From: skutvik@online.no
Date: Tue Nov 15 2005 - 09:15:00 GMT
Paul and MOQ Discussers.
11 November you wrote:
> It should be stated here that in thesis (1) (N.B. this includes all of
> ZMM) the terms 'intellectual patterns' and 'intellectual' do not refer
> unequivocally to the static patterns which are defined by the
> intellectual level of thesis (2) because in thesis (1) there are no
> levels.
The fact remains that Phaedrus saw intellect as the S/O "splitter"
and had this been carried over into MOQ's intellectual level no
theses would have been necessary. In fact most examples of 4th
level patterns are S/O, but later as Pirsig began to receive
questions the 4th. level turned into a mental faculty.
> I suggest that it is the largely epistemological thesis (1) which
> Pirsig refers to when he says in LILA'S CHILD that "Philosophic
> idealism is part of the MOQ" and provides the context for
> understanding such statements as:
Phew: First reject the SOM and its idealism/materialism, then let
"idealism" enter.
> The key point of thesis (1) is that knowledge does not consist of
> representations of independent properties of an objective world.
> Rather, it is suggested that the properties of the world arise within
> the composition of knowledge (and it is here that it agrees with
> philosophic idealism), and, crucially, that this knowledge emerges
> from the ongoing experience of Dynamic Quality and the value
> judgements it produces within the context of existing patterns.
I admire your endless willingness to defend all utterances, but
some are ruinous. Don't you see? You may as well declare that
as everything is expressed by words there is only one level - the
language level - this is the inevitable outcome of idealism.
> So, as with all knowledge according to this thesis, the intellectual
> pattern of the MOQ is itself generated by a procession of value
> judgements, which leads us to thesis (2).
That the MOQ is an intellectual pattern - claiming to be based on
knowledge - is plain, that all is about value goes without saying.
> "The [second thesis of the] MOQ does not deny the traditional
> scientific view of reality as composed of material substance and
> independent of us. It says it is an extremely high quality idea. We
> should follow it whenever it is practical to do so. But the [first
> thesis of the] MOQ, like philosophic idealism, says this scientific
> view of reality is still an idea. If it were not an idea, then that
> "independent scientific material reality" would not be able to change
> as new scientific discoveries come in." [LILA'S CHILD, Notes on
> Annotation 4]
The SOL "translation" goes like this: "The MOQ does not deny
...etc. It says that this is its intellectual level, but the MOQ itself
has transcended this and formed a meta-reality of which intellect
is a sub-set.
> It helps me to think about which thesis is under question when I am
> talking about the MOQ - most of the time it is thesis (2).
Listen carefully: Most of the time the objective element of
intellect is at play, but it contains a subjective element too which
is every bit as "rational" (the empiricists proved beyond doubt
that qualities are in our minds only) and the great error is to
believe that the MOQ has a subjective leaning. The need for
"theses" stems from this fallacy.
> I suggest that the two theses represent distinct stages in the
> development of the overall pattern of the MOQ and that the first stage
> is not so much left behind as expanded by the second.
> Moreover, I
> suggest it is sometimes necessary to 'back up' into the first stage to
> answer questions mistakenly or inappropriately levelled at the second
> e.g., If intellect creates subjects and objects, how is it that
> inorganic and biological objects existed before intellect?
The questions levelled at the MOQ aren't from its own premises,
but from SOM's objective premises (matter before mind). Your
"defense" is from SOM's subjective premises (mind before
matter) and with friends like this .......
> The answer
> is that in thesis (1) all divisions and assumptions are indeed
> contingent upon the activity of a discriminating intellect. However,
> thesis (2) already accepts one pragmatic set of divisions and
> assumptions and, on the basis of these, offers an explanation of how
> they relate in a historical context.
> If this confuses things for you, or if you think it superfluous,
> please ignore it. If it helps, I'm glad.
As said I admire your will to come to the rescue of everything
Pirsig has said, but an error cannot be mended without adding
more complications. And the initial fault is that of presenting the
MOQ as having a leaning towards SOM's subjective part
....instead of making it its own intellectual level as was begun by
ZMM.
But thanks anyway for some MOQ stuff after months of drought.
Bo
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