From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Tue Sep 16 2003 - 19:18:25 BST
Matt
I would like to introduce a word into the chat: authenticity. I think this
lines up nicely with quality.
We all want to do our own thing these days. But we
often accept doing what others want us to do, say
to keep the family happy, or to earn money going to
work. Authenticity seems to be of high value, and
much of the way we live is a compromise of this quality,
to achieve other lower level things. i think much of our social problems
reflect how unhappy we are with how much authenticity we have to give up to
get on or
just live.
Regards
David M
----- Original Message -----
From: "MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT" <mpkundert@students.wisc.edu>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Monday, September 15, 2003 10:35 PM
Subject: Re: MD Four options
> GJ,
>
> GJ said:
> If you come in contact with a new pattern you have three options. Three
reactions that are hard to influence. Especially if you have never had any
insights about them.(pre-moq) If you come in contact with a new pattern the
following can 'happen' to you:
>
> 1) you drop a level (for example: from intellectual to social,
compensating
> intellectual skills -patterns- with social ones)
>
> 2) Imitate succesfull patterns (aquiring skills by copying from others)
>
> 3) go Dynamic (get 'into' the new pattern and create new succesfull ways)
>
> Matt:
> I want to highlight what GJ said because I think it is a beautiful and
useful example of redescription. GJ took the four options I drew up and
redescribed them into a MoQian vocabulary in a way that emphasized something
different then what my four options did. What I think this list emphasizes,
in option (1), is how some options are ruled out of court. The drop of a
level is considered to be immediately less moral then the higher level.
What this means is that if the opportunity to follow the higher level
exists, you should take it. If it doesn't, then you take the highest level
option available.
>
> Unlike some people, I think the ability to ascribe actions or people or
nations to levels is extrememly muddy, and I think it should remain so. I
don't want things to be easily ascribed so that we can draw up a table, a
set of algorithims, and a flowchart and make morality a mathematical
calculation. I think this is what Kant and Plato wanted, but I don't think
it fits with Socratic deliberation, which is what pragmatists want.
>
> However, I can think of one division that can be ascribed as a split
between levels that is fairly universally agreed on in civilized portions of
the world: that between discussion and force. It is illegitimate, so we
say, that when confronted with a pattern, say a platitude spouting liberal,
that we use force instead of persuasion. It is illegitimate for me to hunt
down all of you people who disagree with me and beat you senseless. If I or
anyone else even considered something like that, then I would take Squonk's
ramblings a little more seriously. But we don't. We all agree that it is
illegitimate, that it would be a reversion to a former state, say an
animalistic, barbaric state.
>
> Pirsig applies the distinction between levels in just this way when he
describes the use of police. If conversation isn't an option, then other,
less savory options open themselves because we have no other choice. To
enjoy and gain pleasure from the incarceration of other people is
despicable. It isn't pleasant, it is against our highest moral
sensibilities, but those sensibilities cannot hold us in sway until we can
think of something better to do, and so far the best thing we can think of
to do with a murderer is to lock him away. We are trying, half-heartedly,
to "rehabilitate" prisoners, which is a step up from the old days when they
were simply locked away, but these methods of rehabilitation have a long way
to go. We can work on them. However, like all practical things (like who
you reply to on an e-mail philosophy discussion group on any given day), you
have to prioritize and sometimes you just don't have the resources.
>
> The same goes for war. I agree with Michael Walzer that there are just
and unjust wars. I'm no hawk, but neither am I an ignorant pacifist who
thinks that entering into WW II was unjustifiable. I don't care if we went
into WW II to help the Jews or not. I don't care if their genocide was the
direct, or even indirect, cause of our entrance. The fact is, we did go
into WW II and we did save a lot of Jews. That, I think, is reason enough,
if even retrospectively, to view WW II as a justifiable war. Sometimes, on
rarer and rarer occasions, military action can be justified.
>
> The main reason I highlighted GJ's three options wasn't to make concrete
what option (1) means, though I think its an important point of intersection
between Pirsig and Rorty. I also want to highlight the metaphilosophical
issue of redescription. I like GJ's description, but I also like mine. The
point is that I don't think either are mutually exclusive. You can have
either one, depending on what purpose you want them for.
>
> Matt
>
>
>
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