From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Tue Sep 16 2003 - 19:28:23 BST
Hi
subject-object alienation, is real enough
to account for a great deal of our history and culture.
Regards
David M
----- Original Message -----
From: "Scott R" <jse885@spinn.net>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2003 1:21 AM
Subject: Re: MD Logic of contradictory identity
> Paul,
>
> > [Paul pre:] The intellectual construction of a contradictory dichotomy
> > is, in MOQ terms, no more than an intellectual pattern of values
> formulated
> > from complex symbolic abstractions. So to solve a "contradictory
> > identity" paradox one simply rejects the contradictory dichotomy in
> > favour of non-paradoxical experience. I believe this is the approach
> > that Nagarjuna and the Wisdom Sutras are advocating.
> >
> > [Scott:]
> > Where does the abstraction come from?
> >
> > [Paul:]
> > Experience
> [etc.]
>
> My point is in the next two remarks I made (about nominalism and the
> mystery), that to take abstraction as a given, not acknowledging that it
is
> a complete and utter mystery, is to sweep the L of CI under the rug. So to
> say that subject and object (or DQ and SQ for that matter) are "just
> abstractions" from experience one is assuming there can be experience
> without the abstractions. Not these particular ones, necessarily, nor is
it
> necessarily abstraction that is involved. But something that falls in the
> traditionally "subject" side of things is always involved, as well of
course
> as something on the object side, plus something on the uniting side (so to
> speak), and so the L of CI is always a factor in experience.
>
> What I am getting at (and the above does a poor job of it, I realize) is
> that all experience is word-like in nature. There is always a triangle:
> Quality/DQ/SQ, or meaning-word-interpretant.
>
>
> > [Scott:]
> > This is nominalism, and it is the great error that needs to be overcome.
> >
> >
> > [Paul:]
> > Intellectual patterns are symbols standing for patterns of experience. I
> > accept that intellectual patterns refer to patterns of value, this can
> > be tested by anyone. What I am saying is that taking such symbols and
> > further abstracting from them theoretically independent aspects of
> > experience such as "self" and "not self", then reflecting them back onto
> > hypothetical experience as paradoxes is the great error.
>
> But we don't. It happens before we theorize. It is true that we experience
> before we theorize, but for there to be any experience in the first place
> there had to be a distinction, whether into "self" and "non-self" or
> something else. Hence, in e.g. Kabbala, the initial act of creation is the
> Ein Sof withdrawing from itself. What is wrong with our present state of
> consciousness is that this distinction does not reunite, in most cases. So
> "pure experience" would be a separating/uniting.
>
> >
> > [Scott:]
> > The ability to abstract, or to create an intellectual pattern, is a
> > complete and utter mystery.
> >
> > [Paul:]
> > Agreed.
>
> So I consider it unwise to treat the products of abstraction in
nominalistic
> terms, as "mere".
>
> > [Scott:]
> > As to "reject[ing] the contradictory dichotomy in favor of
> > non-paradoxical experience", well, why not just give oneself a frontal
> > lobotomy? Why have we bothered to become human at all?
> >
> > [Paul:]
> > To experience.
>
> I would prefer: to create.
>
> > [Paul prev:] The point is that "self" and "not-self" are never given in
> > experience, they are arrived at through abstraction, so to say they are
> > one and the same is just to say that they are derived from a unified
> > experience.
> >
> > [Scott prev:] Well, I think saying they are never given in experience is
> > incorrect. If there are no distinctions, there is no experience, and for
> > human beings at this stage in our evolution, the primary distinction is
> > between self and non-self.
> >
> > [Paul:]
> > I was obviously unclear about this. Of course empirical experience is
> > differentiated, but we never experience differentiations on their own.
> > If we did, they wouldn't be differentiations. When we experience
> > something on its own, we are enlightened, for then experience is without
> > differentiation. So we never experience "self" OR "not-self". We
> > experience "self" AND "not-self" together, make and maintain
> > distinctions symbolically and isolate them for analysis.
>
> Agree with the last part (we experience AND, not OR), but see above about
> experience vis-a-vis differentiation.
