Re: MD Dealing with S/O pt 1

From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Thu Sep 11 2003 - 19:02:55 BST

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    Hi

    My dictionary says that nominalism is anti-realist,
    which I am not. I like to call myself an ontological
    phenomenologist. As Matt says, language is a part
    of the reality of experience and its continual development
    is an example of the dynamic quality of experience/reality.
    I don't think there is something noumenal behind the phenomenal
    that somehow escapes the continuing flux. What we call the world
    is a subset of experience/reality, it is entirely conceptual. Of course,
    we can say lots of interesting things about our world, and its
    repeating patterns. Matt has talked a bit about mechanism. It seems to
    me interesting how human consciousness seems to fade into a mechanistic/
    dark/dreaming/forgetfull state. The more familiar you are with something,
    the
    easier it becomes, and it seems to drift into the unconscious. Perhaps the
    human
    body is only a form of mechanistic/repeating unconsciousness. What do you
    think?

    You said:Again, the L of CI points out that reality has not only the
    character of
    > being and becoming but is actually constituted by, so to speak, these two
    > fighting each other. As one narrow sin on one, it turns out to be the
    other.
    > So,although one may start with the equation SQ=Being and DQ=Becoming, it
    > will not stay stable, and one can also say that SQ=Becoming and DQ=Being,
    > and so the ontological basis is not a basis. It shifts endlessly.

    DM:sounds good to me, they have to play off each other to evolve, and
    achieve the cosmos.
    When I say into the subject, I am thinking of German Idealism which of
    course was
    wrapped up with European Romanticism very intimately. I am interested in
    this L of CI.
    It reminds me of Schelling. Coleridge, I have heard it said, is almost a
    word for word
    translation of Schelling, and also Heidegger is indebted to Schelling in
    ways he has tried to
    cover up. What are your sources for L of CI?

    thanks
    David Morey
    >

    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "Scott R" <jse885@spinn.net>
    To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
    Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2003 4:38 AM
    Subject: Re: MD Dealing with S/O pt 1

    > David,
    >
    > > Don't understand why you think anti-essentialism=nominalism.
    >
    > Well, here are some definitions from my dictionary (New World):
    >
    > essentialism: a theory which stresses essences as opposed to existence.
    > essence: a) the inward nature of anything, underlying its manifestations.
    > True substance.
    > b) the indispensible conceptual characteristics and relations of
    > anything.
    > universal: a metaphysical entity characterized by repeatability and
    > unchanging nature through a series of changing relations, as substance.
    > nominalism: A doctrine of the late middle ages that all universal or
    > abstract terms are mere necessities of thought or conveniences of language
    > and therefore exist as names only and have no general realities
    > corresponding to them.
    >
    > So I see a nominalist as one who denies the reality of the concept of
    words
    > (its signified), this being an example of an essence. I don't see someone
    > being one and not the other, but I could be misunderstanding, so please
    fill
    > me in on the difference.
    >
    > >
    > > I am a realist as per essentialism but do not think we can reduce
    > > reality down to any essential properties.
    >
    > If one removes "reduce" and "properties", doesn't this say that you are a
    > realist as per essentialism, but do not think any essence is real? Again,
    I
    > plead confusion.
    >
    > >
    > > But not an anti-realist as per a nominalist. Nor giving priority
    > > to concrete particulars, as these are indistinguishable without
    > > language
    > >
    > > I wish to avoid giving priority to either universals or particulars.
    >
    > Ok. Note that the logic of contradictory identity goes further in seeing
    the
    > two as contradictorily identical, which is to say that language is created
    > by their conflict.
    >
    > >
    > > Reality=experience and this includes language as playing
    > > a role in the emergence of reality/experience and is therefore
    > > universals+particulars from the first word.
    >
    > Right.
    >
    > > This is also a sort
    > > of curse because we can try and treat language as a synchronic
    > > achievement and attempt to fix reality once and for all, however
    > > language is always a living language and closure is never possible.
    >
    > Ditto.
    >
    > > I am also happy to go a step further than pragmatism and say that
    > > there is a equi-primordial Being (static quality) and Becoming(dynamic
    > > quality)
    > > character to reality that is a very convincing ontological basis for
    > > understanding
    > > experience/reality.
    >
    > Again, the L of CI points out that reality has not only the character of
    > being and becoming but is actually constituted by, so to speak, these two
    > fighting each other. As one narrow sin on one, it turns out to be the
    other.
    > So,although one may start with the equation SQ=Being and DQ=Becoming, it
    > will not stay stable, and one can also say that SQ=Becoming and DQ=Being,
    > and so the ontological basis is not a basis. It shifts endlessly.
    >
    > > Unlike the Platonic bias towards only Being that tries
    > > to pin reality down to an essential-static quality, although the dynamic
    > has always been
    > > trying to force its way back into discussion, usually in the form of the
    > subject.
    >
    > Agree, except I'm not sure of the last phrase "usually in the form of the
    > subject". Are you thinking of, e.g., Romanticism? I would agree with that
    in
    > general, but one of my heroes is Coleridge, who sees everything as being
    > based on what he called the law of polarity, which is, in essence [sic],
    the
    > same as the logic of contradictory identity. So, he would not put the
    > dynamic on the side of the subject or the object, but sees both as both
    > static and dynamic, and, of course, in a state of self-contradictory
    > identity (which he calls polarity).
    >
    > - Scott
    >
    >
    >
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