From: Scott R (jse885@spinn.net)
Date: Wed Jul 16 2003 - 04:01:26 BST
Platt,
> [Scott prev]
> > This is why I have continually recommended books on differential
mysticism,
> > in particular, Robert Magliola's *Derrida on the Mend*. It (the paradox)
is
> > also the driving force of what I have called Ironic Metaphysics. It
takes
> > this paradox as the starting point, that forces us to recognize that we
> > cannot bottom out with clear and distinct ideas. Instead we have to
bottom
> > out with triples like Quality/DQ/SQ, and then ask: since this is
> > undefinable, how to we proceed to think? I believe the solution is to be
> > found by imitating the foundations of mathematics, which solved a
similar
> > problem with the axiomatic method.
>
[Platt:]> First, thanks for addressing my observation head on. However, I
have a
> problem with finding a solution in imitating the foundations of
> mathematics. Didn't Godel pretty much destroy the foundations of
> mathematics with his Theorem, or at least shake that foundation?
He destroyed the hope that there would be an eternally complete foundation
of mathematics. However, I find this result to be liberating. It implies
that mathematics will always be open. Mathematics continues to flourish
without complete foundations. Incomplete foundations work quite well.
>
[Scott:] > >It won't be the same solution, since the
> > issues metaphysics deals with are those that mathematics defines out of
> > existence. The solution is really more of an attitude than a set of
> > propositions, roughly that of recognizing that the Truth requires
> > transcendence, so what we do here is propose various working definitions
> > and see how far they take us. Which is, of course, what Pirsig says he
is
> > doing in Lila, but I think this needs to be moved from a methodological
> > principle to a foundational one. That is, to see the paradox of the
> > intellect trying to describe itself as being an instance of the process
of
> > creation. It is a case of the DQ/SQ conflict, and requires the logic of
> > contradictory identity if we wish to approach it.
>
[Platt:]> Yes. It's at such stuck points such as the paradox of intellectual
> explanations of intellect that creative breakthroughs are required. I'm
> not convinced the logic of contradictory identity is the best approach,
> probably because I don't understand it.
I suppose I could be cute and say "that's the point" (that it is not
understandable), but that isn't actually what I have in mind by it. However,
I am still working out in my own mind how, or whether, it can be useful,
beyond telling one that "intellect stops here". I suspect that it is also
possible to say that "intellect (and maybe everything) starts here". (This
may sound like I'm just being mysterious -- and I am -- but I it is
mysterious to me as well. In truth, I don't know what I am talking about it,
but hope to by and by).
>
[Platt:[> I haven't read the books you mention [Rudolf Steiner "The
Philosophy of Freedom", also translated as "Intuitive Thinking as a
Spiritual Path" Georg Kuhlewind, esp. "The Stages of Consciousness", and
Franklin Merrell-Wolff "Philosophy of Consciousness-without-an-Object",
reprinted in "Experience and Philosophy"], but are they much different from
> Shirley McClain's books and hundreds of others that talk about astral
> planes, out of body experiences, encounters with aliens, etc.? Those also
> purport to recount actual "experiences." Call me suspicious.
They are very different. The Steiner book mentioned was written (1893)
before he joined the Theosophical Society, and is straight philosophy of
mind, morality, and human freedom. No personal experiences. His later books,
however, are quite esoteric. Not personal reminisces like MacLaine, but what
he learned from "spiritual investigation". Kuhlewind is also theoretical,
but includes methodology in developing "intuitive thinking". Again, no
personal experiences, except in one book just a mention that he has made the
theory practical for himself. Merrell-Wolff's first book (Pathways Through
To Space) is a journal, with later additions, he kept after his mystical
awakening (It is also in the "Experience and Philosophy" reprint). His
"Philosophy of Consciousness-without-an-Object" is an indepth analysis of
his experience, both considered in itself, and in comparison with other
mystical literature. They all know the proper bounds of reason and
empiricism.
Anyway, the
> original question still remains whether there are any intellectual
> patterns that don't belong in the intellectual level.
