From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Thu Sep 25 2003 - 18:40:51 BST
Matt:
Unlike most (metaphysical) atheists
why metaphysical?
DM
----- Original Message -----
From: "MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT" <mpkundert@students.wisc.edu>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Wednesday, September 24, 2003 10:44 PM
Subject: Re: MD Four options
> Sam,
>
> Sam said:
> Right, I'm happy in many instances to be sceptical about vertical
metaphors. However, unlike you I think there are times when you do gain a
greater understanding, when it is possible to say, eg, 'I never really
understood that before' - or for something creative to happen, a genuine
insight to occur, a new DQ development comes along which solves whatever
problem was hanging your system. So I think there are times when talking
about 'height' of understanding (eg the mountains in ZMM is legitimate. How
do you understand the dharmakaya light?
>
> Matt:
> Well, wait a minute. I think you can say, "I never really understood that
before." I just don't think it implies _correct_ understanding, simply
_better_ understanding (from where you stand now, at least). And I
certainly think creativity, insight, and DQ occur. So, alright, vertical
metaphors are not always out of place. I generally avoid them, but here's
an instance where I think they are fine and, in fact, useful: progress can
be defined as the climbing up of platforms, from level to level, by the use
of ladders. The pragmatist point about progress is that the ladders, once
we've used them to ascend to a new level, can be discarded. They don't need
to be collected. For instance, this is the claim pragmatists would make
about "natural human rights". It was a great rallying cry a century ago,
but I think we can drop the "natural" bit and get along just fine with human
rights.
>
> (Oh, and I can't remember what dharmakaya light and I don't have Lila with
me. Maybe I'll get back to you tomorrow.)
>
> Sam said:
> More interestingly, however, I think there are times when we just get
snared in a contradiction, when our 'moral intuitions' conflict. I think the
excavation of our moral premises can lead to a better understanding of how
our different values fit together, and so, again, we reach a place of higher
Quality. Whatever vocabulary is used, I think it's something more than
simply affirming your beliefs - for part of the process is that your beliefs
change, therefore - what beliefs are being affirmed? I think this ties in
with the transcendence point.
>
> Matt:
> I agree with "a better understanding of how our different values fit
together". But I'm not sure I understand you point with "Whatever
vocabulary is used, I think it's something more than simply affirming your
beliefs." I agree, its not about simply affirming your beliefs, its about
comparing your beliefs and either affirming one or the other or generating a
new one.
>
> Sam said:
> OK. What I'm objecting to with that rhetoric is the Platonising emphasis
on 'intellect' as a highest value (in other words, think clearly and
logically and all your [spiritual] problems will be solved). It's Pirsig's
point in ZMM, that sometimes an argument etc can be perfectly logical, but
still not any good. I think the MoQ has fallen away somewhat from that
insight. I think seeking greater coherence of beliefs is a good thing; I
just think that it's impossible to articulate that which can provide a
genuine coherence, ie the ultimate, what I call God. Therefore, in the face
of our messy lives, we sometimes just have to (pragmatically!) put the
desire for coherence to one side and seek the good or the best outcome,
however we understand the rationale for it being so.
>
> Matt:
> I agree that an argument can be perfectly logical but not any good. A
person can make as many logical metaphysical arguments as they want, they
just don't make any sense to me because I don't accept a crucial premise:
that metaphysics is possible. Where I still hold back is the notion of a
"genuine coherence". I think that's a metaphysical bubble. Better?
Possibly, but hold back from "genuine".
>
> I have no problem with the inarticulable. I think beliefs about God, as
inarticulable as He is, can fit in just fine in our web of beliefs and
desires. You just change enough of your beliefs so that he fits. Unlike
most (metaphysical) atheists, I don't think belief in God is incoherent or
irrational. It can be as coherent as any of our other beliefs. That's what
makes James' Will to Believe still the fundamental pragmatist statement on
religion.
>
> Matt
>
>
>
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