From: Matt the Enraged Endorphin (mpkundert@students.wisc.edu)
Date: Sun Mar 23 2003 - 21:55:12 GMT
Squonk, everyone,
Squonk asked that I respond to the points in his last post. I
will. However, I apologize to everyone who was hoping I might offer
wonderful recontexutalizations, arguments, and narratives in response to
the short, dogmatic points that Squonk has offered. I'm too tired to do
so, and even if I wasn't, I'm definitely too tired of talking to Squonk to
do so. I have spent a long time and have been, as Squonk would surely
point out, quite long-winded in my responses to my interlocutors. Most of
the time, my interlocutors have repaid in equal kindness. Squonk is one of
those who has not. Simply put, his attacks have been made up almost
entirely of a series of staccato condemnations and denunciations, none of
which I can grasp fully because they are so short. The only thing I've
been able to conclude from our conversations is that Squonk is simply on a
different wavelength that I am (with full reference to Rorty's comment
about Pirsig).
(Sidenote: I wrote all of this and my first several ripostes before Squonk
took my going chronologically through posts-I-need-to-reply-to as being a
sign that I was ignoring him. Squonk, take a chill pill, I can only reply
to one post at a time. As for saying that, "That's usually how the end
begins, by not responding to posts," you are right, that's how
conversations end. Most of the time I haven't responded to all of the
garbage you send me, but when you do send something that looks half-way
intelligible, I try and take the time to reply. I've been trying to make
more of an effort, of late, to turn up my crap filter, though, so don't
expect as many replies to some of the tired points you've been trying to
make over the past 6 months. I just have a lot of better things to do and
there are other, much, much better conversation partners here than
you. Just as DMB doesn't think I'm a good conversation partner, I don't
think you are. Nothing against you as a person, philosopher, or mystic, it
is just more constructive for me to spend my time elsewhere. If anyone
wants to expand on Squonk's points for Squonk, I would be more willing to
engage as the hope would be that they would make more sense to me
then. So, if anyone thinks Squonk has a point, please reiterate that point
so I can take it into consideration.)
So, here are my short, dogmatic replies:
Squonk:
Drawing a distinction between that which is known and a knower is a feature
of SoM. Patterns of value in a MoQ do not delineate subjective knowledge of
objective known. Intuition in the MoQ is unpatterned and has more sympathy
with Eastern approaches. Your treatment of Knowledge, belief and intuition
is based in tradition that has Subjects and Objects firmly rooted in its
fundamental distinctions regarding these terms.
Matt:
I agree that "a distinction between that which is known and a knower is a
feature of SOM." However, I deny that my treatment of knowledge, belief,
and intuition is based in SOM. Afterall, I said that knowledge is internal
to beliefs. The holism that Rorty espouses says that what we know aren't
objects, which would SOMic, but other beliefs.
Squonk said:
Causation is redundant in the MoQ. The 'world' and 'we' are the same
evolutionary related forest of patterns and inseparable. While the MoQ is
provisional, it may be argued that it is of higher value than a SoM
perspective, and your treatment is such a SoM perspective.
Matt:
Deny. I agree that the "'world' and 'we' are the same evolutionary related
forest of patterns." However, I have said before and I'll say it again,
sometimes it is helpful, on pragmatic grounds, to make a distinction
between the "world" and "we," like when a tiger is about to eat you.
Squonk said:
Knowledge may be said to be of values, and the sceptic cannot deny value.
The sceptic becomes a supporter of patterns of value, which in turn becomes
a moral position.
Matt:
I agree that "knowledge may be said to be of values." I think that is a
very Pirsigian thing to say. But I deny that "the skeptic cannot deny
value." He surely can if we are taking an intuitionist line on
epistemology. It goes like this, "One of our basic intuitions is that
value exists." Skeptic: "Really? How do you know?" "Well, its one of our
basic intuitions." "Oh, okay. So your reasoning is circular, though you
purport to give us a non-circular foundation of our knowledge." "Um...."
Squonk said:
The term belief may be replaced with value with no loss of meaning. More
than this, values are then seen as not centred on individuals. This opens
up the possibility of a non-substance based metaphysics in which social
patterns are as real as atoms, flesh and blood, and logic. The 'world' and
'we' are not separated and to value that this is the case may be viewed as
an intellectual pattern of low quality.
There is little evidence that your position is non-SoM perspective.
Matt:
Well, it depends on what your definition of SOM is and if we take your
world/we distinction as definitive I think there is evidence that I'm
arguing from a non-SOM perspective. I've already given you some, but I'll
continue with more. Are far as I can see, it may be true that
philosophically we can replace "belief" with "value" and that this
de-centers humans. I've argued along these lines before when saying that
Pirsig's notion of consciousness is expanded to the point where everything
that could be said to exist has a form of consciousness. You make the same
thing happen to "belief." However, I do think we would like to have some
sort of pragmatic grounds for differentiating ourselves from other static
patterns. That's what the theory of evolution does, after all. So, I
would differentiate between "values" and "beliefs" so that we can ascribe
values to everything and beliefs only to some things. That way we can tell
the difference between people and tigers and rocks.
Squonk said:
Have you ever read any Locke?
Matt:
Yes. Thank you for the non sequitor.
Squonk said:
Aristotle conceived of essences as, 'What must be known for a thing to be
what it is.' That does not have to be a definition - it can be a
description of causes. But in the MoQ, cause is replaced by value, so for a
thing, (static pattern) to be what it is, is to know what value it has.
That is more than a recontextualisation, it is an expansion of the format.
Thus, to describe the MoQ in terms of language and metaphor, subjects and
objects, us and the world is to disregard the expanded format.
Matt:
I don't know about your series of inferences (from Aristotle to causes to
values), but "for a thing, (static pattern) to be what it is, is to know
what value it has" is one of the most pragmatic things I've ever heard on
this forum. Bravo! However, I don't see how this is opposed to describing
the MoQ in terms of "language and metaphor, subjects and objects, us and
the world." It might be pragmatic to use any one of these distinctions at
some point (though I don't know what the distinction between language and
metaphor is). The danger we must be wary of is hypostatizing them. That's
what Pirsig warns us of in ZMM.
Squonk said:
The statement that words are meant to be defined is contentious. What is
more, there cannot be definitions in a dynamic flux. What may be usefully
said is that words are static patterns? These patterns are open to dynamic
influence and thus linguistic evolution is possible.
Matt:
Words are static patterns. Yeah, that sounds good. They are open to
dynamic influence and change. Yeah, that sounds good, too. Good thing I
never said anything to the contrary.
Squonk said:
I would contend that it is not possible to exist without differentials in
value to distinguish patterns. Therefore, differentiated patterns of value
are reality as much as Dynamic Quality. Cognition may be seen as a high
pattern of value, therefore cognition and reality are one and the same. To
differentiate between cognition and reality is a feature of SoM.
Matt:
Well, don't know about that last part. Kinda' depends on what we mean by
"cognition." If, like I do, you make knowledge internal to beliefs (or
static patterns), then making a distinction between "cognition of static
patterns" and "noncognition of ultimate reality" makes perfect sense when
we take Quality to be undefined.
Squonk said:
Static patterns of value constitute knowledge.
Matt:
Yes.
Squonk said:
Intuition is far more Dynamic.
Matt:
Deny.
Squonk said:
I feel you need to become more clear with regard to Quality.
Matt:
Wait. Increasing the level of my crap filter. Ah, there it goes.
Matt
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