From: Elizaphanian (elizaphanian@tiscali.co.uk)
Date: Fri May 23 2003 - 14:58:20 BST
Hi Wim,
Continuing the debate. Which I am finding very helpful, by the way.
: You wrote 15 May 2003 12:50:55 +0100:
: 'I would say that the famous sportsman embodies something which is valued by
: the society, and the fame/wealth/power flow to him as a result of that'
:
: To me that seems a perfect description of values inherent in objects (the
: sportsman, things conveying fame/wealth/power), of values that presupposes
: subject-object thinking to be understandable. These values are different
: from the 'value' which I mean when I write 'pattern of value'.
: Maybe we are talking past each other because for you 'pattern of value' is
: synonymous with 'scale of values' while for me they mean something
: completely different?
I think there are two senses of 'value' being employed, yes. I disagree that my language only makes
sense within SOM though (I think social level values do equate to 'scale of values' - and I suspect
that the MoQ embodies a scale of values also). So let us become concrete. David Beckham is a well
known sportsman, who earns great wealth from both his exploits at football and his marketing rights,
ie his fame. His fame is dependent upon his sporting skill - if that collapsed then his marketing
rights would also fall (although he has probably now done enough, and has a good enough 'image', for
some rights to be maintained.)
Now, two senses of 'value'. One is that in which (a significant portion of) Beckham's native society
pay money (a transaction of value?) to watch him perform, or otherwise be associated with his
performance (which is in itself a performance against specific standards of value). These are the
culturally specific values that flourish in English contemporary culture. These, I think, are
broadly equivalent to SOM use of 'value'.
A second sense of value is more MoQ specific. The values of the inorganic level are described by the
laws of physics (I think we agreed on that?). A rock, for example, can be described as a stable
pattern of value, which can be exhaustively analysed using physics? The values of the organic level
are described by the laws of Darwinian selection. So a plant, say wheat, can be described as a
stable pattern of value? The values of the social level are described by...? I would say that they
can be described by sociological 'laws' (they haven't found many - any? - yet), but that the flow of
wealth and power track what is valued by a particular society (ie they track what the existence of
that society allows to static latch, ie the pattern of value represented by a particular society
allows flourishing to certain stable patterns of (organic) value, and suppresses other patterns (eg
criminals)).
So for me, Beckham *qua* footballing celebrity, is a creation of the pattern of value which
describes 'English football'. I don't understand why this equates to SOM. To me, nine times out of
ten, any 'object' word (ie one which has a customary sense within SOM, eg Beckham) can be translated
as 'stable pattern of value' without loss of sense (and without prejudicing the validity of the MoQ
as the ultimate organisation of intellect). I expect you would disagree with that, but if you could
spell out why, that would probably advance this discussion.
Another example. In walking along a beach, I see waves crashing. I know what the word 'wave' refers
to, I know how to use it with sense, but I'd be quite happy to define 'wave' as a pattern within the
water of the sea, and not anything "objective" etc. Why can't this be the same as saying 'the
sportsman embodies something that is valued by the society'?
:
: You also wrote 15 May 2003 12:50:55 +0100:
: 'I am simply unaware of what would be put in its place, ie what Pirsig would
: say in answer to the question "What is the DQ innovation and static latch
: which enabled the intellectual level to come into being?"'
:
: Was Pirsig's answer not simply 'symbols'?
Can you say where and give some context? (Although see below)
: You wrote 19 May 2003 12:14:14 +0100:
: 'I just don't see it as a particularly fruitful way of understanding, eg,
: Rembrandt portraiture, to describe it as "manipulation of symbols"'.
:
: Why not? Do his portraits not obviously stand for patterns of experience he
: and others had with the persons he portrayed? No portrait is fully
: realistic, not even a photograph, because it is always selected from diverse
: possibilities to view someone and because it emphasizes certain aspects
: relative to other aspects of the portrayed person. Rembrandt selected and
: selectively emphasized in a specific way; there is a pattern to be
: recognized in his way of painting, a specific way of collecting and
: manipulating the symbols for the experience he wanted to convey.
Well, I just don't think it is particularly helpful to see a brushstroke as a symbol - or even a
painting
as a 'symbol'. I think there is such a thing as 'symbolic art' (eg Dali, or, better, the way in
which certain items such as books, cups, cats etc had particular meaning for eg Medieval culture -
ie were
symbols properly understood) and in those contexts there are such things (patterns!!) which function
as symbols. My own sense of what 'symbol' best describes is symbolic logic, or mathematics. I see
those as what Pirsig had in mind with his definition of 'intellect', but perhaps I am wrong in
thinking this (LC #50 Pirsig mentions such things). I can see that the conventional definition of
'symbol' *can* be stretched to include it, but then there is nothing which is not symbolic, and the
interesting uses of the word 'symbol' then require another word to carry out their function. (Pirsig
often says we should use words in their customary sense, and I agree with him on that - it's why I
don't like 'intellect' for level 4. "We must all use terms as they are described in the dictionary
or we lose the ability to communicate with each other." (LC #24).
