From: Scott R (jse885@spinn.net)
Date: Wed Aug 20 2003 - 18:29:18 BST
Andy,
> I want to give an answer to Scott's post on Darwin and Consciousness, but
I fear
> I am too stupid. Maybe I am just a materialist. I still don't know what
this
> means. Although, I am deathly afraid of this ambiguous term. It is being
slung
> around as an insult.As if only ignoramuses would be materialists and I
don't
> want to be an ignoramus. But I don't know how to stop being a materialist
> because I don't know what it means to be one.
To question someone's dogma is not to insult the person. Matt questions mine
and I question his. I do not question his or your intellectual integrity.
Here's Rorty's definition of a physicalist (a variety of materialist): "...a
"physicalist" [is] someone who is prepared to say that every event can be
described in micro-structural terms, a description which mentions only
elementary particles, and can be explained by reference to other events so
described. This applies, e.g., to the events which are Mozart composing a
melody or Euclid seeing how to prove a theorem." [from the essay
"Non-reductive Physicalism"]
My argument (to which you are responding, and I appreciate the effort)
convinces me that awareness of macro events cannot be so described, due to
spatio-temporal separation of the micro events.
> Scott said: I would also ask, why is an explanation that avoids purpose
better
> than one that doesn't? Other than, of course, a prior commitment to a
mindless
> materialism. Purpose obviously exists.
>
> Andy: Well, purpose doesn't obviously exist to me. But right now I am
still
> under the influence of mindless materialism. An explanation that avoids
purpose
> is better if it can explain better. I think some Darwinian ideas explain
some
> things better than other ideas out there-such as creationism. Does this
mean
> these Darwin ideas explain everything? Nobody asserts such a thing.
Dennett and Rorty, for example, look to Darwinism to explain the existence
of consciousness. That is what I am specifically targetting.
Didn't you have an idea of what you were going to say before you said it,
and a reason for saying it? That is purpose. In fact, to deny purpose is a
purposeful activity.
>
> Scott: Matter (which I would define as that which the senses can perceive)
> doesn't obviously exist outside the mind, or rather, it "obviously"
(naively)
> exists, but analysis raises doubts. What we perceive is produced in the
act of
> perception: we see trees, not photons. So why do materialists try to
provide an
> explanation of how perception works in terms of what perception produces?.
>
> Andy: If I only knew what you meant when you say materialists. Are these
any
> individuals who acknowledge the contributions of Darwin to evolutionary
> sciences? To biology?
In questions of evolution, I would call a materialist one who thinks that
consciousness evolved in time out of non-conscious, spatio-temporal
processes, and is completely dependent on these non-conscious
spatio-temporal processes. (The existence of quantum non-locality muddies
this, but it applies at least to Dennett, who thinks a computer can be
conscious, and a computer's processes are completely spatio-temporal.)
I think there have been many attempts at explaining how
> perception works and all of them leave something wanting. There is a
mystery
> there. But mystery doesn't necessarily mean we will never find a
satisfactory
> explanation. An explanation helping us navigate through the world. We
don't
> need to assign every unanswered question or mystery under the heading of
> mysticism. I know this is not what you are implying, but your arguments
so far
> remain a mystery to me.
>
> Scott: Here's the argument (taken from a Jan. 10 post):
> Consciousness, or even sentience, *cannot* evolve out of
non-consciousness. To
> see the problem, take the normally accepted view of how visual perception
works:
> light bounces off an object, stimulates the rods and cones in the eye,
which
> stimulate nerve cells, and (much complexity later) we say "I see the
tree". The
> materialist is forced to conclude that all that nerve cell agitation is
the
> seeing of a tree. But this is impossible, if one assumes that space and
time are
> the context in which all that is necessary to explain perception occurs.
>
> Andy: I wouldn't make that assumption.
Then there is no reason to assume that consciousnes evolved *in time* out of
spatio-temporal non-consciousness processes, and therefore no reason for a
Darwinist explanation of consciousness.
I am unsure of how to go about
> explaining perception. We look for patterns in the world around us. Our
> evolutionary history has programmed which patterns we should pay
particular
> attention to. Subatomic particles (electrons and protons) are theorized
for
> explaining things we see in the world around us, such as trees. We
further
> theorize properties for these particles. But matching these properties
with
> something as complex as perception can be tricky business indeed. Perhaps,
we
> need to look at perception differently - from another angle.
Indeed we do. My "other angle" is that perception produces the
spatio-temporal form of things out of a non-spatio-temporal subatomic
reality. I see no other way to avoid dualism (although more explanation is
needed than just this). It also provides a simple interpretation of quantum
weirdness.
>
> Scott: To see this, ask how the excitation of one electron being hit by
one
> photon can have any *connection* to any other electron that is being, or
has
> been hit by another photon. For this to happen a signal must pass from the
first
> to the second, but that signal cannot carry any additional information
than that
> of a single photon. So unless we assume an electron has memory, and can
> distinguish between one photon and another, there can be no greater
experience
> than that which an electron experiences on absorbing a photon (or any
other
> single interaction it can undergo, like being annihilated by a positron.).
>
> Andy: Yes-tricky business. Here is the problem. The whole is greater
than the
> sum of the parts. And, we cannot directly perceive electrons and protons
> because they are only theorized. But, in the world of what we do observe
and
> perceive directly we do see cases where the sum of the parts does not
explain
> the whole. In complexity theory these are often termed holarchies. One
theory
> explaining this phenomenon does use *connections* and the relationships
between
> parts for explaining this. And this has produced remarkable results in
the
> studies of neurology, brain science, ecosystems, economies, traffic
system,
> electric grids, computer science, the cognitive science and so on.
