From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Thu Nov 03 2005 - 20:05:18 GMT
Hey, Platt --
> I see that you're jumping up and down with glee because Michael Hamilton
> has apparently agreed with your take on the "proprietary self." However,
> your happiness is based on a gigantic strawman, namely, that Pirsig
> totally rejects the subject-object view of existence.
My euphoria might have been somewhat premature, as I see that Michael is
irretrievably tied to the heirarchy doctrine. However, his assertion "that
the very understanding of a metaphysics depends on the subject/object
divide"
is to my way of thinking a significant breakthrough for an MoQ loyalist. In
his 11/2 note to Matt, Mike stated that "Pirsig's unease at writing a
metaphysics in the first place could boil down to this fact." I think that
is demonstrably true. And it explains why most of the infighting here has
been about the misconceived 4th level 'Intellect'.
Instinctively, we all know that awareness, intellect and thought are
proprietary to the individual. But in order to conform to the official
doctrine, we're obliged to pretend that this isn't so -- that conscious
activity is not indigenous to the self but a "communal trough" lying in some
esthetic domain which has its own "moral" agenda. The real agenda is to
deny man his proper role in the scheme of things.
Let me try to show you how Pirsig's deceptively simple prose begs the
question on this issue.
> "This may sound as though a purpose of the Metaphysics of
> Quality is to trash all subject-object thought but that's not true.
> Unlike subject-object metaphysics the Metaphysics of Quality
> does not insist on a single exclusive truth.
Why not? Why isn't his Quality thesis "a single exclusive truth"?
> If subjects and objects are held to be the ultimate reality
> then we're permitted only one construction of things-that which
> corresponds to the "objective" world-and all other constructions
> are unreal. But if Quality or excellence is seen as the ultimate
> reality then it becomes possible for more than one set of truths
> to exist. Then one doesn't seek the absolute "Truth."
If "excellence" were the ultimate reality, then existence would be
perfection. Obviously, this is not the case. Pirsig is implying a higher
realm of reality than Quality operating in existence, yet he doesn't posit
it. Instead he imputes relativity to Truth, asserting that there may be
numerous truths and that seeking the "absolute Truth" is futile. There's
where he blows his metaphysics.
> One seeks instead the highest quality intellectual explanation
> of things with the knowledge that if the past is any guide to
> the future this explanation must be taken provisionally; as
> useful until something better comes along.
According to Pirsig, personal beliefs are chosen from a philosophical menu
based on how "useful" they are at a given time. What does this say about
philosophical integrity? How are we to know which choice is the "better"
one for all time? Why bother? -- it's all relative anyway.
> One can then examine intellectual realities the same way
> he examines paintings in an art gallery, not to find which
> one is the "real" painting, but simply to enjoy and keep
> those that are of value. There are many sets of intellectual
> reality in existence and we can perceive some to have more
> quality than others, but that we do so is, in part, the result
> of our history and current patterns of values." (Lila, 8)
In order words, we can choose any ideology that "feels good". And what
feels good depends on our cultural heritage, personal history, and current
value orientation. I expect a philosophy to be more substantive than that,
Platt. And, for someone who believes in absolute moral standards, you would
seem a most unlikely advocate of such relativistic nonsense.
> Obviously you judge your "proprietary self" to be
> an extremely high quality concept, a Rembrandt as t'were
> of ontology.
It isn't MY self that I place on a column for others to revere. (Indeed,
I'm hardly the egotist some of you paint me as.) I don't know about the
"quality" of proprietary selfness, but I do know that it is empirically
valid.
What Michael has declared is that "the subject/object divide is fundamental
to what we are." That statement by itself is notable for its insight. When
we understand that subjectivity is the foundation or our experienced
reality, we can proceed on the logical assumption that the "objective world"
is our differentiated, finite perspective of its absolute Source.
(By the way, I happen to be an admirer of Rembrandt's paintings.)
Glad to see you're still hanging in there, Platt. We should chat more
often.
Essentially yours,
Ham
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