From: Dan Glover (daneglover@hotmail.com)
Date: Thu Nov 24 2005 - 16:49:23 GMT
Hello everyone
>From: "Paul Turner" <paul@turnerbc.co.uk>
>Reply-To: moq_discuss@moq.org
>To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
>Subject: RE: MD Two Theses in the MOQ
>Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2005 11:13:17 -0000
>
>Dan,
>
> >If, as I understand it to be, Quality is (purposely) left undefined in
>ZMM,
> >then what articulated epistemic modality pertains to "it"? Isn't that
> >instead what the MOQ is all about, as described in LILA?
>
>Paul: First of all, I should point out that thesis (1) does not simply
>correspond to ZMM even though most of it is contained in there. The
>distinction between theses is partly an attempt to harmonise the two books
>at an intellectual level and in this respect shouldn't be unduly influenced
>by the effect of the timing of each publication on its relative content.
>It
>is my contention, disputed though it is, that if ZMM had been written
>alongside LILA, its 'Quality' would have been called 'Dynamic Quality'.
Hi Paul
Thank you for your reply. Dynamic Quality doesn't make sense. Quality does.
In other words, even though we cannot define Quality, we all know it when we
see it. On the other hand, when we recognize Dynamic Quality it's no longer
Dynamic Quality but instead some "thing" else. It just doesn't seem at all
likely (to me) that Robert Pirsig would have used Dynamic Quality in place
of Quality if ZMM were written side by side with LILA.
>
>With respect to thesis (1) being described by me as broadly epistemological
>this is because thesis (1) is more about the relationship of Dynamic
>Quality
>to how and what we know than about the ontological question of 'what is',
>which is picked up in thesis (2).
>
> >Introducing Dynamic Quality into ZMM seems analogous to introducing the
> >Quality event into LILA -- while it's easy enough to do, it seems
>improper
> >somehow, not at all in keeping with Robert Pirsig's intentions (as I
> >understand them to be). No disagreement with your theses, mind you,
>rather
> >it seems better to leave Quality undefined within the context of ZMM.
>
>Paul: Again, ZMM and thesis (1) are not identical in my scheme. And, as
>stated above, I'm not so much 'introducing Dynamic Quality into ZMM' as
>extracting from ZMM a contribution to a thesis which is expanded in LILA.
>For this to occur, a translation of terms needs to be attempted, which I've
>done.
Well, okay. But your previous paragraph seems to contradict what you're
saying here: "It is my contention, disputed though it is, that if ZMM had
been written alongside LILA, its 'Quality' would have been called 'Dynamic
Quality'."
>
>Paul prev:>>The key point of thesis (1) is that knowledge does not consist
>of
> >>representations of independent properties of an objective world.
> >
> >So let's just say according to thesis (1) that there are no distinctions.
> >Intellectually (according to thesis (2)) we create distinctions and
>believe
> >them to be true.
>
>Paul: There are distinctions in thesis (1), as I've defined it. Thesis
>(1)
>contains Dynamic Quality and patterns of knowledge.
The MOQ states quite clearly that Dynamic Quality cannot be contained. If
that is your intention then I don't see how thesis (1) could ever be part of
the MOQ.
>
> >In the translated quotes above, it appears (to me) that Quality (in a ZMM
> >sense) is being conflated with quality (in an intellectual LILA sense).
>The
> >thing is, we have to "get it" when it comes to the MOQ and getting it
> >involves letting go of certain preconceived notions concerning the nature
> >of
> >how it is that we have come to perceive reality. Conflating the notion of
> >Quality with the notion of quality doesn't lend itself well to us
>"getting
> >it," in my opinion (of course).
>
>Paul: Not sure who you suggest was doing the conflating? If it was me
>then
>I'm not clear on how.