True. However, my argument is addressed to the question of how one holarchy
can be *aware* of another. None of these results addresses that question --
in particular cognitive science doesn't (I am an ex-computer
science/cognitive science grad student, and it was this argument that
resulted in the "ex").
>
> Scott: This argumentation applies at whatever level of granularity one
tries to
> think it through. One nerve cell excites others. But unless the nerve cell
> itself has memory and is sentient, it cannot make distinctions or note
> similarity. But how can it if it has parts (separated in space). One or
more of
> these parts must be responsible for holding a piece of the memory, but
then that
> piece has to be combined with others....
>
> Andy: The relationships between nerve cells. Graph theory and network
theory
> in mathematics offer plausible explanations.
No they don't. They just restate the problem. It doesn't matter how complex
the relations. At bottom they are all single photons passing from one
electron to another, and no way for any awareness greater than that of an
electron/photon interaction.
>
> Scott: There is one out, and that is depending on quantum non-locality.
But
> note that doing so says that reality is fundamentally non-spatio-temporal,
that
> *all* spatio-temporal experience arises out of eternity. So teleology just
means
> causation in a different temporal direction, and Darwinism becomes
irrelevant.
>
> Andy: You definitely lost me here. How did we go from perception to
wondering
> about the nature of reality. This is why we should be following Rorty and
> looking for useful theories that enable us to cope instead of explaining
the
> fundamental nature of reality. You know-looking for that all encompassing
> theory that explains what it is really like "out there." This theory
doesn't
> exist. And if it did it would do nothing for us in enabling us to cope.
It
> would be a useless theory. Other than providing the weak-minded with a
sense of
> comfort.
In pragmatic terms, I would say that materialism cannot cope with the
existence of awareness. My argument pinpoints where that failure to cope
occurs. In itself, it does not say what it is really like "out there". It
just says that explanations of perception cannot be done in strictly
spatio-temporal terms. I theorize beyond that, but I don't expect to find an
"all encompassing" statable theory.
Also note that this "enabling us to cope" vocabulary is itself Darwinist,
which stems from a theory about the nature of reality. Why does one look for
material explanations? because it is assumed that that is all there are (see
the Rorty definition above).
And that crack about the "weak-minded" is a canard. It is, of course, a
common belief among materialists (e.g., Dennett's title "Darwin's Dangerous
Idea") that people are religious because they find comfort in religion. No
doubt many do. But if you read the New Testament, or Buddhist philosophy, it
provides anything but comfort. It says: you must change, and you must make
every effort to change. "I bring not peace but a sword". For that matter,
one could aim the canard of wishful thinking at the materialist. Since they
know they won't survive death, they know their responsibility ends with
death. The Buddhist (at least) does not have that comforting knowledge.
>
> Scott: I've been considering whether an appeal to fields (e.g., the
> electromagnetic field) could provide another out. I don't see it. For one
thing,
> fields are just mathematical models to describe the results of action at a
> distance. That is, there is action at a distance, and that is basically
saying
> that space and/or time is transcended. So if we say these fields are real
in
> themselves, and that perhaps consciousness is a very complicated nexus of
> fields, well, aren't we saying that fields transcend space and time?
>
> Andy: Fields were a useful theory in physics in the 19th century. It was
a
> theory to help explain the movements of large objects in frictionless
space.
> Calculus is based on the mathematics of fields. They explain some
phenomena
> well and are useless for explaining other things we see around us. Thus
fields
> are not really relevant to modern physics.
Then we need not consider them as an attempt to salvage a materialist
outlook. Good.
>
> Scott: The question, then, is this still materialism, or are the goal
posts
> being moved?
>
> Andy: Uh-oh, materialism again. I don't know the answer to this question.
What
> would be the result of either option?
I lost you here, which two options are you referring to.
>
> Scott: In any case, we would be saying that the electromagnetic field
arising
> from one moving electron has to be conscious. Otherwise, adding and
combining
> fields together won't add up to qualia.
>
> Andy: Consciousness is not the only thing physics and scientific theory
has not
> adequately explained. You can use the same reasoning to argue why all of
> science is wrong because none of it gives an adequate explanation of
movement or
> causation. Mysteries. I am all-right with mystery and uncertainty. We
need
> useful theories. Not all encompassing theories that explain everything.
> Theories that help us get from here to there. Is there purpose in this.
Yes,
> we have local and immediate goals but I am not sure it is very useful to
think
> that the purpose of the universe is to achieve consciousness (however, you
may
> define that) or intelligence or complexity...
My position is that it is the purpose of consciousness (better: Quality) to
achieve universes. It explains more than the reverse.
>
> Scott: It (my argument) is that spacetime separation means that there can
be no
> larger awareness than that of the smallest unit of matter or signal one
knows about.
>
> Andy: and then we can spend a lot of time defining awareness and
spacetime. I
> am unsure what you are really implying here and how it makes Darwin
implausible.
> I think awareness or consciousness exists in the connections between
objects.
> Or it exists in the type of program or computation which we are running.
These are about as explanatory as saying "God does it". Now you are not
claiming that these are explanations, but they are statements about where
you would look for explanations if you wanted to find one. My argument says
that you are doomed to failure if you so try.
> Natural selection chooses better programs. Organisms have a will to
power.
A "will to power" sounds a lot like purpose.
> Individuals search for patterns in the chaos and try and organize them.
But how can they detect a pattern (which has parts) if they consist of
parts? How do the parts merge into a whole in the act of perception, given
spatio-temporal separation?
- Scott
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