From: Paul Turner (paulj.turner@ntlworld.com)
Date: Thu Aug 07 2003 - 18:28:48 BST
Hi Steve, Bo and all
> What is
> important in any MOQ is that we see value as primary reality. I'm
> glad to discuss Bo's MOQ with you and glad that you are willing to
> consider my ideas.)
Back sooner than I thought! Whilst I've been away (taking care of my new
baby daughter :-)) I've had a couple of discussions with Bo about his
problems with Pirsig. I noticed several strands of dispute which I have
summarised for debate.
STEVE - as you are discussing Bo's ideas I thought it may be of use to
you to see what I have gleamed from Bo's posts.
BO - I hope you don't mind me bringing our discussion to the wider
forum!
1. "Historical epoch" argument
Bo writes:
"In ancient - "social level" - times there was no irrational/rational
distinction. What we call 'mysterious' or 'magical' was an integrated
part of the total experience; the dead were living in another world, it
was possible to "persuade" reality to yield to one's wishes by
rituals....etc. Existence was animated as we say. To them such terms had
no meaning of course; It was THE INTELLECTUAL LEVEL which hammered the
irrational/rational, subjective/objective wedge through this holistic
existence and created a new reality of mind and matter of subjective
thoughts different from the objective world. This must be understood to
understand why a definition of Q-intellect supposed to cover "non-S/O
thinking" is counter to the MOQ.
Intellect IS the "thinking/world" distinction itself!"
Paul:
I think the weakness of this argument lies in the use of speculative
interpretation of historical events and psychology as a premise for your
argument instead of empirical experience.
Prehistory is necessarily an invention, your "social level time" is an
artistic creation. As such, although there is undoubtedly merit in
deducing and hypothesizing a prehistoric world to explain empirical
"findings", I think that attempting an inductive definition from
invented premises undermines your argument from the outset.
Furthermore, I think this argument is representative of a common way of
arriving at definitions of the MOQ levels. The definition of MOQ levels
in Lila is achieved predominantly by historical illustration to
exemplify the evolutionary structure and moral framework of Pirsig's
metaphysics. As such, one method of understanding the MOQ seems to
approach Pirsig's levels primarily as historical epochs rather than a
metaphysical system of discrete levels of experience. Without a clear
definition of each level in mind, this can lead to a varying
understanding of the metaphysical distinctions made by the MOQ. This
observation does not deny that the levels seem to have evolved over time
but emphasises that cosmological evolution is an intellectual
explanation of the history of the levels invented AFTER ALL LEVELS were
experienced by a human, and part of that explanation is necessarily the
prior definition of the MOQ levels themselves.
When the levels are seen primarily as "real" epochs with a definite
historical "cut-over", the intellectual "epoch" is often described as
beginning in ancient Greece with the emergence of Greek philosophy. It
seems counter-intuitive that, up until the time of the ancient Greek
philosophers, people did not think; therefore Pirsig's definition of
intellect as "simply thinking" and "the same as mind" doesn't make
sense. One common solution to this is to redefine the intellectual level
and to introduce the notion of "social level mind" or "social level
thinking". This then restricts "intellectual thinking" to substance
based philosophy, reason, science and logic, as that is the thinking
which seems to have started in Greece.
It puzzles me that, even after Pirsig (in directly addressing this
confusion) provides a definition of the fourth level of his metaphysics,
there is still so much confusion and reworking of the MOQ.
2. "Metaphysics is reality" argument
Bo writes:
"Here we go again about the map metaphor. Is there a terrain that the
SOM and the MOQ are maps over? In my opinion not, a metaphysics IS the
ultimate reality and we end up in the infinite regress problem here
unless that is heeded."
Paul:
By equating metaphysics with ultimate reality, you equate metaphysics
with Quality. As Quality is the empirical SOURCE of everything,
including metaphysics, metaphysics logically comes AFTER Quality, and as
such, cannot be synonymous, otherwise there would be no need to make a
distinction. You are postulating a Metaphysics of Metaphysics.
3. "MOQ is not just a thought" argument
Bo writes:
"And the annotating Pirsig hasn't helped much. For example by first
saying this....
> "The main danger to the MOQ from subject-object
> thinking at present seems to be when it tries in a
> conventional way to encase values and declare them
to
> be either objects or thoughts. Lila's Child p503
...and then go on to defining Q-intellect as "thinking" and saying that
the MOQ is just another intellectual pattern ...a THOUGHT which he calls
the greatest danger to the MOQ."
Paul:
I think you make this argument because you have misinterpreted Pirsig's
statement. Pirsig is stating that the main danger to the MOQ is when S/O
thinking tries to encase Quality and declare it to be exclusively in
objects or exclusively in thoughts, when it is prior to and fundamental
to both. Remember the "dilemma" in ZMM?
Continued in part 2
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