From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Fri Oct 24 2003 - 16:21:11 BST
Scott,
Platt (previously):
> > Here is another quote,
> > this time from Roger Kimball:
> >
> > "In brief, Rorty wants a philosophy . . . which 'aims at continuing
> > the conversation rather than at discovering truth.' He can manage to
> > abide by 'truths' with a small t (like in your Rorty quote above) and
> > in the plural: truths that we don't take to seriously and wouldn't
> > dream of foisting upon others; truths in other words that are true
> > merely be linguistic conventions: truths, that is to say, that are not
> > true." What he cannot bear--and cannot bear to have us bear--is the
> > idea of Truth that is somehow more than that."
>
> I think you and Kimball are misunderstanding the concept of truth with a
> small 't'. That a tiger is coming at you is a small 't' truth, yet one
> takes it extremely seriously. That totalitarianism is evil is another
> small 't' truth, which Rorty thinks should be foisted upon others. All
> that Rorty is saying that he doesn't expect *philosophy* to be a means
> of coming up with a sure-fire method to distinguish the true from the
> false. The methods already exist. Philosophy may help in making them
> more explicit, but it won't establish them, in the sense of providing
> unshakable foundations.
But, you say that sure-fire methods already exist for distinguishing
the true from the false. If they are 'sure-fire,' they must be
unshakable and foundational, right? Or, are the methods that already
exist subject to change by one group or another as Rorty would have us
believe?
> Big 'T' Truths are things like "God exists". If someone does not agree
> with it, there is no way to "compel" him to believe it through logic or
> experience. See below about logic and Truth.
So you believe that small t truths are determined by scientific methods
rather than "useful vocabularies" or "linguistic conventions" as Rorty
claims? And, am I correct in assuming Rorty denies the existence of God
or any such big T truths?
> > Agree. People don't need a theory of truth any more than they need a
> > theory of value. Just as they have a sense of value, they have a sense
> > of truth.
>
> So what is your difference from Rorty?
Does Rorty say we possess a sense of value and truth like a sense of
sight and taste? Pirsig does.
> > Does Rorty offer any evidence that we can "increase the dynamic in our
> > lives" (whatever that means) by what we can learn from other cultures?
>
> Pirsig does: the brujo story.
Pirsig's lesson from the brujo story is less what we can learn from the
Zuni culture than how DQ influences individuals.
> > > > Naturally the individual voice that's
> > > > raised against such "conventional wisdom" is pilloried.
> > >
> > > As it always has been. Used to be the individual who disagreed with
> > > conventional wisdom was burned at the stake, in part because the
> > > "conventional wisdom" was not thought to be such, but thought to be
> > > the word of God. Do you find that preferable?
> >
> > Is that a serious question?
>
> Yes an no. No, I don't seriously think you would find burning at the
> stake acceptable. Yes, in the sense of reminding you that belief in
> Truth has killed many people, and still does.
May I also remind you that refusal to believe in Truth has killed many
people and still does? Germans in the 20th century refused to believe
the self-evident Truth that "all men are created equal" etc. and
suffered the consequences. Depends on whose side you're on doesn't it?
Or perhaps more truthfully, whose side wins.
> > What are your tests of truth?
>
> Depends on the statement in question. Different kinds of true statements
> require different methods of verification. Being true by correspondence
> works for sense-perceptible particulars (e.g, "It is raining").
> Physics
> theories are true by the tests you mention. Metaphysical theories I do
> not consider true or false. Rather, they are more likely or less likely
> to lead one to Truth, that is to be salvific (salvation making, in a
> theological sense). (By Truth I mean something indefinable, and so not
> amenable to Aristotelian logic.)
In response to my follow up question you allowed as how the "logic of
contradictory identity" is not a big T truth since it is logic, a
pattern of thinking. You then confirmed your concept of big T truth as
being beyond definition and thus beyond concepts, like Pirsig's Dynamic
Quality.
It seems to me, however, that for both you and Pirsig, the postulate of
big T truth and/or DQ is itself a big T truth. Just as you pointed out
to Matt that his attempt to deny metaphysics was itself a form of
metaphysics, so to the attempt to affirm or deny truth requires an
appeal to truth, either small t or big T, depending on context.
Like science cannot deny Quality, philosophy cannot deny Truth. Or so a
rational, coherent viewpoint would seem to demand.
Platt
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