From: Paul Turner (paulj.turner@ntlworld.com)
Date: Tue Sep 23 2003 - 15:26:13 BST
Scott
[Scott:]
In Lila, Pirsig restricts the use of the word 'objective' to things and
events of the inorganic and biological levels, and 'subjective' to those
of
the social and intellectual levels. In Note #111 of Lila's Child, he
makes
this explicit: in the MOQ, the word 'object' is to be used only in the
sense
"Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, expecially by
vision
or touch". To me this makes the MOQ useless in coming to grips with the
mind, since it disallows talk of the intentionality of consciousness, to
talk about "thinking about X" when the X is not inorganic or biological.
[Paul:]
It doesn't stop us talking about anything. It just asks us to replace
the word "object" with either "inorganic", "biological", "social" or
"intellectual" patterns of value. So if you want to talk about something
you are thinking about that is not currently or is not at all
perceptible to the senses then it is either a social or intellectual
pattern. I don't see the problem.
[Scott:]
In the MOQ, the mind is a set of static patterns of intellectual value.
I see this as a bogus way of eliminating the mind-body problem
[Paul:]
It doesn't eliminate anything; it describes the mind-body relationship
in terms of an evolution of value. It says that the mind-body dichotomy
is a problem when one attempts to define the relationship by reducing
one to the other. In the MOQ, intellectual patterns of mind are not
understood by interrogating the biological patterns of a body any more
than the plot of a novel on a PC is understood by interrogating the
electrical circuits in a motherboard. They are understood in their own
terms as discrete levels of value patterns.
[Scott:]
...similar to the way materialists get rid of it. It just defers the
problem.
[Paul:]
The MOQ provides a metaphysical framework for building better
descriptions of the mind by considering it to be fundamentally a pattern
of values. Developing hypotheses and new ways to understand intellectual
patterns of values is where problems will be "solved".
Materialists, as I understand it, deny "mind" an existence outside of
electrical and chemical properties.
[Scott:]
It ignores the mystery that a unity can split itself, by being able to
"think about".
[Paul:]
I don't think it ignores it. The MOQ describes all thinking as static
and subordinates intellectual understanding to a non-intellectual
understanding. It identifies the "mystery" with a reality beyond the
reach of any kind of thought.
You want to know why we can think, why did thinking evolve? This is a
mystery, but again, the MOQ identifies this mystery [but not the act of
thinking] with Dynamic Quality. Pirsig responds to a similar question
from Dan in Lila's Child:
"RMP: ...the big self invents intellectual patterns that invent the
small self and that collection of small selves known as "we."
Dan Glover: Why?
RMP: The question, "Why?" is always an intellectual question. It is
always part of the static patterns of the small self. Any intellectual
answer it gets will by necessity also be a part of the static patterns
of
the small self. Since the big self cannot be contained by small-self
patterns, there is no intellectual, patterned answer to "Why?" A lot of
the enigmatic unpatterned nature of Zen results from teachers trying
to give non-intellectual, non-patterned answers to "Why?" That is,
they are trying to give, as an answer, the big self itself, which
surpasses all questions and is the only correct answer that can be
given." [Lila's Child p536]
I see that you are not satisfied with that kind of response. However, I
think it is equally as mysterious as "why we think" that there is
anything rather than nothing. The MOQ simply says "because it is better"
and leaves it at that. In your own words you want to "articulate the
ineffability of the ineffable". The MOQ provides a place for a
"conceptually unknown" in a rational understanding of reality but
doesn't try to "conceptualise the unknown in the conceptually unknown"!
In "Guidebook to ZMM" by DiSanto and Steele I found this section from
the original manuscript of ZMM which didn't make it to the published
version. It describes how a young Phaedrus struggled with the logical
paradoxes and contradictions inherent in Hindu philosophy.
"On and on it went, through generality after generality, until he was
ready to drop the whole process of generalizing--except that this
produced the nagging feeling that there are general truths about
Hinduism, just beyond, that he was about to grasp but never did. His
problem, I think, was that the Indian tradition requires acceptance of
it on its own terms. You don't sum it up correctly in terms of another
way of looking at things. Because of his scientific background Phaedrus
threw up his hands at the inadequacy of the proofs, tests, and logical
consistencies within Indian thought without realizing that these demands
for proofs were, within an Indian way of looking at things, a lesser
form of knowledge trying to contain a greater one. This lesser form of
knowledge was to be transcended for an understanding of the real base of
Indian philosophy. Phaedrus did not see this, and so went spinning round
and round, doing Westernized generalizations on a subject that is not
well rendered by Westernized generalizations."
Based on my own experience, I share the narrator's opinion here, and
this "spinning round and round" is enough to prevent my attempts to
articulate the ineffability of the ineffable in anything more precise
than "enigmatic" poetic terms.
And on that note, I leave you to it!
Adios
Paul
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