Re: MD The Eudaimonic MoQ

From: Wim Nusselder (wim.nusselder@antenna.nl)
Date: Thu May 22 2003 - 22:39:43 BST

  • Next message: Wim Nusselder: "Re: MD The Eudaimonic MoQ"

    Dear Sam,

    Some disjointed remarks on some or your reactions to my responses to your
    essay:

    You wrote 15 May 2003 12:50:55 +0100:
    'I would say that the famous sportsman embodies something which is valued by
    the society, and the fame/wealth/power flow to him as a result of that'

    To me that seems a perfect description of values inherent in objects (the
    sportsman, things conveying fame/wealth/power), of values that presupposes
    subject-object thinking to be understandable. These values are different
    from the 'value' which I mean when I write 'pattern of value'.
    Maybe we are talking past each other because for you 'pattern of value' is
    synonymous with 'scale of values' while for me they mean something
    completely different?

    You also wrote 15 May 2003 12:50:55 +0100:
    'I am simply unaware of what would be put in its place, ie what Pirsig would
    say in answer to the question "What is the DQ innovation and static latch
    which enabled the intellectual level to come into being?"'

    Was Pirsig's answer not simply 'symbols'?

    You wrote 19 May 2003 12:14:14 +0100:
    'I just don't see it as a particularly fruitful way of understanding, eg,
    Rembrandt portraiture, to describe it as "manipulation of symbols"'.

    Why not? Do his portraits not obviously stand for patterns of experience he
    and others had with the persons he portrayed? No portrait is fully
    realistic, not even a photograph, because it is always selected from diverse
    possibilities to view someone and because it emphasizes certain aspects
    relative to other aspects of the portrayed person. Rembrandt selected and
    selectively emphasized in a specific way; there is a pattern to be
    recognized in his way of painting, a specific way of collecting and
    manipulating the symbols for the experience he wanted to convey.

    You also wrote 19 May 2003 12:14:14 +0100:
    'If the autonomous individual is seen as simply a "stable pattern of [level
    4] values" - which is what I think it is - then it can function as a
    "choosing unit" in that this pattern can act as a latch for other patterns
    of value to be structured around.'

    Didn't we agree on individuals 'participating in' patterns of value rather
    than 'being' them?
    I consistently write 'pattern of value' rather than 'pattern of values' for
    quite some time now. The pattern, the repetitious experience, IS the value,
    which can be analyzed in the values of stability and versatility
    (recognizability despite minor change) of the pattern. The MoQ is not about
    'patterns of values' in the sense of 'collections of values', in which
    'values' can be read as a specific kind of 'things' (or at least discrete
    experiences). All experience is 'pattern experience' and those patterns
    cannot be analyzed in different values (except stability and versatility or
    comparable twins denoting the double face of the concept 'pattern' when
    compared with absolutely and exact determinated repetition on the one hand
    and chance repetition on the other.
    An 'autonomous pattern of value' is a very complicated concept in itself
    already: it denotes a pattern of value that is independent from a larger
    pattern of value. An 'autonomous pattern of value' that 'chooses to act
    according to values' or that 'latches other patterns of value' is definitely
    too complicated to grasp for me if I want to stick to my basic understanding
    of the MoQ and of my understanding of 'pattern of value'.
    In my understanding a 'pattern of value' is not 'latched by' a 'choosing
    unit', but the pattern itself is the latch for the Dynamic Quality that
    brought it into being (that differentiated it both from unpatterned
    experience and from other patterns).
    In short: I can't separate your 'reifying patterns of value' (and now even
    of 'values' themselves) from the way in which you argue your 'eudaimonic
    thesis'.

    You also asked me 19 May 2003 12:14:14 +0100 to expand on my point that your
    argument proves that 'the development of symbolic language cannot have been
    the first static latch of the 3rd level in an MoQ that needs 4 discrete
    levels'.

    You argued that:
    'The DQ innovation and static latch which enabled the social level to come
    into being was the development of human language, and human language is par
    excellence an example of symbol manipulation.'
    and that therefore the standard account of the MoQ cannot clearly
    distinguish between the 3rd and the 4th level.
    IF the 3rd level separates from the 2nd level when human language develops,
    IF human language is understood as symbolic language and IF manipulation of
    symbols is characteristic for the 4th level, then the 3rd and 4th levels are
    not discrete. IF we need 4 levels and IF manipulation of symbols is
    characteristic for the 4th level, then the 3rd level cannot start with
    (symbolic) language.

    With friendly greetings,

    Wim

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