Re: MD Begging the Question, Moral Intuitions, and Answering the Nazi, Part III

From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Mon Oct 20 2003 - 19:44:05 BST

  • Next message: David MOREY: "Re: MD Begging the Question, Moral Intuitions, and Answering the Nazi, Part III"

    Scott

    Thanks for post below. I think your case in very fair,
    I really do not understand what Platt's problem is with Rorty,
    in so far as I do not recognise the Rorty I have read in his posts.
    I've read most of Rorty although about ten years ago, except
    for the odd essay more recently.

    regards
    David M
    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "Scott R" <jse885@spinn.net>
    To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
    Sent: Sunday, October 19, 2003 5:26 PM
    Subject: Re: MD Begging the Question, Moral Intuitions, and Answering the
    Nazi, Part III

    > Platt,
    >
    > I'm not concerned with political correctness crap on college campuses or
    > with Clinton's moral failings. I am concerned that you are grossly
    > misrepresenting what Rorty has said. Here's the opening of Consequences of
    > Pragmatism:
    >
    > "The essays in this book are attempts to draw consequences from a
    pragmatist
    > theory about truth. This theory says that truth is not the sort of thing
    one
    > should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about. For
    > pragmatists, "truth" is just the name of a property which all true
    > statements share. It is what is common to "Bacon did not write
    Shakespeare",
    > "It rained yesterday," "E equals mc[squared]," "Love is better than hate,"
    > "_The Allegory of Painting_ was Vermeer's best work," "2 plus 2 is 4," and
    > "There are nondenumerable infinities." Pragmatists doubt that there is
    much
    > to be said for this common feature. They doubt this for the same reason
    they
    > doubt that there is much to be said about the common feature shared by
    such
    > morally praiseworthy actions as Susan leaving her husband, America joining
    > the war against the Nazis, Roger picking up litter from the trail, and the
    > suicide of the Jews at Masada. They see certain acts as good ones to
    > perform, under the circumstances, but doubt that there is anything general
    > and useful to say about what makes them all good."
    >
    > So clearly Rorty thinks that some statements are true, and that some
    actions
    > are better than others. I asked why you think that he thinks that "truth
    > doesn't exist", and you reply with:
    >
    > > A quote from an article by Simon Blackburn entitled "Richard Rorty"
    > > answers your inquiry: (Simon Blackburn is a professor of philosophy at
    > > University of Cambridge.)
    > >
    > > "Non-philosophers who dip into his (Rorty's) writings may come away
    > > intoxicated by the scale, but also astonished by the message. How could
    > > anyone, for example, seriously hold, as Rorty has, that 'truth is what
    > > your contemporaries let you get away with,' or that 'no area of
    > > culture, and no period of history, gets Reality more right than any
    > > other.'? Is it really possible to hold that only 'old-fashioned
    > > metaphysical prigs' talk unblushingly of truth any more?"
    >
    > So you have indirectly found a quote that does not say that "truth doesn't
    > exist" but says "truth is what your contemporaries let you get away with".
    I
    > don't know the context from which that quote was taken (do you?), but
    let's
    > consider it as given here.
    >
    > Two of the statements that Rorty considers true are mathematical. They are
    > true because they are deducible from explicit definitions and axioms, that
    > is, assumptions. One of them (that there are nondenumerable infinities)
    uses
    > axioms that not all philosophers of mathematics accept (they do not assume
    > that the law of the excluded middle applies to infinite sets). So if
    > contempory mathematicians _on the whole_ agreed with those philosophers
    > (currently they do not), then that statement would no longer be something
    > that is considered true.
    >
    > My point being that even in mathematics, "what is true" can change (the
    > famous example being Euclid's fifth postulate). So what do you have in
    mind
    > concerning truths that have some justification beyond "what your
    > contemporaries let you get away with?" And what assumptions do you bring
    to
    > bear to provide that justification? That is, what is your "philosophically
    > interesting theory about truth"?
    >
    > Now if you have one, the odds are that Rorty will not find it
    > philosophically interesting. In that case, when you and Rorty argue you
    are
    > mutually begging the question that that hypothetical theory of yours *is*
    > philosophically interesting. That is all that Matt is trying to say.
    >
    > >
    > > Incidentally, as a collector of bon mots from the MD I find the
    > > following from you posted last Jan 15 to be a gem:
    > >
    > > "What I find disingenuous is when you (Matt) say you don't want to be
    > > led back to metaphysics. What you and Rorty are doing is assuming a
    > > metaphysical stance as given and making points from it, and then
    > > claiming 'we don't do metaphysics.'"
    >
