From: Elizaphanian (elizaphanian@tiscali.co.uk)
Date: Mon Jun 02 2003 - 17:27:05 BST
Hi Paul,
Okey dokes, some interesting points you're raising here. Let me begin by recapitulating something -
much hangs on how you understand 'intellect'. Sense A is 'logical and scientific reasoning' (what
DMB calls the 'Spockish' sense, which is apt). Sense B is much wider and more inclusive, eg
Augustine's 'memory, reason and will'. My objections to 'intellectual' as a description of level 4
are primarily because I think if you take sense A as the meaning of 'intellect' (which I think
Pirsig does, although he's inconsistent about it) then it makes no sense as a fourth level, for all
the reasons I keep banging on about. However, if you take something like sense B as the description
then I think you still run into some problems, although of a much smaller scale, due to the
customary sense of 'intellect' in our society, which tends to mean sense A (my dictionary defines it
as "the capacity for understanding, thinking or reasoning, as distinct from feeling or wishing" It's
the second half of that definition that I really object to, and why I like the neuroscientists like
Damasio who insist that emotions have a cognitive function). So I would still prefer to use a
different description.
So, having said that, on with comments on your comments....
: Logic is an intellectual pattern of value, but logic
: and intellectual are not synonymous.
They effectively are in sense A, not in sense B.
: The MOQ is an
: intellectual pattern of value, does that not
: demonstrate preference, taste and insight?
I would say taste inevitably involves feelings, of a more or les refined nature. I would therefore
deny that taste is intellectual, certainly in sense A, and probably not in sense B either.
: Your preference for the term 'eudaimonia' over
: 'intellectual' is an intellectual preference.
Only in part. I think it makes more sense intellectually (ie sense A), yes.
: At the intellectual level, I think the unique
: individual called Rembrandt is the collection of ideas
: and intuitions deduced from experience.
Whereas I think there is a stable pattern of values which can be accurately the recipient of the
name 'Rembrandt'. I don't think that stable pattern of values is accurately described as a
'collection of ideas and intuitions'. Perhaps 'consistent pattern of preferences' would come closer,
but I would want to include the other levels (represented) in the definition.
: The unique
: individual doesn't exist prior to or outside of
: experience. But the idea of a unique individual is
: often a central concept in an intellectual explanation
: of experience.
Sort of - in the sense that (in the MoQ) NOTHING exists outside of experience. Yet it is valid to
speak of static patterns persisting over time. That's what I think the autonomous individual is.
: Emotions 'exist' at the 4th level but as symbols of
: experience at a different level, namely biological and
: social. The MOQ says that intellectual patterns of
: value are generally opposed to biological and social
: patterns of value, which would include emotions.
And the MoQ is incoherent on that score, at least if I understand Damasio correctly.
: > How would you classify 'self-control'?
:
: An intellectual pattern of value describing the moral
: right of a social pattern of value to over-rule a
: biological pattern of value.
I would see THIS as the level 4 pattern of value exercising control over the lower levels, at least
when it is a fourth level 'self'. As I said, I think there might be a level 3 self also. I think the
clearest example (for me) of a fourth level emotion would be Aristotle's sense of friendship, but a
clear explication of that would lead to a treatise on Aristotle, which I don't have the time for at
the moment.
: > So you agree with Pirsig that, under analysis, the
: > notion of a 'self' vanishes into all the things
: > which compose it, ie it can be 'reduced' without
: > remainder?
:
: No, I think that the remainder is Dynamic Quality.
In this example, how do you discriminate Dynamic Quality from Quality as such?
: The self may often be a central idea deduced from
: experience (particularly in the west) but I think the
: MOQ would say that a symbol standing for a pattern of
: value (inorganic, biological, social or Dynamic) being
: created in the brain was the first static latch of the
: 4th level. If that symbol was of an abiding self, then
: maybe you're right? 'Change' seems to be Pirsig's
: suggestion.
That is precisely what I'm arguing for, yes. I don't understand the Pirsig reference.
: I would say there is no self seperate from any
: construction.
I would say there is when it becomes exposed to the fourth level.
: > I think they are linked, but conceptually separable.
: > Primarily because of the possibility of static
: > latching - there are patterns (eg of consistent
: > preferences over time, ie virtues etc) which reveal
: > the constitution and identity of the autonomous
: > individual.
:
: I would argue that the patterns don't 'reveal' a
: pre-existing identity, an identity is derived from the
: patterns of experience. In the west, an identity is a
: good and supported derivation!
The patterns 'reveal' the identity to another person (pattern). It's not that it is pre-existent (at
least, it doesn't have to be. That opens up an interesting line of enquiry though).
: Virtue - in the 'arete' sense? Ah, I think I see where
: you're coming from. As I understand it, Pirsig thought
: arete was synonymous with dharma and Quality in ZMM.
Yes.
: But in Lila, after the static-Dynamic division is
: made, arete is the recognition of static quality. This
: he sees as the result of the Greeks not resolving the
: SQ-DQ relationship, unlike the Hindus.
I'm talking about the static patterns of the fourth level!
: Dharma is the complementary relationship between SQ
: and DQ, not one or the other. On this topic, Squonk
: and I were discussing a simultaneous coalescence and
: differentiation, Eugen Herrigel talks of a
: 'purposeless tension'.
I'm happy for Dharma to be the complementary bit. I'm *certainly* not wanting to do away with the
dynamic elements!!
: The self referred to by dharma is 'big self' or
: 'universal mind', you're right, 'big self' cannot be
: contained in symbols, but neither can any individual,
: society, religion, perception, emotion or static
: pattern of any kind.
My thesis is that, in response to DQ, the static latch of the autonomous individual is constructed
by the accumulation of virtues (ie consistent preferences). This process is open-ended, and driven
by Quality. So when Pirsig writes "Dharma is duty. It is not external duty which is arbitrarily
imposed by others. It is not any artificial set of conventions which can be amended or repealed by
legislation. Neither is it internal duty which is arbitrarily decided by one's own conscience.
Dharma is beyond all questions of what is internal and external. Dharma is Quality itself, the
principle of 'rightness' which gives structure and purpose to the evolution of all life and to the
evolving understanding of the universe which life has created." - I'm very happy with that.
: You can redefine the intellectual level but that you
: define it necessarily leaves out the undefined Quality
: that to me brings about eudaimonia - I would say
: dharma resolves this, not a static level of any
: definition.
:
: But don't let me stop you :-)
Well - Pirsig himself says that the levels can be described because they are static. And I
completely agree that it is the undefined bit that makes things interesting (and alive), I just
don't see why an improved (IMHO) understanding of the fourth level would inhibit that. Am I missing
something?
Thanks for the interesting pointers to chapter 30 by the way. I hadn't re-looked at that for a
while.
Sam
"Phaedrus is fascinated too by the description of the motive of 'duty toward self' which is an
almost exact translation of the Sanskrit word 'dharma', sometimes described as the 'one' of the
Hindus. Can the 'dharma' of the Hindus and the 'virtue' of the Ancient Greeks be identical?" - The
Eudaimonic MoQ says yes. "Lightning hits!"
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