Re: MD A metaphysics

From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Thu Sep 11 2003 - 17:21:32 BST

  • Next message: Paul Turner: "RE: MD Evolution of levels"

    Matt,

    > The obvious tilt of my last post wasn't because I was deeply and
    > personally affronted, but because I'm frustrated with your line of
    > argument. It seemed to me that you were willfully ignoring certain
    > passages and distinctions I made.

    I'm also frustrated because in your own words your are "flexible about
    definitions." Your Humpty Dumpty approach of "When I use a word it
    means just what I choose it to mean" isn't useful to mutual
    understanding.
     
    > Platt said:
    > More to the point, you might want to report what Rorty thinks of the
    > usefulness of beauty.
    >
    > Matt:
    > Rorty doesn't talk a tremendous amount about the concept of "beauty", to
    > my knowledge, except to say that it is thin, like the terms "true" and
    > "good". By thin, Rorty moreorless means undefineable, which pretty much
    > matches with Pirsig.

    In my view, undefineable things have the most depth and greatest value.
     
    > As for usefulness, I think Rorty would respond exactly the way I did.
    > Rorty finds wild orchids beautiful and sexy. Why? Who knows, he just
    > does. Their use extends to the degree in which they please him. In
    > other words, very useful.

    That which pleases a person is very useful? That's a new one on me.
     
    > Platt said:
    > I simply have no use for Rorty's truisms, like, people need people to
    > define a word.
    >
    > Matt:
    > But are they really truisms, then, if you don't have a use for them? I
    > would say, no, which means you should interpret or refute the "truism"
    > you disagree with. And for the record, Rorty doesn't think you need
    > other people to define a word. You can define a word any way you like.
    > That doesn't mean people will agree to your definition, though.

    Yes, I know. You've made your Humpty Dumpty philosophy of language
    clear.

    > Platt said:
    > You also might want to report on what Rorty thinks of the usefulness of
    > logic.
    >
    > Matt:
    > Logic's great as far as I know. It does some neat tricks. In fact,
    > Rorty is usually esteemed as being quite good at it, particularly in
    > lieu of his early phase as an analytic philosopher where he used
    > symbolic logic. Logic is good for keeping your beliefs coherent.

    Agree. Too bad coherence doesn't seem to matter when it is comes to the
    meaning of words.

    > I know you've been trying to tag Rorty with this self-referential
    > paradox, a contradiction. But the first rule of logic is that logic
    > does absolutely nothing without assumptions. Any person whose taken 1st
    > semester logic will tell you that. And when you change your
    > assumptions, you change your consequences. I've been trying
    > (unsuccessfully) to convince you that Rorty changes the assumption that
    > substantiates your charge of irrationality. But you don't believe me.

    What assumption does Rorty change that makes self-referential paradoxes
    meaningless?
      
    > Platt said:
    > More truisms: "All words are defined by other words." "Without sour,
    > there is no sweet." Oops. Sorry. In Rorty's philosophy there are no
    > truisms because truth depends on whatever some intersubjective community
    > says it is, e.g., if everyone says the emperor's clothes are gorgeous as
    > he stands there buck naked, then the emperor's clothes are gorgeous.
    >
    > Matt:
    > Sure there are truisms. As I already alluded to, however, truisms will
    > be different for different communities because different communities
    > will have different assumptions with which they base logic off of. So,
    > what spiral out to be truisms will be different, depending.

    Like I said, . . . "if everyone says (in an intersubjective community)
    the emporer's clothes . . ."
        
    > The "emperor's new clothes" analogy is a typical and persuasive
    > technique in trying to get people to think that the pragmatist is crazy.
    > I will simply point out that people should notice how it relies on
    > ocular metaphors to gain its effect. The Truth is "out there" in front
    > of people, if only they can pierce through and see it.

    Are you denying there is such a true condition as being "naked."
     
    > Platt said:
    > What role does beauty, the aesthetic response, play in Rorty's
    > practical, socially-patterned world?
    >
    > Matt:
    > This question boggles my mind. Beauty plays the role it usually plays.
    > I don't understand the question because I have no idea what you are
    > getting at. I already stretched out utility to a size where it includes
    > beauty, where a choice of utility is the same as an aesthetic choice,
    > but you don't care. You come back with "practical" as a epithet. You
    > also come at me with "socially-patterned" as an epithet, but last time I
    > checked Pirsig said our world is socially-patterned. Quality as a
    > consensus of evaluations, and all that.

    Quality as a consensus of evaluations? Really? I thought Quality was
    direct experience.

    > So I don't know Platt. I have no idea what your angle is. Beauty is
    > all around us. Rorty's a literature nut, he loves wild orchids. I'm
    > not sure what you want, what would satisfy your questions.

    My "angle" is to try to figure out what your and Rorty mean. You
    perhaps can understand my problem when words mean whatever you want
    them to mean. If you would stick to common meanings and not "shrug off"
    questions put to you as irrelevant, it would help.

    > Platt said:
    > To repeat. Arguing against your beliefs is not a personal attack.
    >
    > Matt:
    > Sure it is. When I discuss stuff around here, its another way of saying
    > that I'm "soul searching". The degree to which people will get upset
    > about arguments against their beliefs depends on how much that person
    > identifies with that particular belief, how essential it is in how they
    > describe themselves to themselves. If you argue with a priest about his
    > belief in God, it is quite possible that he might get upset. If you
    > argue with him about his belief in the tastiness of chocolate, he might
    > not. The other variable is how playful you are. If you are always
    > serious, then you will always get upset. If you are always playful, you
    > will never get upset.
    >
    > I think it is important to get upset once in a while. It is important
    > to be affronted by certain beliefs that other people have, like beliefs
    > of the inferiority of Jews and the like. Political and moral beliefs
    > are beliefs we should be ready to stand unflinchingly behind (depending
    > on how important the belief is: reduction of cruelty? very important.
    > the Democratic party is better than the Republican party? not so
    > important.) However, most philosophical beliefs, I believe, are best
    > treated playfully. Which is why I'm not really that affronted.
     
    Good. Stay playful. Higher quality. :-)

    Platt
     

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