I assume you're the one who wrote the two theses so I presume you are the
one who is conflating the notion of Quality with quality. As to how, let's
look to one of your translated paragraphs:
>"The [first thesis of the] MOQ says that Quality comes first, which
>produces
>ideas, which produce what we know as matter. The scientific community that
>has produced Complementarity almost invariably presumes that matter comes
>first and produces ideas. However, as if to further the confusion, the
>[second thesis of the] MOQ says that the idea that matter comes first is a
>high quality idea!" [LILA'S CHILD, Annotation 67]
The MOQ states that Quality comes first AND the idea that matter comes first
is a high quality idea. It is my understanding that by adding "the
scientific community" we are in the second case dealing with defined quality
intellectual patterns of value while in the first case we are dealing with
undefined Quality. That's why I think you're conflating the two.
>
>Paul prev:>>I also think the distinction between the two theses sheds light
>on some of
> >>the problems of terminology encountered in the MOQ. Firstly, as implied
> >>earlier I think 'intellectual' as it is used in thesis (1) is subdivided
> >>into social and intellectual quality in thesis (2) and one should be
>wary
> >>of
> >>equivocation here.
> >
> >I'm unsure of just what you're saying here. Earlier you state that thesis
> >(1) has no levels yet here you seem to be saying that with thesis (1)
> >you're
> >using the intellectual level in a cultural sense (social and intellectual
> >combined). Could you please elaborate on this?
>
>Paul: Yes. I'm saying that 'intellectual' as used in thesis (1) e.g. in
>parts of ZMM, does not correspond without ambiguity to 'the intellectual
>level' introduced as part of thesis (2) midway through LILA. Therefore
>consideration is required when moving between the two theses using the term
>'intellectual'. For example, look at this statement from ZMM:
>
>"The tree that you are aware of intellectually, because of that small time
>lag, is always in the past and therefore is always unreal. Any
>intellectually conceived object is always in the past and therefore
>unreal."
>[ZMM, p253]
>
>In terms of thesis (2) I would say that one is aware of distinct objects
>(at
>least enough to name them) at the social level, as is abundantly evident in
>the writing of the ancient cultures that preceded the intellectual level.
I always assumed that Robert Pirsig used intellect as defined in the
dictionary:
intellect
n.
The ability to learn and reason; the capacity for knowledge and
understanding.
The ability to think abstractly or profoundly. See Synonyms at mind.
A person of great intellectual ability. (www.dictionary.com)
The key here is "the ability to think abstractly" I should think. Naming is
one thing, but the development of writing skills would seem to require an
abstract intellectual ability at an individual or small group level even
though the culture which the individual(s) belongs to may not be considered
a primarily intellectually based culture.
>
>Paul prev:>>Moreover, I suggest it is sometimes
> >>necessary to 'back up' into the first stage to answer questions
>mistakenly
> >>or inappropriately levelled at the second e.g., If intellect creates
> >>subjects and objects, how is it that inorganic and biological objects
> >>existed before intellect? The answer is that in thesis (1) all
>divisions
> >>and assumptions are indeed contingent upon the activity of a
> >discriminating
> >>intellect.
> >
> >Why? If, as stated prior, thesis (1) contains no distinctions, no levels,
> >then why are you introducing divisions now?
>
>Paul: Thesis (1) contains no levels but it contains distinctions. Thesis
>(1) is about Dynamic Quality and the patterns of knowledge it produces and
>those patterns of knowledge make distinctions.
Again, it's my understanding that it is a mistake to say anything at all
about Dynamic Quality. So I would have to reject thesis (1) outright as
something we cannot know, and if we do make a claim to be knowledgable about
Dynamic Quality, it's merely our self importance rearing its ugly head. We
know nothing regarding Dynamic Quality nor can we ever, for as soon as we
know, "it" is no longer Dynamic Quality but something defined.
>
> --------------------------------------------------
>
>Thanks for your comments. One general comment I have is that the 'two
>theses' as you see them seem to correspond to the 'two truths' of Buddhism.
>I think your thesis (1) would correspond to the ultimate truth of
>paramartha-satya and your thesis (2) would correspond to the conventional
>truth of samvrti-satya. As I've laid them out in this thread, both thesis
>(1) and (2) are part of samvrti-satya.
Yes that is how I read your two theses so I better understand my mistake
now. Thank you. I suppose
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