From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Thu Sep 04 2003 - 19:07:51 BST
Hi Matt
For me mechanism implies ontology, so I say be a consistent pragmatist and
drop it.
It is almost the same thing to say only value/utility matters. I agree with
this approach but
prefer value to utility, what is the utility of beauty? But I can value
beauty.
Pirsig does have a problem with causation see Lila, that is causation under
SOM as its basis.
What is a thing? for a pragmatist Mr Kundert? See Heidegger on what is a
thing.
Things imply SOM. Pirsig suggest we speak rather of experience. I like
pragmatism but
I suggest keep a little ontology, keep the idea of Being, even though you
can't define it,
because it helps you to hang on to the importance of synamic quality, where
as SOM
is too static obsessed. Pragmatism is anti-closure, so is the idea of
Being/Quality
that cannot be defined. Mechanical/teleological for me always & maybe also
for Rorty sometimes
implies ontology, good lets be pragmatists in getting rid of these limiting
ontologies, but I see value/utility
in keeping a lunatic ontology of a Being/Quality that you can't define.
Descriptions always imply values,
any argument here is about values, particles imply the values of agency-less
matter (a loded concept indeed!),
quantum fields imply that agency is perhaps ineliminable.
Regards
David Morey
----- Original Message -----
From: "MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT" <mpkundert@students.wisc.edu>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Wednesday, September 03, 2003 10:27 PM
Subject: Re: MD A metaphysics
> David,
>
> David said:
> Matt talks about the mechanistic approach working with rocks, fine it
does, but you can change the words as Pirsig says, e.g. from cause to value,
it makes no difference to science but it changes the ontological assumptions
and implications.
>
> Matt:
> Problem is, pragmatists have no truck with ontology. The only way I can
figure a person would care about ontology is if there were something to get
right about ontology. Otherwise, who cares whether you describe the world
mechanistically or teleologically? The only thing that matters is utility.
When Pirsig redescribes causation into pre-conditional valuation, I think of
that as Pirsig being at his redescriptive, pragmatist best. I take his
point to be that the world doesn't care whether it is described in terms of
value or particles. This is a pragmatist point. But ontology is not part
of this point. Only the usefulness of descriptions. Pirsig doesn't even
try make the case that we should drop the concept of "causation" from our
vocabulary. I don't think he wants to. His point is simply a pragmatic
one.
>
> Now, I think the case can be made that Pirsig is doing ontology. In this
case, I think this is a misstep for a pragmatist, one I would criticize.
However, I haven't looked closely at the text in a while, so I'm not really
sure.
>
> Matt
>
>
>
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