This question strikes me as a consequence of lack of good definitions. One
can set up a set of definitions where the answer is "yes", and another that
answers "no". To straighten it out is where I think the "borrowing from
mathematics" idea is useful, in that mathematics will set up definitions of
key words in such a way that they can't result in questions like this. The
phrase "intellectual pattern" could only be used to refer to a pattern that
belongs to the intellectual level. It would still be an open question
whether a "linguistic pattern", for example, has to belong. (In practice,
one might want to make up a word for each level, and then start arguing
where other words belong.)
> [Scott:]
> > Well, I find Pirsig's definition inadequate, for two reasons. The first
is
> > that it does not provide a means to distinguish automatic symbol
> > manipulation as occurs in a computer (or in a brain) from human
thinking,
> > in which we are aware of what we are thinking, and feel that it is we
who
> > are doing (directing) the thinking. The second is that it does not
account
> > for hypothesis formation, in particular the "Aha!" experience, something
> > which transcends manipulation.
>
[Platt:] > On the first point, I don't think always being aware that we're
using
> symbols is vital to Pirsig's definition.
But it is vital to seeing how the fourth and third levels can be in
conflict. How one can think outside society's box.
On the second point, I don't
> think it's necessary in defining intellect to also include in the
> definition a description of that which might transcend it.
Except that hypothesis formation is what creates new fourth level patterns.
>
> S
> > My "definition" comes from Owen Barfield's book *Saving the Appearances*
[I just corrected this, my unthinking fingers had previously type
"Experiences"],
> > what he calls alpha-thinking. It is the situation where thoughts take
place
> > in a subject/object setting, meaning that the thinker experiences the
> > thinking as his or her own, not as coming from "outside", and in which
the
> > thought is about something that is assumed to not be part of the thinker
> > (called the object of thought). Once one has this ability to distinguish
> > the thinker from the thought about one can also carry out thinking in
which
> > the thinking is the object of thought. This occurs in doing mathematics,
> > and, to relate this to the comment above, I believe can be a way of
doing
> > philosophy.
> >
> > Barfield's book argues that this kind of thinking evolved out of an
earlier
> > situation where the human being did not see himself as separated from
the
> > perceived world -- indeed that what we call thoughts were then perceived
as
> > coming from outside, and as connected to what we now call the object of
> > perception.
>
[Platt:]> Well, this puts us right back in the infinite regress soup again
because
> it raises the question of who sees the seer of our thoughts, and who sees
> the seer who sees the seer of our thoughts, ad infinitum.
Actually, no. In fact, one of Steiner's points is that thinking about
thinking is thinking: that the regress stops. And this is a clue that there
can be non-S/O thinking. Mathematics is an example: the thought of a (pure,
non-dimensional) geometric point *is* the geometric point. Then there is the
question of turning one's thoughts into objects. Merrell-Wolff sees the
regress stopping with what he calls Pure Subject, and one discovers (or he
did, anyway) the Pure Subject *by means of* turning one's thoughts into
objects. In other words, the thinker who does not see his thoughts as
objects thinks (afterwards) that they are "himself", but that self is an
illusion.
Once you make
> the S/O split, thoughts become objects of subjects.
Eventually. Not right away.
> There's the big leap out of the box, or the "turn" as Matt might say. We
> can argue about the intellectual level until the cows come home.
> Eventually, each of us must decide "That's a good description," like
> "That's a good dog." Or, "That's not a good description," like "That dog
> won't hunt." In the end, Quality rules. Since it's a sense like taste,
> touch, smell and sight, it cannot be intellectually described any more
> than the beauty of a rose. But you know it from experience.
I'm not so sure. What I think can be done is to identify one another's
definitions (but that takes a lot of work and patience, and email discussion
groups are probably not the easiest place for it). Then we can --
sometimes -- determine what one another's underlying beliefs are that result
in those definitions. In the old SOM days, this would be asking whether one
was an idealist, materialist, or dualist, and that is a bottoming out. We
can't use those terms on this forum, but I think there are others. For
example, is one basically "spiritual" (religious, or at least recognize
mystical reality) or basically "secular". That's where, for example, Matt
and I split, and so we recognize that, unless one of us can successfully
proselytize the other (and this is not impossible, though unlikely -- we
just don't "hear" the opposing arguments), then some subsequent arguments
are recognized as straight 'tis/'taint, so we stop.
- Scott
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archives:
Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Wed Jul 16 2003 - 04:18:08 BST