From: Scott R (jse885@spinn.net)
Date: Sat Sep 13 2003 - 18:03:39 BST
DM,
> My dictionary says that nominalism is anti-realist,
> which I am not.
Well, the realism of the middle ages, to which nominalism was anti-, was the
position that concepts are real, that is, exist independently of the
thinker. Is this the realism you are not anti-, or the modern version, that
particulars exist independently of the perceiver?
I like to call myself an ontological
> phenomenologist. As Matt says, language is a part
> of the reality of experience and its continual development
> is an example of the dynamic quality of experience/reality.
> I don't think there is something noumenal behind the phenomenal
> that somehow escapes the continuing flux.
While I say that there is no phenomonal without the noumenal (and vice
versa).
> What we call the world
> is a subset of experience/reality, it is entirely conceptual. Of course,
> we can say lots of interesting things about our world, and its
> repeating patterns. Matt has talked a bit about mechanism. It seems to
> me interesting how human consciousness seems to fade into a mechanistic/
> dark/dreaming/forgetfull state. The more familiar you are with something,
> the easier it becomes, and it seems to drift into the unconscious. Perhaps
the
> human body is only a form of mechanistic/repeating unconsciousness. What
do you
> think?
I don't think it is. It grows, for one thing, and though 99% (or some large
fraction) is a repetition, there is room for variability. However, I do not
think the repetitive growth can be considered mechanistic. It calls on
something immaterial to happen. (Take this as conjecture).
>
> You said:Again, the L of CI points out that reality has not only the
> character of being and becoming but is actually constituted by, so to
speak, these two
> > fighting each other. As one narrows in on one, it turns out to be the
> other. So,although one may start with the equation SQ=Being and
DQ=Becoming, it
> > will not stay stable, and one can also say that SQ=Becoming and
DQ=Being,
> > and so the ontological basis is not a basis. It shifts endlessly.
>
> DM:sounds good to me, they have to play off each other to evolve, and
> achieve the cosmos. When I say into the subject, I am thinking of German
Idealism which of
> course was wrapped up with European Romanticism very intimately. I am
interested in
> this L of CI. It reminds me of Schelling. Coleridge, I have heard it said,
is almost a
> word for word translation of Schelling, and also Heidegger is indebted to
Schelling in
> ways he has tried to cover up. What are your sources for L of CI?
Nishida Kitaro (via Robert Carter's "The Nothingness Beyond God: An
Introduction to the Philosophy of Nishida Kitaro"), Coleridge (via
Barfield's *What Coleridge Thought"), who called it polarity, and Derrida
(as in "the sign is ("is" X-ed out) that ill-named thing ("thing" X-ed out),
the only one, that escapes the instituting question of philosophy: 'what
is?'") (via Robert Magliola (and others), "Derrida on the Mend", which
discusses the relation between Derrida and Nagarjuna.)
On the relation between Coleridge and Schelling, Barfield says (p. 6) that a
couple of pages of the Biographia Literaria are pretty much unacknowledged
translations from Schelling, which is hardly all of Coleridge. But in any
case one needs to distinguish between "borrowing" ideas and making them
one's own by thinking them through. And, of course, he made his own many
precursors' thought, as do we all. I haven't read Schelling (or much about
him), so I can't say what is in the one and not in the other.
- Scott
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