From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Tue Sep 23 2003 - 21:31:32 BST
Scott
what are you saying about the mind-body problem?
You want a solution to it? Pirsig is suggesting it
is a false problem, resulting from SOM.
Do you see it as still a problem in MOQ?
If so, why?
DM
----- Original Message -----
From: "Paul Turner" <paulj.turner@ntlworld.com>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2003 3:26 PM
Subject: RE: MD DQ=SQ tension
> Scott
>
> [Scott:]
> In Lila, Pirsig restricts the use of the word 'objective' to things and
> events of the inorganic and biological levels, and 'subjective' to those
> of
> the social and intellectual levels. In Note #111 of Lila's Child, he
> makes
> this explicit: in the MOQ, the word 'object' is to be used only in the
> sense
> "Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, expecially by
> vision
> or touch". To me this makes the MOQ useless in coming to grips with the
> mind, since it disallows talk of the intentionality of consciousness, to
> talk about "thinking about X" when the X is not inorganic or biological.
>
> [Paul:]
> It doesn't stop us talking about anything. It just asks us to replace
> the word "object" with either "inorganic", "biological", "social" or
> "intellectual" patterns of value. So if you want to talk about something
> you are thinking about that is not currently or is not at all
> perceptible to the senses then it is either a social or intellectual
> pattern. I don't see the problem.
>
> [Scott:]
> In the MOQ, the mind is a set of static patterns of intellectual value.
> I see this as a bogus way of eliminating the mind-body problem
>
> [Paul:]
> It doesn't eliminate anything; it describes the mind-body relationship
> in terms of an evolution of value. It says that the mind-body dichotomy
> is a problem when one attempts to define the relationship by reducing
> one to the other. In the MOQ, intellectual patterns of mind are not
> understood by interrogating the biological patterns of a body any more
> than the plot of a novel on a PC is understood by interrogating the
> electrical circuits in a motherboard. They are understood in their own
> terms as discrete levels of value patterns.
>
> [Scott:]
> ...similar to the way materialists get rid of it. It just defers the
> problem.
>
> [Paul:]
> The MOQ provides a metaphysical framework for building better
> descriptions of the mind by considering it to be fundamentally a pattern
> of values. Developing hypotheses and new ways to understand intellectual
> patterns of values is where problems will be "solved".
>
> Materialists, as I understand it, deny "mind" an existence outside of
> electrical and chemical properties.
>
> [Scott:]
> It ignores the mystery that a unity can split itself, by being able to
> "think about".
>
> [Paul:]
> I don't think it ignores it. The MOQ describes all thinking as static
> and subordinates intellectual understanding to a non-intellectual
> understanding. It identifies the "mystery" with a reality beyond the
> reach of any kind of thought.
>
> You want to know why we can think, why did thinking evolve? This is a
> mystery, but again, the MOQ identifies this mystery [but not the act of
> thinking] with Dynamic Quality. Pirsig responds to a similar question
> from Dan in Lila's Child:
>
> "RMP: ...the big self invents intellectual patterns that invent the
> small self and that collection of small selves known as "we."
>
> Dan Glover: Why?
>
> RMP: The question, "Why?" is always an intellectual question. It is
> always part of the static patterns of the small self. Any intellectual
> answer it gets will by necessity also be a part of the static patterns
> of
> the small self. Since the big self cannot be contained by small-self
> patterns, there is no intellectual, patterned answer to "Why?" A lot of
> the enigmatic unpatterned nature of Zen results from teachers trying
> to give non-intellectual, non-patterned answers to "Why?" That is,
> they are trying to give, as an answer, the big self itself, which
> surpasses all questions and is the only correct answer that can be
> given." [Lila's Child p536]
>
> I see that you are not satisfied with that kind of response. However, I
> think it is equally as mysterious as "why we think" that there is
> anything rather than nothing. The MOQ simply says "because it is better"
> and leaves it at that. In your own words you want to "articulate the
> ineffability of the ineffable". The MOQ provides a place for a
> "conceptually unknown" in a rational understanding of reality but
> doesn't try to "conceptualise the unknown in the conceptually unknown"!
>
> In "Guidebook to ZMM" by DiSanto and Steele I found this section from
> the original manuscript of ZMM which didn't make it to the published
> version. It describes how a young Phaedrus struggled with the logical
> paradoxes and contradictions inherent in Hindu philosophy.
>
> "On and on it went, through generality after generality, until he was
> ready to drop the whole process of generalizing--except that this
> produced the nagging feeling that there are general truths about
> Hinduism, just beyond, that he was about to grasp but never did. His
> problem, I think, was that the Indian tradition requires acceptance of
> it on its own terms. You don't sum it up correctly in terms of another
> way of looking at things. Because of his scientific background Phaedrus
> threw up his hands at the inadequacy of the proofs, tests, and logical
> consistencies within Indian thought without realizing that these demands
> for proofs were, within an Indian way of looking at things, a lesser
> form of knowledge trying to contain a greater one. This lesser form of
> knowledge was to be transcended for an understanding of the real base of
> Indian philosophy. Phaedrus did not see this, and so went spinning round
> and round, doing Westernized generalizations on a subject that is not
> well rendered by Westernized generalizations."
>
> Based on my own experience, I share the narrator's opinion here, and
> this "spinning round and round" is enough to prevent my attempts to
> articulate the ineffability of the ineffable in anything more precise
> than "enigmatic" poetic terms.
>
> And on that note, I leave you to it!
>
> Adios
>
> Paul
>
>
>
>
>
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