From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Fri Nov 04 2005 - 23:12:23 GMT
Platt --
I asked:
> Why isn't [Pirsig's] Quality thesis "a single exclusive truth"?
Your answer:
> Because, as Pirsig explains, "There are many sets of intellectual reality
> in existence and we can perceive some to have more quality than others."
What does that mean? What is an "intellectual reality set" and where can we
find it? As far as I know, we all experience the same physical reality that
we call existence. Many theories as to the metaphysical nature of that
existence haved been proposed by intellectuals whom we call philosophers.
Such theories may be searched in books or libraries -- but they are ideas or
hypotheses, not sets of "intellectual reality".
Somehow, Pirsigians have come up with a menu of things supposedly contained
in existence, most of which are commonly thought to be proprietary to
individual consciousness or its creative capability. Why do we need to deny
these human faculties?
> To quote from my favorite physicist, Paul Davies: "In the end a rational
> explanation for the world in the sense of a closed and complete system of
> logical truths is almost certainly impossible. We are barred from ultimate
> knowledge, from ultimate explanation, by the very rules of reasoning that
> prompt us to seek an explanation in the first place. It we wish to
> progress beyond, we have to embrace a different concept of
> 'understanding' from that of rational explanation."
Davies is correct (as usual); absolute truth is not accessible to man. I
have made this point in my own thesis. But if a philosopher doesn't have
enough confidence (faith?) in his thesis to call it a truth, why should we?
No metaphysical hypothesis can be proved empirically, but an idea can be
true conceptually even if it can't be absolutely proven. If I didn't think
my hypothesis was true, I wouldn't have put it on line.
> What in essence you are criticizing Pirsig for is the
> paradoxical necessity of expressing his beliefs using
> the assumptions of SOM even as he rails against its
> shortcomings. He admits as much: "A metaphysics of
> Quality is essentially a contradiction
> in terms, a logical absurdity." (Lila, 5)
It's absurd to me that the author found it necessary to defer to other
philosophers (who, incidentally, had no compunctions about setting their
ideas in a metaphysical thesis) because he considered his own philosophy
contradictory. The contradiction was not in the MoQ, but in the anticipated
antagonism of the 'positivists' whose empirical approach intimidated Pirsig,
and the 'mystics' to whom he eventually gave in.
"It has two kinds of opponents. The first are the philosophers of science,
most particularly the group called the logical positivists, who say that
only natureal science can legitimately investigate the nature of reality
...This is clearly the gwith which Franz Boaz , and because of him modern
American anthropology belongs.
"The second group of opponents are the mystics. ...Some of the most honored
philosophers in history have been mystics: Plotinus, Swedenborg, Loyola,
Shankarcharya and many others." [LILA, Chpt. 5]
Apparently, Pirsig did not want to antagonize Boaz (a fellow anthopologist?)
but felt he could handle the mystical group (though Plotinus is probably the
only "honored" mystic-philosopher he cited.) Catch the politics here,
Platt?
> I'm surprised you think philosophy's purpose is to
> inform us what is better for all time. Seems to me that's
> an answer only known to God.
I think philosophy's purpose is to explain the meaning of existence, and
particularly man's purpose in it. Certainly there are many to choose from;
but if the philosopher makes it clear that man is autonomous in his freedom,
the choice will reflect his personal values. That really is what life is all
about. Can I 'prove' it? No, but it's a workable concept that makes a lot
of sense. Why is it that your friend Pirsig never attempted to point that
out? Why did he feel it necessary to avoid the individuality of the self
and its role in the universe?
> In fact, many times when people find that their concepts
> of truth come in conflict with social patterns they are so
> threatened that they go along to get along, especially on the
> job. Nothing "feels good" about such compromises.
I guess that explains Pirsig's reluctance to define the individual.
> Indeed I do take an absolutist moral position against rape,
> kidnapping, lynching, slavery and murder as commonly
> defined. If you believe the same, the question I would
> pose to you is: "On what basis did you establish that
> belief?"
Because I believe than the individual is the "free agent" of his existential
reality, the sanctity of man and his freedom are the primary values. All of
the violent acts you've suggested deprive man of his freedom, hence are
contrary to his essential nature.
> Pirsig never claimed otherwise. He also claimed that morality is
> empirically valid. Do you agree? (I don't see how you disagree without
> making a moral judgment that instantly disproves your disagreement.)
I don't think Pirsig's novel comes anywhere near being a treatise on
morality. Morality an empirical truth? In relational terms, maybe. But,
you already know that I side with the moral relativists.
> What you assert is simply that there is no experience without an
> experiencer -- an assertion unfortunately you cannot prove without
> assuming the assertion. However, I admire your faith.
I don't need to prove it. It's self-evident!
Ideas are fun -- even if they can't be proved. Thanks for the discussion.
Regards,
Ham
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