From: MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT (mpkundert@students.wisc.edu)
Date: Wed May 28 2003 - 20:04:35 BST
Scott,
Thank you for the explanation. The characterization you give is about what I thought you were working under. So, I'll just give the short re-characterizations that you can probably predict coming, but others may find helpful.
I completely agree with your shorthand on modern philosophy. Redescribing the mind/body problem in terms of different vocabularies is a good call. The difference is in what I take the pragmatist materialist position to be. What I take the pragmatist stance to be, and you are right, this is where we part ways, is the eschewment of metaphysics. While doing this, I believe we can still talk about the relations between vocabularies, such as the relation between intentional and non-intentional. I do not think simply philosophizing in this manner throws us necessarily into metaphysics. The reason is because pragmatists do not take these vocabularies to be what is really going on. They simply think them useful ways in which to get a handle on things.
This is why I disagree with your description of the pragmatic materialist. You say,
"The materialist assumes that everything has a non-intentional characterization, though I acknowledge the distinction between reductive and non-reductive materialists, where the latter says one shouldn't assume that the intentional vocabulary is translatable to the non-intentional. Also, the pragmatic materialist does not assume that the non-intentional is true, while the intentional is false (or "just shorthand"), as s/he looks at the non-intentional vocabulary as true by its utility in dealing with things and events, and not according to how well it corresponds to some fixed objective reality. It is always a vocabulary."
A metaphysical materialist does assume that everything has a non-intentional characterization. However, the non-reductive materialist, or pragmatic materialist, does not say, "one shouldn't assume that the intentional vocabulary is translatable to the non-intentional." Rorty's characterization of the pragmatic, non-reductive physicalist is that the two vocabularies are translatable (following Davidson, we haven't seen a vocabulary that couldn't be translated). The deal with non-reduction is that the only reason we use one or the other is because of its utility (as you point to subsequently). This is how it becomes pragmatic, by deprivelging the vocabularies. By doing this, they are not saying that one of them is the reality sitting behind appearances. In this appearance/reality vocabulary that pragmatists get rid of, the effect is more like, the two vocabularies are both reality, or that they are both appearances. They both work in describing events, but depending on
your purposes, one might be more useful than the other. That's why I say you beg the question, by describing the pragmatist position into a vocabulary it doesn't like, and this makes it look silly.
But I think I understand better what your position is. Its a good succinct representation in language I find nice. I think its needlessly convoluted, for the simple fact that you keep the appearance/reality distinction why trying to remain ironic, but that's simply my dismay over, what I would call, you not being sufficiently pragmatic. The opposite would be true for me from your perspective. I'm pragmatic, but not sufficiently--mystical, spiritual, metaphysical? I'm not sure how you would finish that sentence, but that's the effect.
I'm glad you reminded me of the Magliola article. Its something I should look at as I pick up Derrida.
Matt
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