From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Sun Oct 26 2003 - 14:33:17 GMT
Hi all
I feel that I agree with part of both sides of this argument.
Here is my position:
A White-European Empire builder is confronted
with a Black-African tribeman. He has many wives,
he leaves his ill child in the bush to die, he kills a chicken
to make an important decision, etc. So the European thinks
the African is immoral and savage and primitive. He believes
his views to be the truth. Now a time travelling Rorty trained
philosopher and his Pirsig reading mystic friend turn up on the
scene from the USA.
The Rorty reading philosopher may argue with the European
that his assumptions are not valid, his self-certainty can be undermined
by questioning the metaphysics that underlie his certainty, and the faith
that is interwoven with his social up-bringing. There is no position from
where to judge between the African and the European as to who is
closer to the truth, hence the idea of truth has little use. We can say well
done Mr Rorty reading philosopher in attempting to stop the European
destroying the African culture, although the impact of the European is
unstoppable as soon as he steps on sure, but perhaps the violence
can be avoided.
His Pirsig reading friend,a woman, also examines the situation. This is less
easy
to analyse. The Pirsig student thinks they are both primitive. Perhaps,
the African more so. There is a danger that this placing on levels allows
for
the exploitation or condemnation of one level over another, or being higher
within a given level. But she is aware of this danger (that the Rorty
philosopher does
not have to be troubled by in his philosophy) and does not want to allow
any such values to be justified. In a way the European life style is more
advanced
than the African in the sense of requiring certain later historical
developments to be
possible. But the European is sort of unbalanced by his development. His
subject-object
metaphysics commits him to a practical world where he seeks power and
control over
nature as he strides towards his version of civilisation. Violence seems an
acceptable means
to his ends. The European sees the world through very narrow metaphysical
glasses, and is
incapable of seeing the African's quality of life. Whereas, the African (I
apologise for the stereotyping here),
is pre-SOM thinking, is embedded in a rich culture, that is in touch with
many aspects of reality
and is living a life richer in quality and meaning than the European. Our
Pirsig reader has strong mystical
leanings and feels that in some ways she has more in common with the
African. She feels that there is
such a thing as truth, that she has always been seeking truth. She can see
the European has more knowledge
but does the African know more of truth? She decides to argue with the
European as well because she
thinks that a unique aspect of truth is represented by the African, somehow
we would have less truth,
perhaps less chance of advancing if the African culture were destroyed. This
is what Pirsig advances with
his views of the impact of the US Indians on US culture.
So, with either time traveller we try to protect the African culture from
destruction, although you can't
protect from influence in a Star Trek type X (don't know enough Star Trek to
give you the number)
directive manner -i.e. no interference of so-called primitive cultures. But
the 2 views are different. I
sypathise with the Rorty traveller who is afraid of truth-reason and its use
in justifying exploitation
and failing to see the value of difference. But, in the correct manner, the
Pirsig thinker is also
acceptable, I think preferable. But her version of truth has to be one of
seeking rather than of possessing
if it is not to be dangerous. She is aware that DQ is always on the move,
that we can never say, yes, now we have
the whole truth. She has a concept of quality that is holistic and does not
wish to banish aspects of human experience
as some how primitive or supernatural. Both travellers wish to keep dialogue
and history going. The Rorty traveller
has mainly negative reasons, the Pirsig traveller positive ones. I am not
sure I can put that much of a knife between
the implications of their views about truth. Over to you guys to do it.
regards
David M
----- Original Message -----
From: "David Buchanan" <DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Saturday, October 25, 2003 9:19 PM
Subject: RE: MD What makes an idea dangerous?
> Andy and all MOQers:
>
> dmb says:
> I've trimmed your post into two chunks. The first one is a collection of
all
> the statements that seem to get right at your main confession, your main
> point. The second chunk is your (Andy's) concluding paragraph.
>
> Andy said:
> I, being a pacifist, would resort to (bullets) only as a last resort.
> However, I might not protest too much if others took up arms to quiet a
> growing influence of Nazi and fascist ideas. ...I can't take the high
> ground. Because I also feel that society would be better off if certain
> individuals who held dangerous ideas would come to meet sudden and tragic
> ends. I don't think I would shed any tears over their loss. ...I have to
> admit that I think Platt's ideas are dangerous. I don't think he is too
far
> removed from fascism. ...I can't take the high ground if I think the world
> would be better off without individuals who hold views such Platt's. ...I
> don't think I would shed many tears if those responsible for these
policies
> met a tragic end. ...I was appalled until I realized that I might have the
> same feelings if an archconservative met a similar fate. (as Wellstone's)
>
> dmb says:
> I imagine everyone can relate to what you're saying. There is a dark side,
a
> hateful, murderous, genocidal impulse in the human heart. Maybe its a
> vestige of our evolutionary past as animals and fierce tribalists, when
> killing your competitors was a good thing, a moral thing to do. We rightly
> think of such impulses as evil now and in Pirsigian terms, that's because
> such impulses are lower level values trying to assert themselves, are the
> voice of the Giant within us. (Jungian psychology says that the ability to
> experience and admit one's dark side (without acting on it) is a sign of
> good mental health.)
