From: Elizaphanian (elizaphanian@tiscali.co.uk)
Date: Tue May 20 2003 - 08:58:17 BST
Hi Wim,
Part 4.
: My criticism of your Eudaimonic MoQ is a combination of the first two 'knock
: down' objections you describe:
I see how you're arguing for the first of those 'knock down' arguments, but not the second.
:
: For me 'intellectual' is just a name for Pirsig's fourth level. I take his
: description to be:
: 'the collection and manipulation of symbols, created in the brain, that
: stand for patterns of experience'.
OK.
: The 4th level is 'intellectual' because intellectual constructs are only
: meaningful at that level. That doesn't mean that other phenomena (like
: emotion) have no 'reality' at that level, but only that 'intellectual'
: refers to phenomena that are the best examples of phenomena that have no
: 'reality' at lower levels.
I haven't heard you make this argument before, but it seems like an interesting one. Although you
seem to directly contradict the thrust of it in your next comment. My dictionary (Collins) defines
intellect as "the capacity for understanding, thinking and reasoning, as distinct from feeling or
wishing". Which I guess is a pretty conventional view. I just see intellect as one part of
eudaimonia; so, a very good example of level 4, but not necessarily the best. (My own 'rule of
thumb' "best" example is a Rembrandt self portrait, as an example of a phenomenon which couldn't
have existed at a lower level. But if someone made a persuasive case that it was a level 3 product,
I'd be happy to change my opinion of Rembrandt).
I have a suspicion that 'symbol' buys into a particular conception of intellect as well, ie it
presupposes a rigid separation of 'inner' and 'outer' when it comes to thinking. Which is part and
parcel of modernism, and perhaps Platonism. But that would require rather more attention to
demonstrate than I am able to provide at the moment. I wonder if Matt K has any thoughts on this
point?
: I avoid 'intellect', because that refers (for me) also to a 2nd level
: phenomenon. It is a characteristic that differentiates between homo sapiens
: and other species.
I don't understand your first sentence here, especially in the light of what you said above. I
think there are good grounds for thinking that manipulation of symbols in the brain happens in other
species, and also happens at the social level (eg Lascaux, neanderthal burial rites, various
neolithic innovations). One of the reasons why I don't like it as a definition of level 4.
: Human flourishing for me is not a high quality static latch within the
: social level, but within the 'intellectual' level.
Which is why I don't understand you counting your objections under number 2 of the 'knock downs'.
: I indeed think the
: problems you listed are better solved in my version of the MoQ than in yours
: and that my version differs less from 'the standard account' than yours and
: better deserves the name 'MoQ'.
Well, that doesn't come as a surprise, but I wonder why you feel it necessary to state it. (Also,
I'd be interested to know the criteria of 'betterness' that you are employing in your final clause.
Not in order to dispute your point, just for greater clarity about what you see as important to
'being' a MoQ.)
Cheers
Sam
"A good objection helps one forward, a shallow objection, even if it is valid, is wearisome."
Wittgenstein
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archives:
Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Tue May 20 2003 - 09:39:54 BST