but then there is no DQ without some SQ.

    dmb now says:
    Right. And sugar-free gum is not bound by sugar and Caffine-free soda is
    unrestricted by stimulants.

    You have GOT to be kidding me.

    Its pretty clear that you get my point. I was objecting to the assertion
    that intellect could be concept-free in the normal sense, that it was
    without concepts the way fat-free ice cream has no fat. That's why, after
    pretending concept-free means "not bound by", you admit that "there is no
    intellect with some concepts". But c'mon, Scott. What the hell is a
    concept-free intellect? Do I really have to explain why that makes no sense?
    Isn't it more correct to say that intellect is absolutely stuffed to the
    gills with concepts. Its moves like this that make me ask if English is your
    second language or if you were raised in the wild by a tribe of dyslexic
    chimps. And besides all that, it seems to me that intellect is basically
    bound by concepts since intellectual static patterns and their manipulation
    pretty much defines its domain.

    But getting back to the larger issue, its not difficult to see that static
    and dynamic, as Pirsig uses them, are approximately opposite. They define
    each other by being what the other is not. They are the two main categories,
    the first distinction which all others follow. I'm not saying this is sacred
    ground, just that these are very basic and very central ideas in the MOQ.
    And it just seems to me that this distinction shouldn't be erased or undone
    for any trival reason. And so far from you, sir, I see no reason at all. At
    least not any that make sense. AS DM said, "I think you are wrong and that
    you disagree with a Pirsig of your own making." For example...

    Scott said:
    I am not saying that all that Pirsig talks about is the superiority of DQ
    over intellect. I am saying that he frequently talks of intellect as
    covering up, or taking one away from DQ, as in the hot stove example. The
    painful sensation is seen as "pure", while the thinking about it seen as, I
    guess, impure, derivative, and so on -- in a word, seen as inferior. Why
    isn't it also seen as "pure"?

    dmb replies:
    Here you have used your own characterizations to describe the distinction
    between the pre-intellectual experience and the manipulation of abstract
    symbols, between DQ and sq. But your characterization defies what Pirsig
    says about the need to balance the two, about correcting Phaedrus' mistake
    on that very point; putting DQ above sq. He does not frequently talk about
    intellect "covering up, or taking one away from DQ". He merely makes the
    distinction between the two kinds of experience. He does not frequently talk
    about intellect as "impure, derivative" or "inferior" either. I sincerely
    wonder if he EVER characterized intellect that way. He hammers on our
    cultural blindspot against DQ and points out that spiritual enlightenment is
    distinctly different from intellectual understanding, but I think its rather
    disengenuous to suggest Pirsig makes intellect out to be anything less than
    the most evolved and open ended level, the most dynamic static patterns.,
    :-)

    Scott said:
    In the hot stove example, Pirsig says that the mystic is on (or closer to)
    the Dynamic edge of the painful situation. But he also says that the mystic
    can be on the Dynamic edge of intellectual activity. So I should have
    acknowledged that about Pirsig's description. But then I have to ask: why is
    the Dynamic edge of intellectual activity called "pre-intellectual"?. It is,
    of course, this characterization of DQ (as pre-intellectual) that -- to me
    at least -- is the basis for my characterization of Pirsig's attitude toward
    intellect]

    dmb replies:
    Kudos for the correction.

    I hear writers talk about this sort of thing all the time. They talk about
    how it is the ego-mind or monkey-mind that has to do all the research,
    editing and re-writing. But when the research has been done and the
    creativity begins, they stop talking about it in terms of writing and start
    talking about it in terms of listening to the characters they've created.
    The people in the play tell the writer what they are going to say and do
    within the story. And I think its pretty clear that this just one example of
    how people hang on to the cutting edge of experience, even the ongoing
    experience of thought itself. The creative scientists are not so different.
    Einstein and Poincare had to go to school and do their work, they had to use
    their ego monkey minds to get to the point where creativity could then be
    used. In both cases the choices are infinite, but somehow, not through a
    process of elimination or any other logical selection process, BAM, one just
    seems right. Pirisg's distinction is not invented out of thin air. It refers
    to actual experience that people have all the time.

    Thanks.
    dmb

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