>
> Obviously, we don't translate that feeling into a criminal act because we
> know better, just like we wouldn't turn lust at the supermarket into an
> actual sex act. Naturally, the question of dangerous ideas is more
> complicated than making the simple observation that crimes are crimes. The
> interesting thing here is, I think, is the subtle way this gets at sorting
> out the value levels within ourselves, the way the values levels are so
> intimately connected to our passions, even dark feelings like ill will and
> murderous hate.
>
> And please believe me when I tell you that the following is not just a
cheap
> segue to the second chuck of Andy's comments, but is very much related to
> the point I'm trying to make here. The MOQ can't rightly be used by NAZI's
> not just because they are used as a concrete example, but because the MOQ
> adds that example to so many others that we get a picture of what social
> values are all about and how they can then be recognized in whatever form
> they appear, even in our own culture and in ourselves.
>
> And finally, it is exactly this orienting generalization that allows us to
> see fascism in our own culture, place and time and not just in 1940s
Europe.
> I mean, the neo-con pussy-hawks, who have only succeeded in making the
world
> a more dangerous place for Americans, are a prime example. Except for the
> occaisionaly bit of lip service paid to principles like freedom and
> democracy, this crew exhibits social level values at almost every
> opportunity. They're all about God, guns and money. They're secretive,
> deceptive and punitive toward their critics. They've shown contempt for
> rights and democracy at home and contempt for international law and
> co-operation in front of the whole world. With with us or you're against
us
> in the pre-emptive wars against the world's "evildoers"? And these
> "crusades" are to be waged by Generals who think "the American people
didn't
> put George W. Bush in the White House, Jesus did.". I mean, if you ever
> wondered what American fascism would look like, just watch the news - FOX
> news. :-)
>
> Andy began his conclusion:
> I don't think Pirsig offers us any way to get through this or tells us how
> to answer the question of what makes an idea dangerous? I think that is
why
> I gravitate towards Rorty and Matt. Philosophy has nothing to say on what
> trait dangerous idea might share.
>
> dmb says:
> Hmmm. I think the MOQ's picture of levels in conflict explains mountians
> about what ideas are considered dangerous to whom and such. The old-timers
> who tried to keep a lid on the Zuni Brujo must have thought he was full of
> dangerous ideas. The Victorians who agreed that "the only good Indian is a
> dead Indian" must have thought the "savages" had all kinds of backward
(and
> evil) ideas. The Jews of Europe must have thought anti-semetic ideas were
> dangerous, etc.
>
> But what really grabbed me here is the last sentence. "Philosophy has
> nothing to say on what trait dangerous ideas might share." It grabbed be
> because Rorty says the same thing about truth. He says...
>
> "For pragmatists, "truth" is just the name of a property which all true
> statements share. ...Pragmatists doubt that there is much to be said for
> this common feature. They doubt this for the same reason they doubt that
> there is much to be said about the common feature shared by praiseworthy
> actions... They see certain acts as good ones to perform, under the
> circumstances, but doubt that there is anything general and useful to say
> about what makes them all good."
>
> Truth is a common feature of true statements. There is little to be said
> about this common feature, nothing general or useful. True statements and
> morally praisworthy acts are just a common features of things about which
we
> have some intersubjective agreement about truth and morality. Truth and
> morality are not things in themselves, but are attributes of particular
> statements and acts. Truth and morality, in and of themselves, don't
really
> exist. They are subjective qualities. Ha! Isn't this the very mess Pirsig
> starts with? I realize that post-modern linguistic espistemology isn't the
> same thing as teaching freshman composition, but the point remains, no? In
> MOQ terms, truth and morality are not just subjective attributes of
> objective realities, they are just as real as rocks and trees.
>
> Andy continued his conclusion:
> Instead we have to come to some agreement through a democratic process.
We
> must be allowed to debate and discuss the merits and the faults of all
> ideas. The other option is to look for some ultimate arbiter of truth, but
> this can only lead, it seems to me, to some level of fundamentalism -
> whether we base this arbitration on the Bible, the Koran, or the MOQ. I
am
> not looking for any comments, just kind of thinking out loud. I think
when
> we use the MOQ as an arbiter, this is what Matt refers to as the Kantian
> reading of Pirsig. I think when we use the MOQ to shed insight into which
> ideas are better for us to hold at this moment in time this is what Matt
> refers to a pragmatist reading of Pirsig. Although it is a struggle, and
I
> (along with Platt and many others) might wish for a Kantian reading, I
think
> the pragmatist reading holds more promise in the end.
>
> dmb says:
> The ultimate arbiter of truth? I honestly don't see how such a concern is
> relevant to the MOQ. I know. The Pragmatists think the choice is between
> intersubjective truths and the ultimate absolute truth, and that we really
> have no choice because there is no such thing as the ultimate truth. I
think
> this is a false dilemma generally, and has nothing to do with the MOQ in
> particular. To believe that Pirsig is offering his MOQ as some kind of
final
> arbiter requires one to ignore most everything he's saying. His picture
> includes the primary reality, but unlike anything like a foundationalist
> metaphysics, that reality in the undefible mystical reality. Everything
> else, the world we can define and know in the ordinary sense, is an
> evolutionary jungle with contingency and provisionality built right in. Is
a
> static reality where cultures and languages and ideas blend with and are
> absorbed by other cultures, languages and ideas. And in that forrest of
> evolving manifestation, truth is a real thing. Its a species of Quality,
> intellectual static quality. It is neither the "Absolute truth" nor the
mere
> "property" of a statement.
>
> Thanks,
> dmb
>
>
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