From: Paul Turner (paul@turnerbc.co.uk)
Date: Fri Nov 11 2005 - 16:59:08 GMT
Final post for now! I won't be able to respond very quickly but I wanted to
get the posts out there anyway as they've been sat in my draft folder for a
while.
I have suggested before that it may be useful to recognise two theses within
the overall static pattern of the MOQ. Broadly speaking, insofar as thesis
(1) is largely an articulation of an epistemology of Quality, thesis (2) is
a dialectical exposition of a metaphysics. I will try and briefly outline
the scope of each thesis, as I see them.
--------------------------------------
Thesis (1) only describes the view that a reality of essentially undefined
Dynamic Quality, and not of independent objects, is what is primary in
experience and, significantly, is what produces all intellectual patterns of
knowledge. This thesis is mainly contained in ZMM, crystallising with
Pirsig's realisation that "[Dynamic] Quality is the generator of everything
we know," but is restated in LILA in the sections prior to the end of
Chapter 8. In this thesis, the everyday world of distinguishable things is
understood as the result of ongoing Dynamic Quality within the context of
different intellectual patterns or analogues.
It should be stated here that in thesis (1) (N.B. this includes all of ZMM)
the terms 'intellectual patterns' and 'intellectual' do not refer
unequivocally to the static patterns which are defined by the intellectual
level of thesis (2) because in thesis (1) there are no levels.
I suggest that it is the largely epistemological thesis (1) which Pirsig
refers to when he says in LILA'S CHILD that "Philosophic idealism is part of
the MOQ" and provides the context for understanding such statements as:
"Within the MOQ, the *idea* that static patterns of value start with the
inorganic level is considered to be a good *idea*." [LILA'S CHILD,
Annotation 97]
"It is important for an understanding of the MOQ to see that although
"common sense" dictates that inorganic nature came first, actually "common
sense" which is a set of ideas, has to come first. This "common sense" is
arrived at through a huge web of socially approved evaluations of various
alternatives. The key term here is "evaluation," i.e., quality decisions.
The fundamental reality is not the common sense or the objects and laws
approved of by common sense but the approval itself and the quality that
leads to it." [LILA'S CHILD, Notes on Annotation 97]
The key point of thesis (1) is that knowledge does not consist of
representations of independent properties of an objective world. Rather, it
is suggested that the properties of the world arise within the composition
of knowledge (and it is here that it agrees with philosophic idealism), and,
crucially, that this knowledge emerges from the ongoing experience of
Dynamic Quality and the value judgements it produces within the context of
existing patterns.
So, as with all knowledge according to this thesis, the intellectual pattern
of the MOQ is itself generated by a procession of value judgements, which
leads us to thesis (2).
---------------------------------
Thesis (2) is the articulation of the particular intellectual pattern - the
"plain of understanding" - of the MOQ. I think this second thesis is almost
entirely contained in LILA, starting from Chapter 9. In this chapter we see
a transition from the Dynamic Quality that *produces* intellectual value
judgments to the explanations that are the *result* of those value
judgments. These explanations include things like
-- the relationship between Dynamic Quality and static quality
-- the evolution of value patterns
-- the stratified ontology of the four levels
-- the moral codes which have evolved along with the levels
-- with respect to the first thesis, the other static patterns that it
proposes are required for social and intellectual patterns of knowledge to
be able to latch in the first place.
These are the pragmatic 'high quality' explanations of how the world might
operate in accordance with the assumption that values are the ubiquitous
element of an evolving reality. These are one set of general 'co-ordinates'
with which we might understand everything from the movement of electrons to
enlightenment. None of these explanations are forwarded in thesis (1).
-------------------------------------
Below are some brief suggestions on how the distinction into two theses can
be put to work in understanding the overall MOQ.
To begin, I think confusion has resulted from statements such as this one:
"The MOQ does not deny the traditional scientific view of reality as
composed of material substance and independent of us. It says it is an
extremely high quality idea. We should follow it whenever it is practical
to do so. But the MOQ, like philosophic idealism, says this scientific view
of reality is still an idea. If it were not an idea, then that "independent
scientific material reality" would not be able to change as new scientific
discoveries come in." [LILA'S CHILD, Notes on Annotation 4]
I think the confusion occurs with this statement because it contains the
perspectives of both theses and arguably equivocates on the term 'The MOQ'
as the name for both of them. I translate this statement as:
"The [second thesis of the] MOQ does not deny the traditional scientific
view of reality as composed of material substance and independent of us. It
says it is an extremely high quality idea. We should follow it whenever it
is practical to do so. But the [first thesis of the] MOQ, like philosophic
idealism, says this scientific view of reality is still an idea. If it were
not an idea, then that "independent scientific material reality" would not
be able to change as new scientific discoveries come in." [LILA'S CHILD,
Notes on Annotation 4]
And another example:
"The MOQ says that Quality comes first, which produces ideas, which produce
what we know as matter. The scientific community that has produced
Complementarity almost invariably presumes that matter comes first and
produces ideas. However, as if to further the confusion, the MOQ says that
the idea that matter comes first is a high quality idea!" [LILA'S CHILD,
Annotation 67]
Which I translate as:
"The [first thesis of the] MOQ says that Quality comes first, which produces
ideas, which produce what we know as matter. The scientific community that
has produced Complementarity almost invariably presumes that matter comes
first and produces ideas. However, as if to further the confusion, the
[second thesis of the] MOQ says that the idea that matter comes first is a
high quality idea!" [LILA'S CHILD, Annotation 67]
It helps me to think about which thesis is under question when I am talking
about the MOQ - most of the time it is thesis (2).
It has also occurred to me that an interesting perspective on 'the container
problem' may be provided by thinking in terms of the two theses. With this
device, thesis (1) can be said to 'contain' thesis (2) as one of the many
patterns of intellectual knowledge produced by Dynamic Quality, e.g.
alongside all the variations of SOM. Thesis (2), however, can be said to be
how the world is *from within the pattern of the MOQ* and as such does not
'contain itself' or any other competing, general description of reality i.e.
metaphysics. There may be problems with this and I include it as a
tentative suggestion only.
I also think the distinction between the two theses sheds light on some of
the problems of terminology encountered in the MOQ. Firstly, as implied
earlier I think 'intellectual' as it is used in thesis (1) is subdivided
into social and intellectual quality in thesis (2) and one should be wary of
equivocation here.
Secondly, the term 'pre-intellectual', which is mostly used within the
context of thesis (1), could be modified to 'pre-static' (i.e. the
experience of indeterminate value prior to its contextualisation into any
static patterns) when used within the context of thesis (2) so as not to
erroneously relate Dynamic Quality solely to the intellectual level.
---------------------------------------
I suggest that the two theses represent distinct stages in the development
of the overall pattern of the MOQ and that the first stage is not so much
left behind as expanded by the second. Moreover, I suggest it is sometimes
necessary to 'back up' into the first stage to answer questions mistakenly
or inappropriately levelled at the second e.g., If intellect creates
subjects and objects, how is it that inorganic and biological objects
existed before intellect? The answer is that in thesis (1) all divisions
and assumptions are indeed contingent upon the activity of a discriminating
intellect. However, thesis (2) already accepts one pragmatic set of
divisions and assumptions and, on the basis of these, offers an explanation
of how they relate in a historical context.
If this confuses things for you, or if you think it superfluous, please
ignore it. If it helps, I'm glad.
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