But then Pirsig *does* seem to *define* symbol as 'pattern of experience' (intelligence is simply
the manipulation of symbols, "intellect is simply thinking" LC#95). So symbol seems to simply mean
'mental content', ie something which the brain uses. (Interestingly, Pirsig writes "All objects are
in fact mental constructs based on experience." LC 59) In which case we need to distinguish between
the customary use of 'symbol' and the use within the Pirsigian-MoQ-intellectual level. So a painting
can contain normal symbolism, but the artist creates out of his sYmbols, ie what is created as
patterns in his mind (capital Y as second letter is deliberate).
Yet I think this immediately runs into problems. What is it that distinguishes the mental content of
an intellectual from the mental content of, say, a chimpanzee with a three-hundred word vocabulary
in American sign language? Or a four year old human child? When an antelope or gazelle perceives a
lion or cheetah tracking it, what is used to describe the brain content? Or, for MoQ purposes, what
do you use to distinguish the sYmbolic brain patterns within the mind of a gazelle from the sYmbolic
brain patterns in an intellectual? I think this definition collapses. But I could be wrong!
Pirsig actually states that his use of sYmbol only refers to 'language-derived' symbols, which I
think supports my point, ie it rules out what is going on in the mind of a gazelle, or in the mind
of a non-linguistically developed great ape or child. Yet again, this reliance on language takes us
back to the conventional use of symbol. So I still think my objection holds; the definition of
sYmbol is dependent upon an extra-mental phenomena (language).
I guess I just don't like it!
: You also wrote 19 May 2003 12:14:14 +0100:
: 'If the autonomous individual is seen as simply a "stable pattern of [level
: 4] values" - which is what I think it is - then it can function as a
: "choosing unit" in that this pattern can act as a latch for other patterns
: of value to be structured around.'
:
: Didn't we agree on individuals 'participating in' patterns of value rather
: than 'being' them?
Yes - although I might be reconsidering my view on that, it depends where this conversation goes.
: I consistently write 'pattern of value' rather than 'pattern of values' for
: quite some time now. The pattern, the repetitious experience, IS the value,
: which can be analyzed in the values of stability and versatility
: (recognizability despite minor change) of the pattern. The MoQ is not about
: 'patterns of values' in the sense of 'collections of values', in which
: 'values' can be read as a specific kind of 'things' (or at least discrete
: experiences).
: All experience is 'pattern experience' and those patterns
: cannot be analyzed in different values (except stability and versatility or
: comparable twins denoting the double face of the concept 'pattern' when
: compared with absolutely and exact determinated repetition on the one hand
: and chance repetition on the other.
I'm not sure I agree with this. Do you think there can be a typology of value? Is a value (ie a
value judgement) something discrete? When the amoeba flees the acid is this not a discrete
experience for the amoeba? Can't we become more specific in our descriptions? Are all descriptions
wrong - that seems the logical implication of your argument (although I don't believe it's what
you're arguing for).
: An 'autonomous pattern of value' is a very complicated concept in itself
: already: it denotes a pattern of value that is independent from a larger
: pattern of value. An 'autonomous pattern of value' that 'chooses to act
: according to values' or that 'latches other patterns of value' is definitely
: too complicated to grasp for me if I want to stick to my basic understanding
: of the MoQ and of my understanding of 'pattern of value'.
I don't think it's *that* complicated!! Wasn't it Pirsig's own language (taken up by you on occasion
if memory serves) that certain patterns 'go off and do their own thing/ pursue their own interests'?
: In my understanding a 'pattern of value' is not 'latched by' a 'choosing
: unit', but the pattern itself is the latch for the Dynamic Quality that
: brought it into being (that differentiated it both from unpatterned
: experience and from other patterns).
I don't think we disagree..... The choosing unit is itself a pattern. I'd be quite happy to say the
choosing unit 'itself is the latch for the DQ that brought it into being'. Although I would want to
emphasise the participatory role of the lower levels, ie the dependence on the lower levels.
: In short: I can't separate your 'reifying patterns of value' (and now even
: of 'values' themselves) from the way in which you argue your 'eudaimonic
: thesis'.
Fair enough.
: You argued that:
: 'The DQ innovation and static latch which enabled the social level to come
: into being was the development of human language, and human language is par
: excellence an example of symbol manipulation.'
: and that therefore the standard account of the MoQ cannot clearly
: distinguish between the 3rd and the 4th level.
: IF the 3rd level separates from the 2nd level when human language develops,
: IF human language is understood as symbolic language and IF manipulation of
: symbols is characteristic for the 4th level, then the 3rd and 4th levels are
: not discrete. IF we need 4 levels and IF manipulation of symbols is
: characteristic for the 4th level, then the 3rd level cannot start with
: (symbolic) language.
OK I accept the logic of the argument. I dispute (of course) that 'manipulation of symbols is
characteristic for the fourth level', so for me the consequence doesn't follow, therefore - even if
it shouldn't have been in the 'standard' part of the argument - I'm happy for language to be (a)
divider between levels 2 and 3.
Thanks
Sam
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