    > I disagree with Rorty (and Matt) with respect to their materialism. That's
    > where arguments between me and Matt end up begging the question (which in
    > this case turns out to be that we have different definitions of
    > 'metaphysics', and neither of us wants to giive his up). I do not disagree
    > with their pragmatism. I do criticize Rorty for sometimes confusing the
    two,
    > that is, for sometimes saying "pragmatists think that..." when he should
    be
    > saying "materialists think that..."
    >
    > >
    > > Likewise, what I find so ludicrous in Rorty's and the postmodernists'
    > > position is their determination to advance their own concepts of truth
    > > while simultaneously denying there is such a thing. They assert general
    > > truths while claiming in the same breath that general truths don't
    > > exist. Example: "We know it to be absolutely true that truth is
    > > provisional."
    >
    > See the initial quote. Rorty does not deny that there are true statements.
    > And "Love is better than hate" sounds pretty general to me. So this claim
    of
    > yours that Rorty denies that he has a concept of truth is simply false,
    and
    > so your accusation of illogicality is bogus.
    >
    > Apparently you think that if one does not have a philosophically
    interesting
    > theory of truth, then one must think that the word "true" has no meaning.
    > Since the vast majority of people have no interest in philosophy at all,
    yet
    > all use the word 'true', it should be obvious that one does not need such
    a
    > theory.
    >
    > >
    > > I consider Rorty and his fellow travelers dangerous to a free society
    > > because without confidence in the concept of truth (and it's companion,
    > > logic), the public is disarmed against lies. ("I did not have sex with
    > > that woman . . ." is still being defended by many as a statement of
    > > fact.)
    >
    > Are you also one who blames Nietzsche for the Nazis? What -- in Rorty, not
    > in his "fellow travellers" -- do you find illogical?
    >
    > >
    > > Rorty wants to rid society of the idea of objective truth independent
    > > of our wishes and whims, substituting the idea of communal
    > > justification for belief, i.e., if everybody (defined as the power
    > > elite in charge at the moment) says diversity is good, then it must be
    > > true that diversity is good.
    >
    > Here you are rhetorically twisting what Rorty says ("Wishes and whims",
    for
    > example). Rorty's position is not "think whatever you like to be true",
    but
    > that he doubts that one can find some method for deciding in all cases
    what
    > is true. So does Pirsig, with respect to finding in all cases what is
    moral.
    > If everybody says diversity is good, then Rorty's conclusion from that is
    > that everybody says diversity is good, not that it is good in some
    absolute
    > sense. If everybody finds diversity is bad, then everybody finds diversity
    > is bad. Many people now find diversity is good. Many people now find
    > diversity is bad. Do you have access to God's opinion on the matter? If
    not,
    > what is your method for determining whether it is good or bad -- and what
    > assumptions to you bring to bear to make that determination? Can you
    > distinguish between those (like Rorty) who say diversity is good in that
    we
    > can learn from other cultures, and hence increase the dynamic in our
    lives,
    > versus those (unlike Rorty) who say that all cultures are equally good?
    >
    > On the "power elite" business. The same people who speak political
    > correctness were by and large against the war in Iraq. They were unable to
    > stop the war. So how powerful are they?
    >
    > > Naturally the individual voice that's
    > > raised against such "conventional wisdom" is pilloried.
    >
    > As it always has been. Used to be the individual who disagreed with
    > conventional wisdom was burned at the stake, in part because the
    > "conventional wisdom" was not thought to be such, but thought to be the
    word
    > of God. Do you find that preferable?
    >
    > It's no mystery
    > > why college campuses today have strict, politically correct speech
    > > codes. It's the predictable consequence of Rorty's "intersubjective
    > > agreement" which is a simply a not-so-subtle disguise for raw, power
    > > politics.
    >
    > A slippery-slope argument. Having strict, politically correct speech
    codes
    > is a form of censorship. Rorty is against censorship. You are blaming
    Rorty
    > for something that he is against.
    >
    > > To put it simply, Rorty's views are abhorrent to anyone who puts a high
    > > premium on intellectual freedom and integrity.
    >
    > That is your opinion, it is not mine. In fact, I see Rorty as one who puts
    a
    > high premium on intellectual freedom and integrity, while what I see in
    your
    > comments is
    >
    > a) a case of mistaking the ideas of supposed "fellow travellers" for those
    > of Rorty, and
    > b) distorting Rorty's views to make spurious claims of illogicality.
    >
    > Do you know of some absolute standard by which one can determine whose
    > opinion is closer to the truth?
    >
    > - Scott
    >
    >
    >
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