>
> >
> > [Scott prev:]
> > The change in thinking that I propose to
> > relate "experience", "self", and "non-self" is not that "self" and
> > "non-self" are intellectual abstractions we impose on experience, but
> > that experience in itself is the creation of the self and the other. It
> > can also create in other contradictory identities.
> >
> > [Paul:]
> > So do you believe that the symbols pick out natural breaks in
> > experience?
>
> I believe that there are breaks in experience, or there wouldn't be
> experience. The symbols for the breaks will vary.
>
> > [Paul prev:]
> > For example, "time as duration" and "time as discrete events" are
> > just abstracted descriptions of how one can conceive of "time", so the
> > only contradiction is in the hypothetical sense that an experience can
> > be described in terms of duration or in terms of events. The description
> > has no bearing on empirical experience.
> >
> > [Scott:] Again, whence the "just abstracted descriptions"?
> >
> > [Paul:]
> > >From experience. "Time" is a term invented to describe an aspect of
> > experience. We all experience it, yet nobody can explain it by
> > abstraction. Although many have tried.
>
> And failed because it involves the L of CI.
>
> >
> > [Scott prev:]
> > In any case,
> > these "abstractions" became very real to me in trying to discern how a
> > computer could be aware. This is because a computer is designed
> > explicitly to treat time as discrete events solely, and this makes
> > awareness impossible. Hence the difference between a person and a
> > computer is that the former actually does experience duration as well as
> >
> > discrete events.
> >
> > [Paul:]
> > Well, this is a logical deduction made from the prior assumption that
> > awareness does actually equate to time as duration and time as discrete
> > events. Very interesting though.
>
> The assumption is that time is a mystery, and that it is the same mystery
as
> that of God, or Quality, or all the undefinables, though we have different
> names for the two sides of the polarity in different situations. Hence we
> can recognize error when we see an attempt to explain the mystery by
denying
> its mysteriousness (usually by assuming one side of the polarity is an
> illusion derived from the other, as materialist and idealist SOM do).
>
> >
> > [Paul prev:] In terms of "DQ" and "SQ", I would say they refer to
> > complementary aspects of experience which have been abstracted
> > symbolically by Pirsig to provide a metaphysical conception of a process
> > of experience. They are also static divisions of experience.
> >
> > [Scott prev:] I would say that "complementary" does not cover it. They
are
> > opposed, and by opposing constitute the process experience, Experience
> > is never just static or just dynamic. Once named, the names are, of
> > course, static.
> >
> > [Paul:]
> > "Experience is never just static or just dynamic"
> > Precisely. They are isolated only by abstraction and analysis. Like
> > "self" and "not self".
>
> Isolated, yes. The L of CI's basic premise is that neither self nor
non-self
> have "self-identity".
>
> > [Paul:]
> > Okay "all static divisions collapse into a non-intellectual monism
> > referred to by Pirsig as Quality" seems like a brush-it-under-the-carpet
> > solution. You want to avoid the finality. I agree with that sentiment
> > but I acknowledge the limits of intellect in articulating the ineffable.
>
> I see them as the same thing. The L of CI does not try to articulate the
> ineffable. It tries to articulate the ineffability of the ineffable.
>
> > [Paul:]
> > I see thinking very much as part of experience, but not the whole thing
> > and not in a "directionally creator relation" to experience [I'm not
> > ready to accept that aspect of Barfield].
>
> Hmm. I believe it was perception that Barfield considered to be in a
> "directionally creator relation" to experience, not thinking. I'll have to
> check.
>
> >
> > I guess this particular discussion comes down to whether one sees
> > "contradictory identity" as something imposed by thought on experience
> > or something inherent and natural in both [thought and experience]?
>
> I think this question itself needs the L of CI. The "imposed by thought on
> experience" seems to beg the question in some way, as does "something
> inherent and natural in both". If forced to choose as stated here, I would
> go with the latter, reflecting my agreement with the revelation "By [the
> Logos] were all things made", but one has to wonder if at some future
stage
> of consciousness "things" just don't seem so contradictory anymore.
>
> How's that for a weasel answer :-)
>
> - Scott
>
>
>
>
>
>
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